LexKANDASWAMY versus STATE OF TAMIL NADU
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i· -it- [2008] 10 S.C.R 1103 KANDASWAMY A v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU CRIMINAL APPEAL N0.1111 OF 2008 r ~- JULY 17, 2008 B [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND P. SATHASIVAM, JJ.] , Penal Code, 1860: s. 299, 300, 302 and 304 (Part I) - Cul- pable Homicide - Conviction under s. 302 - Challenge against - Held: In the light of factual scenario and principles laid down c in ss.299 and 300, conviction altered to s.304(Part /). The prosecution case was that appellant-accused in- discriminately cut the deceased which resulted in his death. The trial Court convicted appellant under s.302 IPC and sentenced him to undergo life·imprisonment. The only D stand before the High Court was that the scenario as pro- jected by the prosecution ruled out the application of s.302 IPC. High Court did not find any substance in the plea. In appeal to this Court, the crucial question is the ap- E plicability of the appropriate provision. Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. In the background of the legal principles --r.. and the factual scenario, the inevitable conclusion is that the appropriate conviction would be under s.304 Part I F IPC. Custodial sentence of 10 years would meet the end of justice. [Para 21] [1114 C-D] 2.1. In the scheme of the IPC, culpable homicide is genus and 'murder' its specie. All 'murder' is 'culpable G __._. homicide' but notvice-versa. Speaking generally, 'culpable homicide' sans 'special characteristics of mu'rder is cul- pable homicide not amounting to murder'., For the pur- p~se of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity of 1103 H 1104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 10 S.C.R. 1'· A the generic offence, the IPC. practically recognizes three I degrees of culpable homicide. The first is, what may be called, 'culpable homicide of the first degree'. This is the gravest form of culpable homicide, which is defined in s.300 as 'munter'. The second may be termed as 'culpable ~ -- B homicide of the second degree'. This is punishable un- der the first part of s~304. Then, there is 'culpable homi- cide of the third degree'. This is the _lowest type of cul- pable homicide and the punishment provided for it is also the lowest among the punishments provided for the three c grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable ·under the second part of s.304. [Para 8] [1108 D-Gl 2.2. Clause (b) of s.299 corresponds with clauses (2) and (3) of s.300. The distinguishing feature of the mens rea requisite under clause (2) is the knowledge possessed D. by the offender regarding the particular victim being in ~- such a peculiar condition or state of health that the inter- nal harm caused to him is likely to be fatal; notwithstand- ing the fact that such harm would not in the ordinary way of nature be sufficient to cause death of a person in nor- E mal health or condition. It is noteworthy that the 'inten- tion to cause death' is not an essential requirement of clause (2). Only the intention of causing the bodily injury coupled with the offender's knowledge of the likelihood of such inJury causing the death of the particular victim, F is sufficient to bring the killing within the ambit of this clause. This aspect of clause (2) is borne. out by illustra- tion (b) appended to s.300. Clause (b) of s.299 does not postulate any such knowledge on the part of the offender. Instances of cases falling under clause (2) of s.300 can G be where the assailant causes <!eath by a fist blow inten- tionally given knowing that the victim is suffering from an enlarged liver, or enlarged spleen or diseased heart and such blow is likely to cause death of that particular per- son as a result of the rupture of the liver, or spleen or the H failure of the heart, as the case may be. If the assailant .. . KANDASWAMY v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 1105 had no such knowledge about the disease or special A frailty of the victim, nor an intention to cause death or bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the offence will not be murder, even if the injury which caused the death, was intentionally given. In clause (3) of s.300, instead of the words 'likely to cause B death' occurring in the corresponding clause (b) of s.299, the words "sufficient in the ordinary course of nature" have been used. Obviously, the distinction lies between a bodily injury likely to cause death and a bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. c The distin
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