KANAKARATHANAMMAL versus V. S. LOGANATHA MUDALIAR AND ANOTHER

Citation: [1964] 6 S.C.R. 1 · Decided: 18-01-1963 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 1 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

\ 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
KANAKARATHANAMMAL 
v. 
V. S. LOGANATHA MUDALIAR AND ANOTHER 
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SuBBA RAo, K. N. WANCHOO, 
N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.) 
Hindu Law Women's Rights Act (Mys. IO of 1933), s. I0(2)(h)-
.Scope of Practice-Necessary parties-Who are. 
The appellant in a suit against respondents claimed recovery of 
possession of the properties in ·Schedules 1. 2 and 3 as the sole heir of 
'her mother. She claimed these 'properties exclusively, under s. 12(1) 
(i) of the Mysore Hindu Law Women"s Rights Act, 1933. On chal· 
lenge to her title by respondents she relied on a sale-deed created in 
favour of her mother for a consideration of Rs. 28.000. Respondents 
·set up title in respect of the suit properties in the appellant's father 
alleging that her father had executed a will under whi~h-'respondent 1 
had been appointed an executor and as such. he got possession of the 
properties and hande<l them over to Respondent 2, as directed under 
the will. Alternatively, they urged that even if the property belonged 
to the appellant's mother, she would not be entitled to claim exclusive 
title to it, because by succession it would devolve upon the appellant 
and Iller brothers; and her failure to join her brothers made the suit 
incompetent for non-joinder of necessary parties. 
The trial court ~tis~ 
missed the suit. 
On appeal, the High Court confirmed the decree of 
the trial court. but held that the main property in Schedule I did not 
belong to the appellant's mother, but to her father and the sale-deed 
in respect of the property was taken by her father in the name of her 
mother henami. On appeal by special leave, the 
appellant 
mainly 
contended that the property in question would fall under s. 10(2)(b) 
·of the Act, and not under s. 10(2)(d) as respondents had contended 
'1nd therefore, she would be exclusively entitled to it and the plea of 
non-joinder of her brothers would fail. 
Held: (Per, P. B. Gajendraga'dkar, K. Subba Rao, K. N. Wanchoo 
and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar JJ.). 
It would be straining the language 
of s. i0(2)(b) of the Act to hold that the property purchased in the 
name of the wife with the money gifted to her by her husband should 
be taken to amount to a property gifted under s. 10(2)(b). The re-
quirement of s. !0(2)(b) is that the property which 
is 
the subject-
matter of devolution must itself be a gift from the husband to the 
wife. 
In deciding under which ·class of properties specified by els. 
(b) and (d) of s. 10(2) the present property falls. it would not be 
possible to entertain the argument that the gift of the money and the 
purchase of the property must be treated as one transaction and held 
on that basis that the property itself has been gifted by the husband to 
his wife. 
_134-159 S.C.-1. 
1963 
Decombo, 18. 
2 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
lHJ 
The gift ·that is contemplated 1>y s. M(2)(b) must be a gift of tht 
very property in specie mode by the husband or other relatiom therein 
~....=,Ito-
mentioned. The trial court therefore, was right in holdina that even. 
"· 
if the property belonaed to the appellant's mother. her failure to im-
V. s. L. Mlllloliar plead her brothers who would inherit 
the property alongwith her 
made the suit incompetent. 
In the present case, the estate could be represented only when all 
the three heirs were before the court. When the appellant persisted' 
in proceeding with the suit on the basis that she was exclusively entitl~ 
ell to the suit prope!"ty she took the risk and it was now too late to 
allow her to amend the plaint by adding her brothers at this 
late 
stage. 
Naba Kumar Hazru v. Radheshyam Mahish, A.LR. 1931 P.C., 22S 
followed. 
Per b):udholkar J. 
(disaenting)-Upon the pleadings there is no 
scope for spliting up the transaction into two parts, 
;~., a gift of the 
money by the father to the mother in the first instance and the pur• 
chase by the mother of that property subsequently witb that money. 
1t was ~ot even an alternative contention of the respondents that the 
transaction was in two parts and that what the father gifted was the 
money and not the property. 
It would be indeed an artificial 
way· 
of looking at the transaction, as was done by the trial court. as being 
constitute'd of two parts. Thus the transaction was 
one 
indivisible-
whole and that is, the father provided the money for 
acquiring the 
property in the mother's name. Therefore, in effect it was the father 
who 

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.