KAMLESHWAR PRASAD versus PRADUMANJU AGARWAL (DEAD) BY LRS.
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A B KAMLESHWAR PRASAD v. PRADUMANJU AGARWAL (DEAD) BY LRS. APRIL 2, 1997 [K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, J.T.] Tenancy Law: U.P. Act XIII of 1972-Sec. 21 ( 1) (a~Bona fide use requirement-Landlord requiling the premises for his own bona fide use-Ap- pellate auth01ity satisfied with the bona fide requirement-Landlord dying C dwing the pendency of the w1it petition in the High Court-High Cowt holding that the decree of the appellate autholity has become final and cannot be disturbed-On appeal held bona fide use would not lapse with the death of the landlord as such a need must exist on the date of application for eviction which is the cmcial date. D Constitution of India, 1950 : Articles 226, 227-Decree passed by the competent auth01ity having become final-!11te1ference by the High Court taking into account subsequent event-Not pennissible. Respondent-landlord filed a petition for eviction of the appellant E under sec 21 (1) (a) of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972 inter alia on the ground that he bona fide required the premises for carrying on his own business and he had no other means of livelihood. Appellant filed objections before the prescribed authority which, on consideration of the materials on record, came to the conclusion that the landlord did not require the premises for his own bona fide use. On appeal the appellate authority F reversed the conclusion of the prescribed authority and directed the evic- tion of the appellant. G Appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court. During the penden- cy of the petition, the landlord died and was substituted by his legal heirs. Appellant contended that the landlord having died the bona fide require- ment no longer survived and therefore taking into consideration the subsequent event the court must quash the order of the appellate authority. On behalf of the landlord it was contended that the order of the appellate authority was a decree which had become final and it would not be appropriate to interfere with the decree under Article 226 of the Con- H stitution. It was also contended that the requirement in question must exist 508 [ KAMLESHWAR PRASAD v. P. AGARWAL [PATTANAIK, .I.] 509 on the day the application for eviction was filed and it was no longer open A to the High Court to interfere with the said finding in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226. The High Court held that the decree for eviction had become final and that finality could not be dis- turbed under Article 226. Hence this appeal. Dismissing the appeal, this Court HELD :l. Under the U.P. Act XIII of 1972 the order of the appellate authority is final and the said order is a decree of a competent court which having become final cannot be interfered with the High Court in exercise B of its power of superintendence under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitu- C tion by taking into account any subsequent event which might have hapยท pened. [511-F] 2.1. The landlord needed the premises for starting the business which had been found by the appellate authority. The day of application for eviction is the crucial date on which the tenant incurred the liability of D being evicted from the premises. [511-G] 2.2. The bona fide need cannot be said to have lapsed with the death of the landlord as the business in question can be carried on by his legal heirs. [511-H] CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2576 of 1997. From the Judgment and order dated 17.2.97 of the Allahabad High Court in C.M.W.P. No. 13903 of 1991. Manoj Swamp and Ms. Lalitha Kohli for the Appellant. Ms. Halida Khatoon for the Respondents. The Judgment of the court was delivered by PATTANAIK, J. Leave granted. E F G This appeal by special leave to appeal is directed against the judg- ment dated 17.2.1997 of the Allahabad High Court dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant. The respondent-landlord filed a petition for eviction of the appellant under Section 21(1) (a) of the U.P. Act XIII of H 510 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) 3 S.C.R. A 1972 inter alia on the ground that he bona fide requires the premises for carrying on his own business and he has no other means of livelihood. The tenant- appellant filed objections before the prescrihed authority stating therein that the application for eviction has been filed on false and baseless allegations and in fact the respondent does not need the premises bona B fide for starting his own busine
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