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KAMALADEVI AGARWAL versus STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ORS.

Citation: [2001] SUPP. 4 S.C.R. 284 · Decided: 17-10-2001 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: M.B. SHAH · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

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KAMALADEVI AGARWAL 
v. 
STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ORS. 
OCTOBER 17, 2001 
[M.B. SHAH AND R.P. SETHI, JJ.) 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: 
Section 482-Inherent powers of High Court-Quashing the proceeding 
at initial stage should be exercised sparingly.;_Could be exercised only where 
the allegations do not prima facie disclose the commission of an offence-
Criminal pros_ecution cannot be thwarted at the initial stage- merely because 
civil proceedings are also pending-Nature and scope of civil and criminal 
proceeding and standard of proof required is different and distinct-Criminal 
cases have to be proceeded with in accordance with the procedure as pre-
scribed under the code of criminal procedure and the pendency of a civil action 
in a different court even though higher in status cannot be made a basis for 
quashing of the proceedings. 
The appellant was a partner of a registered firm, carrying on the 
business of Bhujia and allied products with the trade mark 'HALDIRAM 
BHUJIA WALA'. The partnership business was initially commenced in the 
year 1956 with four partners. The firm was reconstituted after admitting a 
partner in place of one retiring partner. Appellant was admitted as a 
partner of the said firm subsequently in the year 1969. An application for 
trade mark of HALDIRAM BHUJIA WALA and IOgo HRB was filed 
before the appropriate authority by all the partners on 29.12.1972 and the 
trade mark was registered on 27.01.81. 
Appellant filed a complaint alleging that four accused persons had 
brought into existence the self-forged deed of dissolution of partnership 
for their personal gains and to the detriment of the firm. The appellant 
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alleged that her son suffered mental shock upon closure of his shop in 
1991, by the order of injunction passed by a Court of law, on the ground of 
dissolution of partnership firm of which appellant was a partner, and that 
her signature as well as other two partners were not genuine and had been 
forged. The Trial Magistrate in his Order dated 5.4.2000 found that appel-
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lanthad made aprimafacie case under Sections 465, 467, 468,471and120-
284 
KAMALADEVI AGARWAL v. STATE 
285 
B IPC against all the accused persons. Therefore, he issued summons for 
their presence on the next date of hearing. The accused respondents in-
stead of appearing before the Magistrate for contesting the case, approached 
the High Court by filing a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing 
the proceeding initiated and process issued against them. Their petition 
was allowed. Hence this appeal. 
It was contended for the appellant that merely because a civil action 
is pending between the parties, it is no ground to quash the proceedi~g; 
that as between civil and criminal proceedings, the criminal matters should 
be given precedence and that only because genuineness of the document is 
required to be determined in both the proceedings, High Court was not 
justified in quashing the criminal proceeding, since the onus of proof 
required being different than the proceedings in the civil suit. It was 
contended for the respondents that besides law, propriety demanded that 
when a higher court was seized of the matter, though in civil proceedings, 
Magistrate should have not proceeded the matter by issuance of process. 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
HELD : 1.1. This Court has consistently held that the revisional or 
inherent powers of quashing the proceeding at the initial stage should be 
exercised sparingly and only where allegations, even if taken at the face 
value and accepted in entirety, do not prim a facie disclose the commission 
of offence. Disputed controversial facts cannot be made the basis for the 
exercise of the jurisdiction. Criminal prosecution cannot be thwarted at 
the initial stage because civil proceedings are also pending. [289-B-C] 
R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR (1960) SC 866; Hazari Lal Gupta v. 
Rameshwar Prasad & Am:, AIR (1972) SC 484; State of Karnataka v. L. 
Muniswamy & Ors., AIR (1977) SC 1489; State of Haryana & Ors. v. Ch. 
Bhajan Lal & Ors., AIR (1992) SC 604; Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh 
Agarwal & Ors., [1999] 8 SCC 687; Medchi Chemical Pharma (P) Ltd. v. 
Biological Ltd. & Ors., [2000] 3 SCC 269; Lalmuni Devi (Smt.) v. State of 
Bihar & Ors., [2001) 2 SCC 17 and M. Krishnan v. VUay Singh & Anr., 
Criminal Appeal No. 1028 of 2001 Order dated 11.10.2001, relied on. 
Manju Gupta v. Lt. Col. M.S. Paintal, [1982) 2 SCC 412;

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