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KAMAL JORA versus STATE OF UTTARAKHAND & ANR.

Citation: [2013] 8 S.C.R. 40 · Decided: 01-07-2013 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: A.K. PATNAIK · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

A 
B 
[2013) 8 S.C.R. 40 
KAMAL JORA 
v. 
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND & ANR. 
(Civil Appeal No. 4835 of 2013) 
JULY 01, 2013 
[A.K. PATNAIK AND GYAN SUDHA MISRA, JJ.] 
Municipality: 
C 
Uttar Pradesh Municipal Corporations Act, 1959 - ss.3(2) 
and 8-AA - Dissolution of Municipal Council for its 
upgradation to Municipal Corporation - Without giving 
opportunity of hearing to the Municipal Council - After 
direction of the Court, State invited objections for the same 
D by Public Notice - Municipal Council dissolved - Dissolution 
challenged by the Chairman of the Council on the ground that 
before dissolution, opportunity of hearing not given to the 
Municipal Council - Held: Dissolution of the Council was not 
without hearing the Council as several Municipal Councilors 
E were heard before the dissolution - Constitution of India, 1950 
- Article 2430. 
The State Government by a Notification dissolved the 
Municipal Council, in exercise of powers uls. 3(2) of Uttar 
F Pradesh Municipal Corporations Act, 1959ยท as applicable 
to the State of Uttarakhand r/w. Art.243Q(2) of the 
Constitution and s. SAA of the Act. When the Notification 
was challenged by the appellant on the ground that 
opportunity of hearing was not given to the Municipal 
G Council before its dissolution, the Court held that 
opportunity of hearing should have been given and 
quashed the Notification. Thereafter, the State issued 
public notice inviting objection to conversion of the 
40 
H 
KAMAL JORA v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND & ANR. 
41 
Municipal Council to Municipal Corporation. Date of A 
hearing was also fixed and several Municipal Councilors 
were heard. Subsequently, the State issued two 
Notifications and declared conversion of the Municipal 
Council to Municipal Corporation and dissolution of the 
Municipal Council. The appellant again challenged the 
B 
two Notifications, by filing writ petition, contending that 
no hearing was granted to the Municipal Council before 
its dissolution. Single Judge of High Court quashed the 
two Notifications. Appeal against the same was allowed 
by the Division Bench of High Court holding that c 
opportunity of hearing was given to all the persons. 
In appeal to this Court, the appellant contended that 
though objections were invited through public notice, but 
no hearing was given to the Municipal Council and yet 
0 
the Municipal Council was dissolved. 
The State contended that dissolution of Municipal 
Council for upgradation to Municipal Corporation cannot 
be termed as dissolution as envisaged under Article 
243U of the Constitution and the proviso to Article 243U 
is not violated, if no opportunity of hearing is given 
before such dissolution. 
Dismissing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1. The earlier judgment of the Division Bench 
of the High Court holding that an opportunity of hearing 
must be given to persons likely to be affected by 
dissolution of the Municipal Council, though not binding 
E 
F 
on this Court is binding on the parties because of the 
G 
principle of res judicata. The State Government being the 
appellant in the aforesaid Special Appeal, cannot now 
contend that a hearing was not required to be granted 
to the Municipal Council, before it issued the two 
H 
42 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2013] 8 S.C.R. 
A 
notifications dissolving the Municipality and appointing 
an Administrator. [Para 11] [49-B-D] 
2. However, the State Government had provided an 
opportunity of hearing to the objectors on their 
B 
respective objections and amongst the objectors there 
were several Municipal Councilors. Hence, the appellant, 
who was the Chairman of the Municipal Council, could 
have also participated in the hearing in support of his 
objections. Thus, there is no infirmity in the impugned 
c 
judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court that 
an opportunity- of hearing was actually given to all 
persons likely to be affected by the two notifications. 
[Para 12) [51-A-D] 
D 
E 
F 
G 
Mohinder Singh Gill a,nd Anr. v. The Chief Election 
Commissioner, New Delhi and Ors. (1978) 1SCC405: 1978 
(2) SCR 272; S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan and Ors. (1980) 4 
SCC 379: 1981 (1) SCR 746; Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union 
of India (1981) 1 SCC 664: 1981 (2) SCR 533; State of 
Maharashtra and Ors. v. Jalgaon Municipal Council and Ors. 
(2003) 9 SCC 731: 2003 (1) SCR 1112 - referred to. 
Case Law Reference: 
1978 (2) SCR 272 
1981 (1) SCR 746 
1981 (2) _SCR 533 
2003 (1) SCR 1112 
referred to 
referred to 
referred to 
refe

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