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KALIYA versus STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

Citation: [2013] 7 S.C.R. 760 · Decided: 23-07-2013 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: B.S. CHAUHAN · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

A 
B 
(2013) 7 S.C.R. 760 
KALIYA .. 
v. 
·STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 
(Criminal Appeal No. ·228 of 2008) 
JULY 23, 2013 
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN ANO. S.A. BOBDE, JJ.] 
. 
. 
PENAL CODE, 1860: 
c 
s. 302- Married woman· burnt alive by her mother-in~law 
(appellant) - Conviction and sentence oflife imprisonment -
Held: In the dying declaration recorded by the doctor, the 
deceased stated that her mother-in-law.poured kerosene on 
her and set her on fire - Carbon copy of dying declaration 
0 
rightly admitted by trial court as secondary evidence - No 
objection was raised at that time - As the incident occurred 
in the house of appellant, and she was present therein at the 
relevant time, she could have furnished the explanation as 
to how and under what circumstances the· victim died - The 
matter was within her special knowledge ""'" Both the courts 
E below rightly held· that appellant was responsible for causing 
the death of deceased - Evidence Act, 1872 - ss. 63 and 65. 
Evidence Act, 1872: 
F 
ss. 63 and 65(c) -- 'Secondary evidence' - Witnesses 
concerned deposing that original dying declaration was not 
traceable - Trial court granting permission to lead secondary. 
evidence and permitting carbon copy to be adduced in 
evidence - Held: In view of provisions of ss. 63 and 65, such 
G a course is permissible. 
H 
The mother-in-law of the deceased (appellant), her 
husband, and the father-in-law faced· trial for offences 
punishable u/ss. 302 and 498-IPC, on the allegation that 
760 
· KALIYA v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 
761 
they burnt alive the deceased for dowry, The trial court A 
convicted all the accused of the offences charged. 
However, the High Court maintained th~<conviction of.the 
appellant u/s, 302-IPC and acquitted the other accused 
of the charges. 
In the instant appeal it was mainly'contended for the 
appellant that since the original dying declaration was not 
filed before the trial court, the carbon copy of the· same 
could not have been exhibited and taken on record. 
Dismissing the appeal, the Court 
B 
c 
HELD: 1.1. There is ample evidence on record to the 
effect that the deceased was admitted to hospital on 
18.6.1984. However, her case sheet could not be 
deposited by the Clerk working in the hospital. PW.18, 
D 
the doctor who examined the deceased, supported the 
case of the prosecution with respect to the admission of 
the deceased in the hospital and further that he recorded 
her dying declaration wherein she stated that when she 
was lying on the bed, her mother-in-law poured kerosene 
E 
on her and set her on fire and ran away. He further 
deposed that the .deceased appended her thumb 
impression on the dying declaration. He also deposed 
that before recording her dying declaration, the deceased 
was in a fit mental condition. His statement stands fully 
corroborated by the evidence of the staff nurse, (PW.5) 
who was present at the time of recording the dying 
declaration. The testimony of both these witnesses 
remained unimpeached. [Para 5] [766-E-H) 
F 
1.2. In the instant case, the dying declaration· G 
produced before the court was the carbon copy of the 
original. PW.16 and PW.17 clearly deposed that even after 
conducting an extensive search, the original dying 
declaration. could not be traced~ The trial court granted 
permission to lead secondary evidence and the same was 
H 
762 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2013] 7 S.C.R. 
A adduced strictly in accordance with law and accepted by 
the courts below. In view of the provisions of SS. 63 and 
65 of the Evidence Act 1872, such a course of action is 
permissible. In case an objection was not raised at the 
time of admission of the secondary evidences, it is 
B precluded from being raised at a belated stage. (Paras 5, 
9 and 10] (766-H; 767-A-B; 768-F-G; 769-0-E] 
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Dal Singh & Ors. AIR 2013 
SC 2059; State of Rajasthan v. Kishore, 1996 (2) SCR 1103 
C =AIR 1996 SC 3035; M. Chandra v. M. Thangamuthu & Anr., 
2010 (11) SCR 38 = (2010) 9 SCC 712; J. Yashoda v. K. 
Shobha Rani, 2007 (5) SCR 367 = AIR 2007 SC 1721 -
relied on 
Mafabhai Nagarbhai Raval v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1992 
D SC 2186; Laxmi v. Om Prakash & Ors., 2001 ( 3) SCR 777 
=AIR 2001 SC 2383 ; Govindappa & Ors. v. State of 
Karnataka, 2010 (6 ) SCR 962 = (2010) 6 SCC 533; H. 
Siddiqui (D) by Lrs. v. A. Ramalingam 2011 (5 ) SCR 587 = 
AIR 2011 SC 1492; Rasiklal Manikchand Dhariwal & Anr. v . 
. E M.S.S. Food Products, 2011 (14) SCR 1141 = (2012) 2 SCC 
196); 

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