KALAWATI W/O DEVAJI DHOTE versus STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
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[2009] 3 S.C.R. 187 _, KALAWATI W/O DEVAJI DHOTE A v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA (Criminal Appeal No. 267 of 2009) FEBRUARY 11, 2009 B [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND ASOK KUMAR GANGUL Y, JJ.] • Penal Code, 1860: c - S.302 - Murder - Trial Court convicting accused on the basis of evidence ofa child witness and the dying declaration - Affirmed by High Court - On appeal, Held: In view of the credible and cogent evidence of the child witness and the dying declaration, no merit in the appeal. D "" The appellant was convicted by the Trial Court for offence under s.302 IPC, relying on the evidence of a child witness and the dying declaration. The conviction was affirmed by the High Court. Hence the appeal. E Dismissing the appeal, the Court ' HELD: 1.1 Though a dying declaration is entitled to ~ great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power is F essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the Court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such nature as to inspire full confidence of the Court in its correctness. The Court has to be on guard that the statement of the G deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or j prompting or a product of imagination. The Court must \ be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the 187 H 188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 3 S.C.R. A assailant. Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction B unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. [Para 6] [194-C] 1.2. The principles governing dying declaration, are: (i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence C that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. (ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base 0 conviction on it, without corroboration. E F G (iii) The Court has to scrutinize the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had an opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. (iv) Where the dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration, the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. (vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does H contain the details as to the occurrence, it is ) I ' KALAWATI W/O DEVAJI DHOTE v. STATE OF 189 MAHARASHTRA not to be rejected. A (viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. B ~ (ix) Normally the Court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to - make the dying declaration looks up to the medical opinion. But where the eye-witness said that the deceased was in a fit and c t conscious state to make the dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. ' (x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the D said declaration cannot be acted upon. (xi) Where there is more than one statement in the nature of dying declaration, one first in point of time must be preferred. Of course, if the E plurality of dying declarations could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, it has to be \ . accepted. [Para 6] [194-G; 196-A] • Smt. Paniben v. State of Gujarat AIR 1992 SC 1817; Munnu Raja & Anr. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (1976) F 2 SCR 764; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Sagar Yadav and Ors. AIR 1985 SC 416; Ramavati Devi v. State of Bihar AIR 1983 SC 164; K. Ramachandra Reddy and Anr. v. The Public Prosecutor AIR 1976 SC 1994; Rasheed Beg v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1974 (4) SCC 264; Kaka Singh v. State G l of M.P. AIR 1982 SC 1021; Ram Manora th and Ors. v. State ' of U.P. 1981 (2) SCC 654; State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurlh1 Laxm
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