KALARIMADATHLL UNNI versus STATE OF KERALA

Citation: [1966] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 230 · Decided: 22-04-1966 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: M. HIDAYATULLAH · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

230 
KALARIMADATlllL UNNI 
v 
STATE OF KERALA 
April 22, 1966 
(M. HIDAYATULI.All A~D V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.J 
Indian Penal Code, ss. 300 and 34-Ingredients of the four clauses 
of the section-Tests-Victim dying of asphvxiation, his mouth and 
nose having been ph1aged--Offence whether murder or cu/.pable 
homicide-"Injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature tq caus., 
death" in terms of cl. 3 proof of-Common intention of acCl/l;fd in a 
case covered by cl. 3. 
The appeUants were convicted of murder under s. 302 read with 
s. 34 I.P.C. on the allegation that they had laid their victim in a drain 
after closing his mouth with adhesive tape and plugging his nose 
with cotton wool soaked in chloroform. as a result of whilh death 
was caused. They appt·aled to this Court by special leave. It was 
contended on their behalf: (i) that their offence did not amount to 
murder but only to culpable homicide under the second part of s. 
304, (ii) that it could not be inferred from the mere fact of death that 
the injury caused by the appellants was sufficient in the ordinary 
course of nature to cause death; this had to be proved bv further evi-
dence and (iii) that th<' ingredients of s. 34 I.P.C. were not satisfied. 
HELD : (i) What distinguishes the ofTenccs of murder and culp-
able homicide is the prPsence of a special 1nens rea \\'hich consists of 
four mental attitudes in the presence of any of which the les9er 
offence becomes the greater. These four mental attitudes arc stated 
in the four clauses of s. 300 I.P.C. (235 BJ 
(ii) The first clause of s. 300 says that culpable homicide is mur-
der if the act by which death is caused is done with the intention of 
causing death. An intention to kill a person brings the matter so 
clearly within the general principle of mens rea as to cause no diffi-
culty. Once the intention to kill is proved. the offence is murder un-
less one of the exceptions applies, in \Vhich case the offence is re-
duced to culpable homicid not amounting to murder. On the facts 
of the present case an intention to cause death 
\Vas 
not 
proved 
against the appellants and the clause thereforl' did not apply. [235 CJ 
(iii) The second clause of the section deals with acL< done with. 
thP. intention of causing surh bodily injury as the offt'nder knows to , 
be likely to cause tho dl'aLh of the pcr!l<m to whom harm is caused. 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
The mental attitude here is two-fold. There is first the intention to 
G 
• 
cause bodily harm and next there is the subjective knowledge that 
death will be the likely consequence. EnRlish Common Law made 
A
no clear distinction bct\veen intention and recklessness but in our 
law tne loresight of the death must be present. Thn mental attitude 
is thus made of t\vo elements-(a) causing an 
intentional 
injury 
and (b) which injury the offender has the foresight to know would 
cause death. The present case could not fall under this clause either. 
H 
bccau~. it could not be said that the appellants who only wanted to 
make their victim uncons<'ious had the subjective knowlc~c of the 
fatal consequences of the bodily harm they were causing. [235 Fl 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
K. 
UNNI V. 
STATE 
231 
(iv) The appellants were however guilty of murder under the 
third clause of s. 300. [237 G-H] 
The third clause discards the test of subjective knowledge. It 
deals with acts done with the intention of causing bodily injury to 
a person and the bodily injury intended to be intlicted is sufficient 
in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. In this clause _the 
result of the intentionally caused injury must be viewed objective-
ly, If the injury that the offender intends causing and does cause 
is sufficient to cause death in the ord;nary way of nature the offence 
is murder whether the offender intended causing death or not and 
whether the offender had a subjective knowledge of the consequen· 
ces or not. [236 BJ 
For the application of this clause it must be first established 
that an injury is caused, next it must be established object;vely 
what the nature of that injury in the ordinary course of nature is. If 
the injury is found to be sufficient to cause death one test is satisfied. 
Then it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that 
very injury and not some other injury and that it was not acciden-
tal or unintentional. [236 C-D] 
Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab [19581 S.C.R. 1495, referred to. 
The bodily injury caused by the appellants was d

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