LexaceLexace Ask the AI ›
βš–οΈ Ask the AI about your situation:πŸš— Car AccidentπŸ’Ό Work / Job🏠 Housing / EvictionπŸ‘ͺ Family / DivorceπŸ“‹ Contract DisputeπŸ’° Money Owed

K.S. VIDYANADAM AND ORS. versus VAIRAVAN

Citation: [1997] 1 S.C.R. 993 · Decided: 06-02-1997 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: B.P. JEEVAN REDDY · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 10 judgment(s) · cites 2 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this case

Judgment (excerpt)

K.S. VIDY ANADAM AND ORS. 
A 
"-
v. 
VAIRAVAN 
... 
FEBRUARY 6, 1997 
B 
[B.P. JEEVAN REDDY AND S.B. MAJMUDAR, JJ.] 
.. 
Specific Relief Act, 1963: Sections 10, 16(c) and 20 . 
Agreement of Sale-Immovable property-Specific performance c 
of-Discretionary power of cowt to grant-Circumstances to be considered in 
exercise of-Readiness and willingness of plaintiff to perf onn his part of the 
conttact-lnference against-Agreement specified period of six months within 
which pl~int!ff Jas 'to purchase stamp papers, tender balance amount of 
consideration and require defendants to execute sale deed-Plaintiff took no 
action for 2-112 years after initial payment of a small amount earnest D 
J. 
money-Suit filed within a period of 3 years under Art. 54 of Limitation 
Act-Held : Even though time was not the essence of contract, it should be 
perf onned within a reasonable time having regard to tenns of contract 
prescribing time limit and nature of property-If property was located in an 
urban area, continuing sharp rise in price in thereof would be a relevant factor E 
for the court to decide whether delay on part of plaintiff would dis entitle him 
the relief of specific perfonnance--Total inaction of plaintiff for 2-112 years 
was a circumstance which weighed against exercise of discretion for grant of 
specific peifonnance of agreement in favour of plaintiff-Contract Act, 1872, 
S. 55---Limitation Act, 1963, Art. 54. 
... 
F 
-I 
The appellants-Defendants 1 to 3 and the respondent- plaintiff 
entered into an agreement on 15.12.1978 for sale of house and in terms of 
the agreement the plaintiff paid a small amount of earnest money. The 
agreement stipulated that within a period of six months the plaintiff has 
to puchase stamp papers, tender the balance amount and call upon the G 
defendants to execute the sale deed and deliver possession of the property. 
It also stipulated that in case of plaintilPs failure in performing his part 
of the contract the defendants would be entitled to forfeit the earnest 
money and that in case of defendants' failure to perform their part of the 
contract, they would be liable to pay double the earnest money. After a 
lapse of 2-1/2 years, on 11.7.1981 the plaintiff issued a notice through his H 
993 
994 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1997] 1 S.C.R. 
A advocate to the defendants stating that he had always been ready and 
willing to perform his part of the contract, that he was sufficiently rich and 
was able to pay the balance amount of consideration as and when required, 
that although period of six months was specified in the agreement, time 
was not the essence of the contract and that ll.uring 15.12.1978 to 11.7.1981, 
B the plaintiff had been requesting the defendants to execute the sale deed 
but the defendants had been seeking time representing that the tenant who 
was in occupation of the house had not vacated. The plaintiff then stated 
that though as per the agreement of sale the defendants were under an 
obligation to deliver vacant possession of the premises but because the 
tenant had not so far vacated the building, the plaintiff was prepared to 
C purchase the building with the tenant. Accordingly, the plaintiff called 
upon Defendants 1 to 3 to execute the sale deed on an agreed date. To this 
notice Defendants 1 to 3 sent a reply stating that time was the essence of the 
contract, that the prices of the property were sharply increasing day-by-day, 
that the tenant was their relation who was always willing and ready to vacate 
D the property and that it was the plaintiff who was not ready and willing to 
complete the transaction and that only when the plaintiff noticed that the 
prices in the locality had gone up three times, had he come forward with the 
suit notici The defendants stated that the plaintiff never approached them 
for anything and that they never made any representation as alleged in the 
IJUit notice. The respondent-plaintiff instituted tl1e suit on 23.8.1981 
E wherein,' while asking for specific performance of the agreement under 
Section 10 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 he also prayed alternatively for 
refundΒ· of the amount paid by him with interest. The trial court rejected 
the plaintiff's case which was supported only by oral evidence and also 
found that after the suit agreement, the plaintiff had purchased two other 
F properties in the years 1979 and 1981 and that he had no ready money to 
pay the balance consideration under the suit agreement. After

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.