K.S DHARMADATAN versus CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND ORS.

Citation: [1979] 3 S.C.R. 832 · Decided: 01-05-1979 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 4 judgment(s) · cites 4 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

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.832 
K. S. DHARMADATAN 
v. 
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND ORS. 
May 1, 1979 
[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND P. S. KAILASAM, JJ.] 
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, Section 6 scope of-Whether sanction 
of competent authority is necessary for prosecution when in fact on the said 
date the employee was out of service, but on appeal in a departmental enquiry, 
he is ordered to be reinstated with retrospective efject--Construction of deeming -
provision. 
The appellant was being prosecuted for offences under sections 120-B, 420, 
471 and 468 read with section 34 I P.C., Section 167 (72) of the Sea Customs 
Act and Section 5(2) read with section 5(l)(d) of the Prevention of Corrup-
tion Act 1947. 
At the time when the charge sheet was filed and the special 
judge took cognizance agains.t th'e appellant sometime in October, 1970, 
the 
appellant ceased to be a public servant and, therefore, no sanction under Section 
6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 was obtained. The depa.rtmental 
enquiry against th'e appellant ended in his dismissal but the President of India 
allowed his appeal ailld set aside the order of removal from service passed by 
the Collector of Customs against him with directiolli'! to treat the period of 
absence from 5-9-1967 till the date of reinstatement as und'er suspension, and 
to institute de novo proceedings against the appellant after rectifying the defect 
in the charge sheet. 
While the departmental 
proceedings were going on, the trial against the 
appeliant proceeded to its logical end except the arguments being heard. 
The 
appellant on being reinstated filed an application before the special Judge pray-
ing that all furth'er proceedings be dropped as the prosecution against the appel-
lant was initiated in the absence of a proper and valid sanction haivi'=lg been 
obtained under Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 
The special 
Judge rejected it and the High Court confirm'ed' the rejection. 
Dismissing the appeal by special leave, the Court 
HELD : 1. Section 6(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 applies 
only where at the time wh'en the offence WM committed the offender was acting 
as a public servant. 
If the offender had ceased to b'e a public servant then 
section 6 would have no application at aU. 
Furthermore, the point of time 
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when the sanction has to be tc..ken must be the time when the Court takes 
cognizance of an offence and not before or after. If at the relevant time, the 
offender was a public servant no sanction under section 6 was necessary at alI. 
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[835E-FJ 
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In the instant case, no sanction under section 6 of the Act was n'ecessary, 
as the appellant had ceased to be a public servant at the time when the cogniz~ 
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ance of the case was taken against him by the special Judge. 
[836E] 
S. A. Venkataraman v. The State, [1958] SCR 1037; C. R. Bansi v. State of 
Maharashtra, [1971] 3 SCR 236 followed. 
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K. s. DHARMADATAN v. CENTRAL GOVT. (Fazal Ali, l.) 
'833 
2. A deeming provision cannot be pushed too far as to result in a mof.t 
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anamolous or absurd position. 
A deeming provision should be confined only 
for the purpose for it is meant. 
[837C, 838A] 
Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. The Modi Sugar Mills Ltd., [1961] 2 
SCR 189; Braithwaite & ·co. India Ltd. v. 
Employees' State Insurance Corpo-
ration, [1968] 1 SCR.771; Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar and Ors., 
(1955] 2 S.C.R. 603; Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay City v. Elphinstone 
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Spinning and JVeaving Mills Co. Ltd., 40 I.T.R. 142; applied. 
3. In the instant case : 
(a) Th'e order of the Pre&ident reinstating the appellant and creating a 
legal fiction regarding the period of suspension must be limited only so far as 
the period of and the incidents of suspension were concen.1ed and could not be 
carried too far as to project it even in cases where actions had already been 
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taken 
[838A-B] 
(b) Th'e dismissal was not a nullity so as to vitiate all proceedings. 
The 
order passed by the President was not an order on merits. It was merely an 
order passed by the President in an appeal M a departmental enquiry and the 
'3:ppellant succ~eded because of a manifest defect in the charge sheet. 
The 
President n'ever intended that the appellant should be deemed to have been 
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reinstated even for the purpose of section 6 of the POCA, 1947 so as to nullify 
acticns completed, consequences ensued or transactions closed. 
In fact when 
the President ob

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