K. RAVEENDRANATHAN NAIR & ANR. versus COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX & OTHERS

Citation: [2017] 11 S.C.R. 389 · Decided: 10-08-2017 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: A.K. SIKRI · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 1 judgment(s) · cites 1 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

[2017] 11 S.C.R. 389 
K. RAVEENDRANATHAN NAIR & ANR. 
v. 
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX & OTHERS 
(Civil Appeal No. 3131 of2006) 
AUGUST 10, 2017 
[A. K. SIKRI AND ASHOK BHUSHAN, JJ.) 
A 
B 
Income Tax Act. 1961 - s.260A (2)(b) - Kera/a Court Fees 
and Suits Valuation Act. 1959 - s.52A, Sch. II - Relevant date for 
payment of court fees for appeals flied against the orders passed 
C 
by Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (!TAT) or Wealth Tax Appellate 
Tribunal - Determination of - s.260A was inserted in the IT Act 
w.efOct. 01, 1998 providing.for appeals against the orders passed 
by !TAT - Sub-sec.2(b) thereof. prescribing fixed court fees of 
Rs.20001- on such appeals was omitted in I 999 - Law of court fee 
in the State of Kera/a governed by the 1959 Act was amended by 
D 
Amendment Act of 2003 which was passed on March 06, 2003 and 
s.52A was inserted therein -Date.from which s.52A became effective 
- Held: Right of appeal gets vested in the litigants at the 
commencement of the !is therefore, such a vested right cannot be 
taken away/impaired or made more stringent or onerous by any 
E 
subsequent legislation unless the subsequent legislation said so 
either expressly or by necessary intendment - The amendment in 
question in the 1959 Act, i.e. s.52A, was made effective from March 
06, 2003 and was not made retrospective - Order of High Court is 
set aside. 
Practice and Procedure -Appeal - Right of- Held: Right of 
appeal is not a matter of procedure hut a substantive right - This 
right gets vested in the litigants at the commencement of the lis, 
therefore, an intention to inte1fere with or impair or imperil such a 
vested right cannot he presumed. 
Allowing the appeals, the Court 
HELD: 1.1 When the proceedings originate in the form of 
a suit filed in the lowest eonrt, it is easy to ascertain that date of 
11ling which becomes governing date for the purpose of payment 
of court fee in respect of appeals, as vested right accrues on the 
389 
F 
G 
H 
390 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017] l l S.C.R. 
date of filing of the initial court proceedings. In tax matters, the 
appeal provisions applicable for assessee would be the one as on 
date of assessment and not the one applicable during the 
assessment period. For revenue appeal, the same would be one 
as on the date disputed demand is negatived by the appellate 
authority and not the one applicable during the period of 
assessment or as on the date of assessment.(Para 7][395-E-F) 
l.2 The High Court in the impugned judgment had accepted 
that right of appeal is not a matter of procedure and that it is a 
substantive right. It also recognised that this right gets vested 
in the litigants at the commencement of the tis and, therefore, 
such a vested right cannot be taken away or cannot be impaired 
or imperilled or made more stringent or onerous by any 
subsequent legislation unless the subsequent legislation said so 
either expressly or by necessary intcndment. An intention to 
interfere with or impair or imperil a vested right cannot be 
presumed unless snch intention be clearly manifested by express 
words or by necessary implication. However, the High Court 
had still dismissed the writ petition as it was of the opinion that 
the vested right of appeal conferred under Section 260A of the 
Income Tax Aict, 1961 insofar as payment of court fee is 
concerned, is taken away by necessary implication. In other 
words, the provisions of Section 52A of the Kerala Court Fees 
and Suits Valuation Act, 1959 inserted by the Amendment Act of 
2003, in that sense, have retrospective operation thereby effecting 
the earlier assessment also. This proposition was advanced with 
the logic that prior to introduction of Section 260A in the IT Act 
with effect from October 01, 1998, there was no right of appeal. 
[Para 12][397-D-G] 
l.3 Such a logic given by the High Court is difficult to accept. 
Before October 01, 1998, in the absence of any statutory right of 
appeal to the High Court, there was no such vested right. At the 
G. same time, the moment Section 260A was added to the statute, 
right to appeal was recognised statutorily. Therefore, in respect 
of those proceedings where assessment orders were passed after 
October 01, 1998, vested right of appeal in the High Court had 
accrued. Same was the position qua Department in respect of 
those cases where the demand raised by the Department stood 
H 
K. RAVEENDRANATHAN NAIR v. COMMISSIONER OF 
391 
INCOME TAX 
nega

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.