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K.NARENDRA versus RIVIERA APARTMENTS (P) LTD.

Citation: [1999] 3 S.C.R. 777 · Decided: 24-05-1999 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: SUJATA V. MANOHAR · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

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~ยท NARENDRA 
A 
v. 
RIVIERA APARTMENTS (P) LTD. 
MAY 24, 1999 
[SUJATA V. MANOHAR AND R.C. LAHOTI, JJ.] 
B 
Specific Relief Act, 1963-Sections 16, 18, 20-Specific performance-
Jurisdiction to decree is discretionary-Scope of-Default on part of 
purchasers in performing their obligations under the contract-Rise in value 
of /and-Possession over a meagre part of property was delivered to C 
purchasers-Performance of contract would involve hardship to seller-
Held, discretionary jurisdiction to decree specific performance not to be 
exercised in favour of purchasers-Award of compensation. 
The appellant entered into an agreement to sell suit property in the 
year 1972, for a sum of Rs. 8,97,740. The total are~ of the_ land was D 
approximately 4000 sq. mtrs. wherein lease hold rights were vested in favour 
of the appellant in terms of a perpetual lease. An amount of Rs. 5000 with 
a cheque for Rs. 2,72,000 which was post dated was given by the purchasers 
respondents with a stipulation that the same was to be encashed by the seller 
after the plans for multi-storeyed buildings as submitted by the purchasers E 
were passed and cleared for construction by the NDMC and L&DO or 
earlier by a mutual agreement. However, the agreement to sell dated 25-7-
1972 did not specifically provides for a time limit within which the agreement 
was to be performed or its performance secured. Subsequently, part of the 
land forming subject matter of the agreement was declared as an excess land 
within the meaning of the Urban Land Ceiling Regulation Act and hence F 
could not have been sold. Part of the land had been acquired by the State and 
to that extent the agreement had been rendered incapable of performance. 
The Land Acquisition Officer estimated the value of the acquiring property 
at Rs. 33,400 per sq. mtr. Possession over a meagre part of the property was 
delivered by the appellant to the respondents. On a major part of the property, G 
the appellant continued to remain in possession. Considering the failure on 
the part of the respondents in securing sanctions/clearance and the difficulties 
created in the way of transfer by Urban Land Ceiling Act, the appellant filed 
a suit in 1979, seeking a decree for a declaration that the agreement to sell 
dated 25-7-1972 had become null and void and impossible of performance and 
a decree for delivery of possession of a portion of the land. In 1980, the H 
777 
778 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1999) 3 S.C.R. 
A respondents filed a suit against the appellant seeking performance of the 
contract for sale and in the alternative to grant a decree for the refund of 
Rs. 3,25,000 with interest and a decree for compensation. The trial Judge 
dismissed that suit. However, the High Court in appeal held that as the 
appellant had got encashed the cheque for Rs. 2,75,000 the appellant was 
B obliged to hand over physical possession of the portion of the suit premises 
which was in his occupation to the respondents. This appeal had been filed 
against the judgment of the High Court. The respondents submitted that 
inspite of a part of area of the property agreed to be transferred having been 
rendered inalienable by the owner on account of its having been acquired by 
the State and part of the property having been found to be inalienable on 
C account of being in excess of the ceiling limit provided by ULCRA, the 
respondents were prepared to have a sale deed executed of such remaining 
part of the property as is available to be transferred and that the ULCRA 
having been repealed, the hurdle of the land being in excess of the ceiling 
had been removed. 
D 
Allowing the appeal, this Court 
HELD: 1.1. Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides that 
the jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary and the 
court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so; 
the discretion of the court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable guided 
E by judicial principles and capable of correction by a court of appeal. 
Performance of the contract involving some hardship on the defendant which 
he did not foresee while non-performance involving no such hardship on the 
plaintiff, is one of the circumstances in which the court may properly exercise 
discretion not to decree specific performance. The doctrine of comparative 
hardship has been statutorily recognized in India. However, mere inadequacy 
F of consideration or the mere fact that the contract is onerou

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