K. M. VISWANATHA PILLAI versus K. M. SHANMUGHAM PILLAI

Citation: [1969] 2 S.C.R. 896 · Decided: 25-11-1969 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: S.M. SIKRI · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

K. M. VISWANATHA PILLAI 
v. 
K. M. SBANMUGHAM PILLAI 
November 25, 1969 
[S. M. SJKRI AND K. S. HEGDE, JJ.J 
Motor Vehicles Act (4 of 1939), ss. 49(1) and 60(1) (c)-Persons 
owning bwes benami-Whether bar for obtaining permit. 
The appellant was the owner of 5 buses. The vehicles stood in the 
name of the respondent, appellant's benamidar, and tbe stage carriage 
permits were also obtained in the respondent's name. The appellant, who 
was running the buses, filed a suit ·claiming the buses along with their 
permits. It was decreed by the trial court, and the lower appellate court 
confirmed the decree in respect of 4 buses. The Higb Court, in further 
appeal, held that the appellant and the respondent together practised fraud 
in contravention of ss. 41(1) and 60(1)(c) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 
1939 in as much as the respondent representing himself to be the owner 
falsely obtained the permits in his own name, and allowed the true 
owner, who had no permit to conduct the actual business and dismissed 
the suit in 1010. 
In appeal this Court, 
HELD : There is nothing in the Motor Vehicles Act, which expressly 
or by implication bars benami 
t'ransactions or persons 
owning buses 
benami and applying for pennits on that basis. 
Section 42( 1) does not require that the owner himself should obtain 
the permit; it only requires the owner to see that the transport vehicles 
shall not be used except in accordance with the conditions of the permit. 
The definition of 'permit' itself shows that all permits need not be in the 
name of the owner because the latter part of the definition shows that 
it is only in the case of a private carrier or a public carrier that a permit 
has to be in the owner's name. The same inference follows from the 
definitions of 'private carrier' and 'public carrier'. 
[899 HJ 
The amerided s. 60(1) (c) provides for one of the contingencies in 
which permit can be cancelled. According to it, it is permissible for the 
Transport Authority to cancel a permit if the holder of it ceases to own 
the vehicle covered by the permit. It is only a permissive clause and the 
Transport Authority has only been given a discretion to cancel the permit 
in that contingency. It may or may not cancel it, even if the holder 
of the permit ceased to own the vehicles eovered by it. 
But it is by 
no means necessary that cl. (c) should be 
applicable to the case of 
every permit holder. There may be permit holders who own the vehicle 
covered by the permit and there may be permit holders who do not own 
the vehicle. This clause appears to apply only to the former case and 
not to the latter. 
[900 B-H] 
Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman, [1952] S.C.R. 583, followed. 
Khal/i/,.ul-Rahman Khan v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, A.LR. 
1963 All. 
383, Gur Narayan v. Sheolal Singh. 
(1919) 46 Cal. 566 
(P.C.) and C.I.T. Gujarat v. Abdul Rahim 
& 
Co., 55 
1.T.R. 651, 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
approved. 
H 
Varadarcjulu Naidu v. Thavasi Nadar, (1963) 2 M.L.J. 20 and 
Chavali Venkataswami v. Chavali Kotayya, 
( 1959) 2 and W.R. 4-07, 
disapproved. 
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VISWANATHA v. SHANMUGHAM (Sikri, J.) 
8 97 
A 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1453 of 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
1966. 
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated September 14, 
1965 of the Madras High Court in Second Appe&l No. 1394 of 
1963. 
A. K. Sen, R. M. Mehta and J. B. Dadachan;i, for the appel-
lant. 
R. Gopalakrishnan, for the respondent. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
Sikri, J. This appeal by certificate granted by the High Court 
of Madras is directed against its judgment and decree modifying 
the decree passed by the District Judge. 
The relevant facts for the determination of the points raised 
before us are as follows : The plaintiff, K. M. Viswanatha Pillai, 
appellant before us and hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff, 
and K. M. Shanmµgham Pillai, respondent before us and here-
inafter referred to as the defendant, were originally members of 
a Joint Hindu Family. On June 29, 1953, the six brothers who 
constituted the Joint Hindu Family entered into a partition of the 
properties belonging to the Joint Family, evidenced by a regis-
tered document Ex. A-35. A motor bus MDH 662 fell to the 
share of the plaintiff. 
At the time of partition the permit was 
not in the name of the defendant and some proceedings for the 
transfer of the permit to his name were pending. Accordingly it 
was provided in the part

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