K. KALIMUTHU versus STATE BY D.S.P.

Citation: [2005] 3 S.C.R. 1 · Decided: 30-03-2005 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: ARIJIT PASAYAT · Disposal: Disposed off
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Judgment (excerpt)

, 
I 
•\ 
f 
K. KALIMUTHU 
A 
V. 
STATE BY D.S.P. 
MARCH 30, 2005 
[ARIJIT PASAYAT AND S.H. KAPADIA, JJ.] 
a 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: 
Section 197-ProteCtion under-Scope and ambit of-Sanction for 
prosecution of public servant-Held: Protection to public servant under Section C 
I 97 is available if the act or omission for which he was charged had reasonable 
connection with the discharge of his official duty-Question relating to sanction, 
need not necessarily be considered as soon as complaint is filed and may be 
determined at a later stage of proceeding. 
Section 197-Applicability of-Discussed 
D 
Words and phrases : 
Cognizance-Meaning of 
.· 
"Official" and "official duty"-Meaning of-Jn the context of Section E 
197 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 
Charge sheet was filed against appellant, a public servant for various 
penal offences. Special Judge found that the cognizance of offence could 
not be taken in the absence of requisite sanction contemplated under F 
Section 197 CrPC. In revision filed by State, High Court held that the 
person claiming protection under section 197 has to show that there is a 
reasonable connection between the act complained of and the discharge 
of official duty and having failed to show the same, appellant is not entitled 
to protection under section 197 CrPC. Aggrieved appellants filed the 
present appeals. 
G 
Disposing of the appeals, the Court 
HELD : 1. The purpose of Section 197 CrPC is to afford adequate 
protection to public servants to ensure that they are not prosecuted-for 
H 
2 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2005) 3 S.C.R. 
A anything done by them in the discharge of their official duties. This 
protection has certain limits and is available only when the alleged act done 
by the public servant is reasonably connected with the discharge of his 
official duty and is not merely a cloak for doing the objectionable act. The 
question is not as to the nature of the offence such as whether the alleged 
offence contained an element necessarily dependent upon the offender 
B being a public servant, but whether it was committed by a public servant 
acting or purporting to act as such in the discharge of his official capacity. 
It is not the duty which requires examination so much as the act, because 
the official act can be performed both in the discharge of the official duty 
as well as in dereliction of it. If the omission or neglect on the part of the 
C public servant to commit the act complained of could have made him 
answerable for a charge of dereliction of his official duty, it may be said 
that such act was committed by the public servant while acting in the 
discharge of his official duty and there was every connection with the act 
complained of and the official duty of the public servant. Thus, the concept 
of Section 197 does not get immediately attracted on institution of the 
D complaint case. [5-F-G, H; 6-A, B, C-D) 
Bakhshish Singh Brar v. Smt. Gurmej Kaur and Anr., AIR (1988) SC 
257 and P. Arulswami v. State of Madras, AIR (1967) SC 776, referred to. 
2. The mandatory character of the protection afforded to a public 
E servant is brought out by the expression, 'no court shall take cognizance 
of such offence except with the previous sanction'. Use of the words, 'no' 
and 'shall' shows that the bar on the exercise of power by the court to 
fake cognizance of any offence is absolute and complete. The very 
cognizance is barred. A court, therefore, is precluded from entertaining 
p a complaint or taking notice of it or exercising jurisdiction if it is in respect 
of a public servant who is accused of an offence alleged to have been 
committed during discharge of his official duty. (8-A-C] 
3. Use of the expression, 'official duty' implies that the act or omission 
must have been done by the public servant in the course of his service and 
G that it should have been in discharge of his duty. The Section does not 
extend its protective cover to every act or omission done by a public 
servant in service but restricts its scope of operation to only those acts or 
omissions which are done by a public servant. in discharge of official duty. 
The Section has, thus, to be construed strictly, while determin,ing its 
H applicability to any act or omission in course of service. Once it is 
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K. KALIMUTHU v. STATE BY D.S.P. [PASAYAT, J.] 
3 
established that act or omission was done by the public servant while A 
discharging his duty then the scope of its b
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