K. H. NAZAR versus MATHEW K. JACOB & ORS.

Citation: [2019] 14 S.C.R. 928 · Decided: 30-09-2019 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: L. NAGESWARA RAO · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 4 judgment(s) · cites 4 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
928
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 14 S.C.R.
 K. H. NAZAR
          v.
  MATHEW K. JACOB & ORS.
  (Civil Appeal Nos.7699-7700 of 2019)
  SEPTEMBER 30, 2019
 [L. NAGESWARA RAO AND HEMANT GUPTA, JJ.]
Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 – ss.2(5) and 81(1)(q) – Width
and amplitude of the expression ‘commercial site’ – Appellant
requested environmental clearance to carry out quarrying
operations on land – Permission was granted – Writ petition was
filed by Respondent Nos.1 & 2 – Respondents objected that the
land in question cannot be used for a purpose other than plantation,
especially for quarrying operations – Single Judge of the High
Court doubted the correctness of the judgment passed by the
Division Bench of the High Court in State of Kerala v. Mohammedali
Haji, which held that quarry falls within the ambit of ‘commercial
site’ and it was exempted from the applicability of the Act – Single
Judge referred the matter to the larger Bench – In the larger Bench,
the majority opinion was in favour of the Respondent Nos.1 & .2
and held that land which is used for quarrying is not covered by
the expression ‘commercial site’, therefore, there can be no exemption
of such land from the Act – On appeal, held: There is a definite
distinction between the expression ‘lands’ and ‘sites’ in the context
in which they have been used in the Act – Commercial sites read
along with the other clauses dealing with sites clearly indicate that
land occupied by structure is described as ‘site’ – The expression
‘commercial site’ cannot take into its fold vacant lands, including
lands used for the purpose of quarrying – It has a restrictive meaning
in comparison to the other categories of ‘land’ in s.81 – Therefore,
quarry cannot fit into the terms ‘commercial site’ – There is no error
in the majority opinion of the Full Bench of the High Court – Appeals
dismissed.
Interpretation of Statutes – Beneficial legislation – Held:
Provisions of a beneficial legislation have to be construed with a
purpose-oriented approach – The Act should receive a liberal
 [2019] 14 S.C.R. 928
928
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
929
construction to promote its objects – Also, literal construction of
the provisions of a beneficial legislation has to be avoided – It is
the Court’s duty to discern the intention of the legislature in making
the law – Once such an intention is ascertained, the statute should
receive a purposeful or functional interpretation – Exceptions to
beneficial legislation should be narrowly interpreted.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. While interpreting a statute, the problem or
mischief that the statute was designed to remedy should first be
identified and then a construction that suppresses the problem
and advances the remedy should be adopted. It is settled law
that exemption clauses in beneficial or social welfare legislations
should be given strict construction. [Para 13] [939-F]
2. There is no dispute that the Kerala Land Reforms Act,
1963 is a beneficial legislation.  The extent of land that can be
held is fixed and any land in excess has to be surrendered to the
Government, which is distributed in favour of the landless in the
State.  The interpretation of the provisions of the Act should be
in a manner which promote the said object. [Para 14] [940-B]
3.  Section 81 exempts among others, lands comprised of
mills, factories or workshops, lands occupied by educational
institutions, and lands owned by Universities, religious and
charitable institutions.  House sites, sites of temples, churches
and mosques, sites of buildings including warehouses and
commercial sites are also exempted.   There is a definite
distinction between the expressions ‘lands’ and ‘sites’ in the
context in which they have been used.  Commercial sites read
along with the other clauses dealing with sites clearly indicate
that land occupied by structures is described as ‘site’. As stated
above, the other clauses in Section 81 dealing with sites are house
sites, temples, churches and mosques and buildings.   As such,
the expression ‘commercial site’ cannot take into its fold vacant
lands, including lands used for the purpose of quarrying.  It has a
restrictive meaning in comparison to the other categories of ‘land’
in Section 81.  Therefore, quarry cannot fit into the terms
‘commercial site’.  The Appellant contended that digging the land
    K. H. NAZAR  v.  MATHEW K. JACOB & ORS.
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
930
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 14 S.C.R.
for extracting stones is for a c

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.