K. GOPAL REDDY versus STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

Citation: [1979] 2 S.C.R. 363 · Decided: 22-11-1978 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: JASWANT SINGH, O. CHINNAPPA REDDY

Cited by 5 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

363 
K. GOPAL REDDY 
V. 
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 
November 22, 1978 
(JASWANT SINGH AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.j 
Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal 
Appellate 
JurisdictkJn) 
Act, 
1970-Appellant acquitted by trial court on the ground that two views were 
pcssible on the evidence-High Court convtcted and sentenced hhn-AppeUate 
G'ourt-TVhc11 cn11 review evidence-
Words a11d phrases-"Proof beyond reasonable doubt' n1eani11g of. 
The iappellant was charged with the offence of committing the murder of 
his wife. 
The trial court acquitted him on the ground that the prosecution 
had failed to establish any motive for the offence, that the evidence of the 
prosecution witnesses was discrepant, conflicting and improbable 
and that 
when two views were possible on the basis of two divergent versions given by 
the prosecution and the defence, the benefit of doubt should be given to the 
accused. 
The High Court reversed the order of !acquittal and convicted and sentenc-
ed the appellant to imprisonment for life on the view that the trial court 
had magnified the importance to be attached to the discrepancies which were 
of a minor nature. 
In appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant 
the.,t 
B 
c 
D 
in aJI c·ases \vhere two views of the evidence were possible the accused was 
E 
entitled to the benefit of doubt arising from the two views and that on this 
principle the High Court should not have interfered with the order of acquittal 
merely because another view Mis also possible. 
Dismissing the appeal, 
llELD ; (1) Where the trial court allow~ itself to be beset with fanciful 
doubts, rejects creditworthy evidence for slender reasons and takes a view of 
the 
evidence 
which 
is but barely poSsible, it is the obvious duty of the 
High €ourt to interfere in the interest of justice. lest the admini.;tration 
of 
justice be brought to ridicule. 
f370DJ 
(2) After the deci11:ion of this Court in Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan 
(AIR 1961 SC 715) this Court has consistently recognised the right 
of the 
appellate court to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclu-
sion bearing in mind the considerations mentioned hy the Privy Council 
i•_1 
Sheo Swarup v. Emperor (61 I.A. 389). 
Occasionally phrases like 
"mani-
festly illegal'', "grossly unjust" have been m1ed to de.cribe 
the 
ocders of 
acquittt\J which warrant interference. But such expre:Mions have been 
U3ed. 
more as :flourishes of language to emphasise the reluctanc.e of the appellate 
court to interfere \vith an order of acquittal than to curtail the power of the 
appellate court to review the entire evidence and to come to its own con-
dasion. 
In two other cases it has been held that io the principles laid down 
in 
Sanwat 
Singh's 
oose 
may added the further principle that if :wo· 
F 
u 
J 
A 
B 
c 
D 
364 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1979) 2 S.C.R. 
reasonable conclusions could be reached on the basis of the evidence on 
record the appellate court should not disturb the finding of the trial 
court. 
This principle stems out of the fundamental principle of our criminal juris~ 
prudence that the accused is entitled to the benefit of any reasonable doubt-
Jf two reasoniably probable and evenly balanced views of the eyidence arc 
possible, one must necessarily concede the existence of a reasonable doubt. 
But fanciful and remote possibilities must be left out of account. To entitle 
an accused person to the benefit. of a doubt arising fro·m the possibility of 
la duality of views, the possible view in favour of the accused must be 
as 
nearly reasonably probable as that against him. If the preponderance of 
probability fa all one way, a bare possibility _of another view will not entitle 
the accused to claim the benefit of any doubt. It is, therefore essentilail that, 
any view of the evidence in favoYr of the accused must be reasonable even 
as any doubt, the benefit of which an accused person may claim, 
must be 
reasonable. 
A reasonbble doubt does not mean some light, airy, insubstantial 
doubt that may flit through the mind of a Judge about almost anything at 
any time or other, it does not mean a doubt begotten by sympathy 
out of 
reluctance to convict, it means a real doubt, a doubt founded upon reason. 
"Proof beyond a reasonable doubt'' does not mean proof beyond a shadow 
of doubt. 
The la\\' would fail to protect the community if 
it 
admitted 
fanciful 
po~sibilitics to deflect the course of justice. If the 
evi

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.