K.C.THOMAS, FIRST INCOME-TAX OFFICER, BOMBAY versus VASANT HIRALAL SHAH & ORS.
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6 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 437 are, therefore, unable to accept the contention of learned counsel. For the foregoing reasons we allow the appeal and quash the writ of certiorari issued by the High Court. It may be mentioned that in the absence of a stay of proceedings by the High Court the Income-tax Officer has actually made an assessment in pursuance of the impugned notice. That assessment wii.1 stand unless it is modified or annulled in any proceeding permitted by law. Costs of the appeal and the petition before the High Court will be borne by tbe respon- dent. ORDER BY COURT In view of the judgment of the majority, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. K. C. THOMAS, FIRST INCOME-TAX OFFICER, BOMBAY v. VASANT HIRALAL SHAH & ORS. (B. P. SINHA, C.J., K. SuBBA RAo, RAGHUBAR DAYAL, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.) Income Tax-Escaped income-Notice issued for assessment after expiry of 8 years-If sanction required-Indian lncom1-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922). ss. 34(i), 34(ii), 34(3) proviso. os amended b1 Act XXV of 1953 and Act XVIl of 1956. The appellant had issued notice to the respondents under s. 34( I) (a) of the Income Tax Act, 1922 in respect of an escaped income of Rs. 47,595 for the assessment year 1944-45. The ca.e of tte respondents was that the, impugned notice was bad because the Income-Tax Officer proceeded against the respondents without obtaining the necessary sanc- tion of the Central Board of Revenue as required by cl. (iii) of the pro- viso to s. 34(1) of the Act. The respondents filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the notice issued under s. 34( I) of the Act. The respondents succeeded bofore the High Court. 1964 1. T. Officer, A-Ward, Sitapur v. Murlidhar Bhagwandas, Lakhimpurkheri M11dho/kar J. 1964 January, 29 1964 K. ยท C. Thomas, /, T. O/fic<r, Bombay .. V. H. Shah SUPREME COURT REPORTS Held: (i) The sanction under cl. (iii) of the proviso to s. 34(1) is, however, necessary only where the notice in question is issued under cl. (ii) of the proviso. That is evidently what the legislature meant when it said "in aDf case falling under cl. (ii)". The words "in any case" used in cl. (iii) only mean a case in which notice can be issued under cl. (ii). Such a notice can be issued only when. the escaped income is of one lakh of rupees and over. Clause (iii) requires such !ianction where the notice is issued under cl. (ii) and when on a construction of cl. (ii). no notice can be issued with respect to a class of escaped asse:ss- ments, there can possibly be no requirement of the sanction of the Cent- ral Board of Revenue. If a notice is issued by virtue of some other pr~ vision euch as the second proviso to sub-s. (3) of s. 34, it would be a notice "!n any other cas~" referred to in cl. (iii) of the proviso to subยทs. (J) o( 'ยท 34 and in such a case the sanction which is required is only that of the Commissioner. Such a sanction was obtained in this case and therefore, the notice cannot be said to be bad because the sanction of the Central Board of Revenue had not been obtained. In the present case the income which has escaped assessment is below one lakh of rupees and more than eight years have elapsed since tho assessment year in respect of which the income is alleged to have escaped assessment. Clearly, therefore, no notice could issue under cl. (ii). (ii) The High Court erred in holding that the provisions of the 8Ccond proviso to s. 34(3) would not apply to a case where the escaped assess- ment is of an amount less than a lakh of rupees and more than eight years have elapsed. Apparently, the High Court has overlooked the fact that the second proviso to sub-s. (3) of s. 34 was amended first by Act 25 of .1953 and then by Act. 18 of 1956. The amendment of 1956 would govern the whole of s. 34( l) and would consequently include even an escaped assessment with respect to which limitation is provided in cl. (ii) of the first proviso to s. 34(1). The result would be the same even if the case fell to be governed by the Amending Act of 1953, though not by that of the Amending Act of 1956. CML APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 688 of 1962. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated April l, 1958 of the Bombay High Court in Misc. Application No. 202 of 1957. N. D. Karkhanis and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant. l. N. Shroff, for the respondents. Januar
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