K. ANANDAN NAMBIAR AND ANOTHER versus CHIEF SECRETARY, GOVERNMENT OF MADRAS AND OTHERS
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K. ANANDAN NAMBIAR AND ANOTHER 1'. CHIEF SECRETARY, GOVERNMENT OF MADRAS AND OTHERS October 27, 1965 [P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K N. WANCHOO, M. HIDAYATULLAH, R. S. BACHAWAT AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.J Defence of India Act and Rules, 1962, r. 30(l)(b)-/f invalid. Consti~ution of India, 1950, Arts 352 and 359( I )-Presidential Order suspending right to move Court for enforcement of fundamental rights-- Petition challenging validity of rule--Maintainability. The petitioners were members of Parliament. They were detained by orders passed by the Stat" Government under r. 30 ( 1) (b) of the Defenee of India Rules, 1962. They challenged the validity of the orders of detention on the grounds that: (i) rule 30(1) (b) was invalid because, a legislator cannot be detained so as to prevent him from exercising his constitutional rights as such legislator while the legislative chamber lo which he belongs is in session; and (ii) the impugned orders were passed mala fide as they were passed for the purpose of stifiing the' petitioners' political activities which were inconvenient to the State Government. It was also urged that the orders were passed by the Chief Minister of the State without satisfying himself of the necessity of detaining the petitioners merely beicause the Union Home Minisrer thought that the petitioners should be detained. The respondent raised a prefoninary objection that the petitions were incompetent in vlerw of the Order issued by the Pr .. i- dent of India under Art. 359(1), suspending the rights of any person to move any court for the enforcement of the lrights conferred by Arts. 14, 21 and 22 for the period during which the Proclamation.of Emergeacy issued under Art. 352 was in force, if such person had been deprived of any such rights under the Defence of India Act, 1962, Jor any rule or order made thereunder. HELD : (i) The last clause of the Presidential Order postulates that the Defence of India Act or any rule or orde<r made thereunder is valid. During the pendency of the Presidential Order, the validity of Act, rule or order made the<eunder cannot be questioned on the ground that t~y contravene Arts. 14, 21, !and 22; but this limitation will not preclude a citizen from challenging the validity of the Act, rule or order made thereunder, on any other ground. (410 F-G] The petitioners contended that r. 30(1) (b) under which the impugned orders of detention had been passed 'Was invalid on grounds other than those based on Arts. 14, 19, 21 and 22. If that plea was well-founded, the last clause of the Presidential Order was not satisfied and therefore the bar created by it suspending the citizens' fundamental rights under Arts. 14, 21, and 22 could not be pressed into service by the respondent. The petitions, therefore, were not incompet,enl. (412 BJ Makhan Singh v. The State of Punjab, [1964]4 S.C.R. 797, followed. (ii) Rufo 30(1)(b) is not invalid. [421 Al Articles 79, 85, 86 and 100(1), relied upon by the petitioners cannot be said to deal with any rights which can be described as ~stitutional l A • c D • E F G • H ' ! ·. ,. ' ") A. NAMBIAR v. CHIEF SECRETARY (Gaje1idragadkar, C.J.) 407 A rights of the members of Parliament. The totality of rights cannot olaim the status of fundamental rights and the freedom of speech on which reliance was placed is a part of the privileges falling under Art. 105. A plea that a breach has been committed of any of these privileges could not be raised in view of 1the decision of the Committee of Privileges of .the House of Commons in the case of Captain Ramsay, becaus-o the pri- vileges, powers and immunities of the members of the Indian Legislature· B c D E F are the same as those of the1 members of the House of Commons as. they existed at the commencement of the Indian Constitution. Besides, freedom of spe<~h would only ~ available to a member of Parliament when he attends 1the session of Parliament. If an order of detention validly preve.nts him from attending a session of Parliament, no occasion ·arises for the exercise of the ,right of freedom of speech and no complaint can be made that the said right has been invalidly invaded. [415 G-H;: 419 B-Dl If a person who is convicted and sentenced for a period less than t\VO years-such a conviction would not entail disqualification for being a member of Parliament-has necessarily to forego his right of participating· in the business of the
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