JOHN D’ SOUZA versus KARNATAKA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION

Citation: [2019] 13 S.C.R. 770 · Decided: 16-10-2019 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: SANJAY KISHAN KAUL · Disposal: Case Partly allowed

cites 2 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
770
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 13 S.C.R.
JOHN D’ SOUZA
v.
KARNATAKA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION
(Civil Appeal No. 8042 of 2019)
OCTOBER 16, 2019
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL AND SURYA KANT, JJ.]
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947:
ss. 33(2)(b)   – Inquiry under  – Scope of  – Dismissal of
workman  – Since another industrial dispute was pending,
application u/s 33(2)(b) by the employer, seeking permission to
effectuate the dismissal order  – Labour Court dismissed the
application holding that dismissal of the workman was not justified
– Order of Labour Court was upheld by Single Judge of High
Court  – Division Bench of High Court set aside the orders of
courts below holding that jurisdiction u/s. 33(2)(b) could not be
expanded to permit the parties to lead evidence which was never
produced in domestic enquiry  – Appeal to Supreme Court – Held:
For adjudication of an ‘industrial dispute’, the legislature has
provided a self-contained mechanism through s. 10 r/w. ss. 11(3)
and 11A  – Therefore, the Court, in exercise of jurisdiction u/s.
33(2)(b) cannot adjudicate the legality, propriety, justifiability or
otherwise sustainability of a punitive action against a workman
– Matter is remitted to Labour Court to decide the matter afresh
within the limit and scope of ss. 33(2)(b)  – Parties are also directed
to settle the dispute through mediation  – Till the mediation
proceedings are concluded, proceedings before the Labour Court
are stayed.
Partly allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The composite Scheme of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 bears out that when an ‘industrial dispute’
pertaining to “Discharge or ‘dismissal’ of workmen including
reinstatement of or ‘grant of relief’ to workmen wrongfully
dismissed” arises (See Sr.No. 3 of Second Schedule), such
dispute is referable for adjudication to the Labour Court in
exercise of the jurisdiction vested in it under Section 10(1)(c)
   [2019] 13 S.C.R. 770
770
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
771
of the Act.  The Labour Court shall have the powers of Civil
Court to secure evidence for deciding such dispute.  Most
importantly, the doctrine of proportionality is statutorily
embedded in Section 11A of the Act, which further empowers
the Labour Court, subject to its satisfaction, to set aside the
order of discharge or dismissal and reinstate a workman on such
terms and conditions as it thinks fit or to award a lesser
punishment in lieu thereof.  All such awards or orders are
enforceable under the Act. [Para 21] [764-F-H]
1.2 The Legislature has, thus, provided a self-contained
mechanism through Section 10 read with Sections 11(3) and 11A
of the Act, for adjudication of an ‘industrial dispute’ stemming
out of an order of discharge or dismissal of a workman.  Having
done so, it can be safely inferred that neither the Legislature
intended nor was there any legal necessity to set-up a parallel
remedy under the same Statute for adjudication of the same
‘industrial dispute’ by the same Forum of Labour Court or
Tribunal via Section 33(2)(b) of the Act.  Section 33(2)(b) has
been inserted for a purpose other than that for which Section
10(1)(c) and (d) have been enacted.  Section 33(2)(b), thus, is
neither meant for nor does it engender an overlapping procedure
to adjudicate the legality, propriety, justifiability or otherwise
sustainability of a punitive action taken against a workman. [Para
22] [785-A-C]
1.3 The caption of Section 33 itself sufficiently hints out
that the primary object behind this provision is to prevent
adverse alteration in the conditions of service of a workman
when ‘conciliation’ or any other proceedings in respect of an
‘industrial dispute’ to which such workman is also concerned,
are pending before a Conciliation Officer, Board, Arbitrator,
Labour Court or Tribunal.  The Legislature, through Section
33(1)(a) and (b) has purposefully prevented the discharge,
dismissal or any other punitive action against the workman
concerned during pendency of proceedings before the Arbitrator,
Labour Court or a Tribunal, even on the basis of proven
misconduct, save with the express permission or approval of the
Authority before which the proceedings is pending.  Sub-section
(2) of Section 33 draws its colour from sub-Section(1) and has
JOHN D’ SOUZA v. KARNATAKA STATE
ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
772
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 13 S.C.R.
to be read in conjunction thereto.  Sub-section (2), in fact, dilutes
the rigours of sub-section (1) to the extent that it enable

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.