JOGINDER TULI versus S.L. BHATIA AND ANR.

Citation: [1996] SUPP. 7 S.C.R. 221 · Decided: 07-10-1996 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: K. RAMASWAMY · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

JOGINDER TULi 
A 
v. 
S.L. BHATIA AND ANR. 
OCTOBER 7, 1996 
[K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.] 
B 
Rent and Eviction: 
Landlord Terminating the tenancy-Suit for possession-Landlord sub-
sequently filing application to amend the plaint to recover damages for use C 
and occupation-Suit being beyond pecuniary jurisdiction of trial court, it 
returned the plaint for presentation to proper Court-High Court directing the 
district Court to take up the matter and to proceed with the suit from the stage 
it was returned-Tenant's plea for counter- claint-Court fee on counter claim 
not paid-Held, normally when plaint is returned for presentation to proper 
court it has to start from the beginning, but in this case since the evidence was D 
already adduced, High Court was right in directing to proceed from the stage 
at which the suit stood transferred-The tenant has not paid the court fee on 
counter claim within prescribed p~riod, it is barred by limitation-He cannot 
be allowed to pay the court fee now. 
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 : 
Order ZV, Rule ]-Suit-Presentation of plaint, and commencement of 
suit-Discussed. 
· 
Court Fee: 
Court fee on counter--Claim-To be paid within prescribed period. 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 13235 of 
1996. 
E 
F 
From the Judgment and Order dated 8.1.96 of the Delhi High in G 
C.M. No. 3825/95 in C.R. No. 723 of 1995. 
K.K. Mohan, Ms. Amarjit Kaur, Smit Mohan and Ms. Geetanjali 
Mohan for the Appellant. 
Mukul Rohtagi and Arun K. Singa for the Respondents. 
221 
H 
222 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 7 S.C.R. 
A 
The following Order of the Court was delivered : 
Leave granted. 
This appeal by special leave arises from the order of the learned 
single Judge of the High Court of Delhi made on January 8, 1996 in C.M. 
B No. 3825/95 in C.R. No. 723/95. 
The admitted position in that the appellant had enjoyed the demised 
property pursuant to lease dated December 21, 1990 at a monthly rent of 
Rs. 6,000. the respondent had terminated the tenancy on March 15, 1993 
C and filed the suit No. 133/1993 for possession. He valued the suit at Rs. 
72,000 on yearly rent. Respondent No. 1 filed an application to amend the 
plaint to recover damages for the use and occupation. On that basis, the 
pecuniary jurisdiction of trial Court was beyond its jurisdiction and accord-
ingly plaint was returned for presentation to proper Court. On revision, the 
High Court directed to return it to the District Court with a direction that 
D the matter would be taken up by the District Court and proceeded with 
from the stage at which it was returned. 
In the first instance, it was contended that the appellant also has 
counter claim for the improvement effected on the building and, therefore, 
E without giving an opportunity to the appellant to adduce evidence in this 
regard, the District Court could not proceed in that behalf. An application 
made to be filed for clarification and review was rejected by the High 
Court. Thus, this appeal by special leave. 
Shri Mohan, learned counsel for the appellant, contended that in the 
p 
written statement, the appellant has raised the issue of territorial jurisdic-
tion of the Court and also the valuation in that behalf. He also stated in 
the written statement that he is entitled to the counter-claim for the 
improvement effected thereunder. When we directed the learned counsel 
to produce the issue framed by the trial Court by our order dated Septem-
ber 16, 1996, Shri Mohan has now fairly stated that no issue of counter-
G claim had been framed by the trial Court. It is also admitted position that 
he did not pay any court fee on the counter-claim. He sought permission 
to pay the court fee on the counter-claim and direction to frame the issue 
and to proceed with the trial. We are afraid that we cannot give that 
direction. Once he has not paid the court fee within the time prescribed, 
H necessarily, it is barred 'by limitation. Therefore, at this distance of time, 
J. TULi v. S.L. BHATIA 
223 
he cannot be allowed to pay the court fee in this regard. Under these A 
circumstances, the original order passed by the High Court directing the 
District Judge to proceed from the stage at which the suit stood transferred 
to the District Court appears to be correct in the circumstances. Normally, 
when the plaint is directed to be returned for presentation to the proper 
Court perhaps it has to start from the beginning but in this case, since the 
e

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