LexaceLexace Ask the AI ›
βš–οΈ Ask the AI about your situation:πŸš— Car AccidentπŸ’Ό Work / Job🏠 Housing / EvictionπŸ‘ͺ Family / DivorceπŸ“‹ Contract DisputeπŸ’° Money Owed

JOGI RAM versus SURESH KUMAR & ORS

Citation: [2022] 9 S.C.R. 766 · Decided: 01-02-2022 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: SANJAY KISHAN KAUL · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 1 judgment(s) · cites 5 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this case

Judgment (excerpt)

A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
766
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2022] 9 S.C.R.
JOGI RAM
v.
SURESH KUMAR & ORS.
(Civil Appeal Nos. 1543-1544 of 2019)
FEBRUARY 01, 2022
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL AND M. M. SUNDRESH, JJ.]
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – s.14(2) vis-Γ -vis 14(1) –
Objective and applicability of – Held: Objective of sub-sec.(2) is
that there cannot be a fetter in a owner of a property to give a
limited estate if he so chooses to do including to his wife but of
course if the limited estate is to the wife for her maintenance that
would mature in an absolute estate u/s.14(1) – Sub-sec.(2) of s.14
inter alia applies to a Will which may create independent and new
title in favour of females for the first time and is not a recognition
of a pre-existing right – In such cases a restricted estate in favour
of a female is legally permissible and s.14(1) of the said Act will not
operate in that sphere – Further, the objective of s.14(1) is to create
an absolute interest in case of a limited interest of the wife where
such limited estate owes its origin to law as it stood then – The
objective cannot be that a Hindu male who owned self-acquired
property is unable to execute a Will giving a limited estate to a wife
if all other aspects including maintenance are taken care of – In
the present case, the testator had taken all care for the needs of
maintenance of his second wife (β€˜RD’) by ensuring that the revenue
generated from the estate would go to her alone – However, he
wished to give only a limited life interest to her as the second wife
with the son (appellant) inheriting the complete estate after her
lifetime – Thus, it would be the provisions of s.14(2) of the said Act
which would come into play in such a scenario and β€˜RD’ only had a
life interest in her favour – Hence, the respondents-third parties
(claiming to be bona fide purchasers) who derived their rights from
β€˜RD’ cannot inherit a better title than what she had – Further, in
view of the sequence of litigations, respondents can hardly be said
to be bona fide purchasers – The first endeavour was by the daughter
of β€˜RD’ by seeking a collusive decree when she had no interest in
the property – She then sought to create lease interest in the property
– Both these aspects were held against β€˜RD’ and her daughter right
[2022] 9 S.C.R. 766
766
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
767
till the Supreme Court in the first round of litigation clearly opining
that β€˜RD’ had only a limited estate in the property – Despite having
lost right till the Supreme Court, the sale deeds were intervening
factors even during the pendency of the litigation which went against
β€˜RD’ – Also, High Court has wrongly proceeded on the basis that
the first round of litigation would not create any binding precedents
because there was change in law after the first round of litigation –
There was, in fact, no change in law as all the judgments were
much prior in time – The rights of the respondents are derived only
from β€˜RD’ and once the judgment is binding on her it cannot be
said that she can create rights contrary to the judgment in favour
of third parties and that too during the pendency of the litigation –
View taken by trial court and the first appellate court is correct –
Sale deeds in favour of the respondents cannot be sustained –
Impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside – Decree of the
trial court (in favour of the appellant decreeing his suit for
declaration and injunction challenging the sale deeds executed by
β€˜RD’) affirmed by the appellate court is reaffirmed – Transfer of
Property Act, 1882 – s.41 – Res judicata.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 Sub-Section (2) of Section 14 of the said Act is
in the nature of a proviso. It begins with a β€˜non-obstante clause’.
Thus, it says that β€œnothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply
to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any
other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court....”
etc. where a restricted estate in such property is prescribed. The
objective of sub-Section (2) is quite clear as enunciated repeatedly
by this Court in various judicial pronouncements, i.e., there cannot
be a fetter in a owner of a property to give a limited estate if he
so chooses to do including to his wife but of course if the limited
estate is to the wife for her maintenance that would mature in an
absolute estate under Section 14(1) of the said Act. The Will while
conferring a limited estate on Ram Devi, Tulsi Ram had clearly
stated that she will earn income fro

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.