JOGI RAM versus SURESH KUMAR & ORS
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
A B C D E F G H 766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R. JOGI RAM v. SURESH KUMAR & ORS. (Civil Appeal Nos. 1543-1544 of 2019) FEBRUARY 01, 2022 [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL AND M. M. SUNDRESH, JJ.] Hindu Succession Act, 1956 β s.14(2) vis-Γ -vis 14(1) β Objective and applicability of β Held: Objective of sub-sec.(2) is that there cannot be a fetter in a owner of a property to give a limited estate if he so chooses to do including to his wife but of course if the limited estate is to the wife for her maintenance that would mature in an absolute estate u/s.14(1) β Sub-sec.(2) of s.14 inter alia applies to a Will which may create independent and new title in favour of females for the first time and is not a recognition of a pre-existing right β In such cases a restricted estate in favour of a female is legally permissible and s.14(1) of the said Act will not operate in that sphere β Further, the objective of s.14(1) is to create an absolute interest in case of a limited interest of the wife where such limited estate owes its origin to law as it stood then β The objective cannot be that a Hindu male who owned self-acquired property is unable to execute a Will giving a limited estate to a wife if all other aspects including maintenance are taken care of β In the present case, the testator had taken all care for the needs of maintenance of his second wife (βRDβ) by ensuring that the revenue generated from the estate would go to her alone β However, he wished to give only a limited life interest to her as the second wife with the son (appellant) inheriting the complete estate after her lifetime β Thus, it would be the provisions of s.14(2) of the said Act which would come into play in such a scenario and βRDβ only had a life interest in her favour β Hence, the respondents-third parties (claiming to be bona fide purchasers) who derived their rights from βRDβ cannot inherit a better title than what she had β Further, in view of the sequence of litigations, respondents can hardly be said to be bona fide purchasers β The first endeavour was by the daughter of βRDβ by seeking a collusive decree when she had no interest in the property β She then sought to create lease interest in the property β Both these aspects were held against βRDβ and her daughter right [2022] 9 S.C.R. 766 766 A B C D E F G H 767 till the Supreme Court in the first round of litigation clearly opining that βRDβ had only a limited estate in the property β Despite having lost right till the Supreme Court, the sale deeds were intervening factors even during the pendency of the litigation which went against βRDβ β Also, High Court has wrongly proceeded on the basis that the first round of litigation would not create any binding precedents because there was change in law after the first round of litigation β There was, in fact, no change in law as all the judgments were much prior in time β The rights of the respondents are derived only from βRDβ and once the judgment is binding on her it cannot be said that she can create rights contrary to the judgment in favour of third parties and that too during the pendency of the litigation β View taken by trial court and the first appellate court is correct β Sale deeds in favour of the respondents cannot be sustained β Impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside β Decree of the trial court (in favour of the appellant decreeing his suit for declaration and injunction challenging the sale deeds executed by βRDβ) affirmed by the appellate court is reaffirmed β Transfer of Property Act, 1882 β s.41 β Res judicata. Allowing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1 Sub-Section (2) of Section 14 of the said Act is in the nature of a proviso. It begins with a βnon-obstante clauseβ. Thus, it says that βnothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court....β etc. where a restricted estate in such property is prescribed. The objective of sub-Section (2) is quite clear as enunciated repeatedly by this Court in various judicial pronouncements, i.e., there cannot be a fetter in a owner of a property to give a limited estate if he so chooses to do including to his wife but of course if the limited estate is to the wife for her maintenance that would mature in an absolute estate under Section 14(1) of the said Act. The Will while conferring a limited estate on Ram Devi, Tulsi Ram had clearly stated that she will earn income fro
Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.
Lex