JIWANLAL ACHARIYA versus RAMESHWARLAL AGARWALLA
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JIWANLAL ACHARIYA RAMESHWARLAL AGARWALLA August 26, 1966 (K. N. WANCHOO, ]. C. SHAH AND R. S. BACHAWAT, JJ.) Bilrar Money Lenders (Regulation of Transactions) Act, 1939 (Bihar No. 7 of 1939), s. 4--Loan, if Includes promisSory note, Indian Limitation Act (9 of 1908), s. 20-Handing over post-dated Cheque-Date <,/ payment for purpose of /lm!tatlon. . The respondent aclvanced a loan to the appellant before be was regis- tered as money-lender in 1952 under the Bibar Money-Lenders Act, 1939. On February 4, I 954 tho appellant executed a promissory note in renewal of this loan and on the same day delivered to the respondent a post· dated cheque dated February 25, 1954 towards part payment of the debl. The cheque was cashed soon after February 25, 1954. On February 22, 1957, the respondent filed a suit for recovery of the sum on the basis of the promissory note. The appellant contended that (i) the suit was not maintainable under s. 4 of the Bihar Money-Lenders Act, because, the suit promissory note was not a loan within the meaning of s. 4, but was really renewal of a loan advanced when the respondent was not legistered as a money-lender under the Act, and (ii) the suit was barred by limitation as the part payment was made on February 4, 1954 when the poet dated cheque was gh= to the respondent. HELD : (i) (Per Full Court) Section 4 of the Bihar Money-Lender. Act was not a bar to the maintainability of the suit. [ 195 FJ The word 'loan' used in s. 4 has the same meaning as it has In s. 2(f) and includes a transaction on a bond bearing interest executed in respect of past liability. [195 EJ Surendra Prasad Narain Singh v. Sri Gajadhar Prasad Sahu Trust Es/ate ond Ors. [1940) F.C.R. 39 and B. S. Lyle v. C/rappe/i, [1932) I K.B. 591, relied on. A B c D E The promissory note of February 4, 1954 was a loan within the F meaning of s. 2(f) and it was made after the respondent had been registered. [ 195 FJ (ii) (Per Wanchoo and Shah, JJ.) The suit was not barred by timitation. Where a post-dated cheque is accepted conditionally and it is honoured the payment for purposes of s. 20 of the Limitation Act can only be 0 the dare which the cheque bears and cannot be on the date the cheque i• handed over, for the cheque, being post-<lated, can never be paid till the date on the cheque anives. [197 HJ Commissioner of Income-tax v. Messrs. Ogale Glass Works Ltd. [195SJ I S.C.R. 185, Marreco v. Rlc/rardson, L.R. (1908! 2 K.B. 584 and Felix Hadley v. Hadley, L.R. [1898) 2 Ch. 680, distinguished. Per Baebawat, J.-Tbe suit was barred by limitation. H 190 A B c D E F G H JIWANLAL v. RAMESHWARLAL (Wanchoo, I.) 191 The doctrine· that the payment take:; effect from the date of the delivery of the negotiable instrument is as inuch applicable to a post,dated cheque and a. bill payable on a future date as to a cheque and a . bW payable on demand. During the currency of the post-dated cheque or of the bill payable on a future date, the creditor cannot sue to rec:oVer the original debt. The post dated cheque or the running bill, if it. is duly met operates as payment of the debt from the elate of its delivery. For the purposes of s. 20 of the Limitation Act, also the date of the pa:fment of the debt is the date when the· post-dated cheque was delivered lo the creditor and not the date wnicb the cheque bore nor the date· when it was cashed. [199 OJ' Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay South Bombay v. Messrs. Ogal• Glass Works Ltd. Ogale Wadi, (1955) 1 S.C.R. 196, Marreco v. Ri~hart! son, [1908] 2 K.B. 584 and Felix Hadley & Co. v. Hadley [1'898] 2 Ch. 680, relied on, Ked~r Nath Mitra v. Dinabandhu Saha, (1915) I.L.R. 42 Cal. 1043; approved. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 606 of 1966. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated August 5, 1964 of the Patna High Court in Appeal from Original Decree No. 362 of 1959. P. K. Chatterjee, for the appellant. The respondent did not appear. The Judgment of W ANCHOO and SHAH, JJ. was delivered by WANCHOO, J. BACHAWAT, J. delivered a dissenting Opinion. Wanchoo, J. Two questions of law arise in this appeal by special leave against the judgment of the Patna High Court. The facts which have been found by the High Court and which are necessary for our purposes may be briefly narrated. The appellant was the defendant in a suit filed by the plaintiff-respon- dent for recovery of money on the ba
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