LexJITENDRA SINGH @ BABBOO SINGH & ANR. versus STATE OF U.P.
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A B c [2013] 13 S.C.R. 764 JITENDRA SINGH @ BABBOO SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. (Criminal Appeal No. 763 of 2003) JULY 10, 2013 [T.S. THAKUR AND MADAN B. LOKUR, JJ.] Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000: ss. 2(k), 7A and 20 - Prosecution of accused u/ss. 147, 302, 3048 and 498A /PC - During trial, accused raised plea of juvenifity underJuvenile Justice Act, 1986 - Plea rejected, finding him to be above 16 years of age - After trial, convicted uls. 3048 and 498A and sentenced to 7 years and 2 years D imprisonment respectively with fine of Rs. 1001- - Conviction and sentence confirmed in High Court - In appeal to this Court, accused took plea of juvenility under Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 - On direction of Supreme Court trial court's report as to age of the accused stating him to be of 13 years 8 E months on the date of incident as per his school certificate and as per medical examination and other records his age was 17 years - Held: Per Madan Lokur, J: The accused was 17 years of age on the date of occurrence, and hence a juvenile under 2000 Act - His conviction is confirmed - The F punishment which can be awarded to the accused is to require him to pay afine under clause (e) of s.21(1) of Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 - The fine of Rs. 1001- imposed by trial court is inadequate, in view of the gravity of the offences - Therefore, matter remanded to Juvenile Justice Board for determining G appropriate quantum of fine - Per Thakur, J. (Supplementing) - Since the accused was above 16 years of age, on the date of occurrence, being not a juvenile under 1986 Act, there was no error of jurisdiction in trying the H 764 f JITENDRA SINGH @ BABBOO SINGH v. STATE OF 765 U.P. .)' accused - Being a juvenile under 2000 Act, in view of ss. 7 A A and 20, the court is not obliged to set aside the conviction, but 017ly his sentence awarded by the regular court can be set aside and making reference to the Juvenile Justice Board - Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 - s. 21(1)(e) - Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 304B and 498A. B Trial of a person - By a regular criminal court - Who, at subsequent stage found to be a juvenile - Measures for prevention of such situation - Suggested. ... '· Maxim - 'expressio unius est exclusio alterious' - c Applicability of. Per Madan B. Lokur, J. 1. The Report given by the Additional Sessions Judge whereby he has stated that the appellant was a D juvenile on the date of the incident, has been examined ,) and there is no reason to reject it. There is documentary evidence to show from the school admission register (which has not been tampered with) that the date of birth of the appellant is 31st August 197 4. That apart, the medical examination of the appellant conducted on 8th E July 1988 less than two months after the incident, also shows his age to be about 17 years. This was not doubted by the Additional Session Judge while rejecting the bail application of the appellant and was also not doubted by the High Court while granting bail to him. F Therefore, it does appear that the appellant was about 17 years of age when the incident had occurred and that he had set up a claim of being a juvenile or child soon after his arrest and before the charge sheet was filed. Thus, ' -'I the appellant was a juvenile or a child within the meaning G of that expression as defined in Section 2(k) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. [Para 21] [785-D-G] 2.1. A plain reading of section 3048 IPC, which explains a dowry death, makes it clear that its ingredients H 766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.C.R. A are (a) the death of a woman is caused by burns or a bodily injury or that it occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances; (b) the death takes place within seven years of her marriage; (c) the woman was subjected, soon before her death, to cruelty or B harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry. In the present case, in the facts of the case, the ingredients of Section 304-8 of the IPC were made out. [Paras 24 and 25) (786-G-H; 787-D] C 2.2. On the basis of the facts found by the Trial Court as well as the High Court from the evidence on record that a case of causing a dowry death had convincingly been made out against the appellant. There is no apparent reason to disturb the concurrent findings of fact D arrived
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