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JITENDER TYAGI versus DELHI ADMINISTRATION & ANR.

Citation: [1989] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 341 · Decided: 03-10-1989 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: M.M. DUTT · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

JITENDER TYAGI 
A 
v. 
DELHI ADMINISTRATION & ANR. 
OCTOBER 3, 1989 
[MURARI MOHON DUTT AND K.N. SAIKIA, JJ.] 
B 
National Security Act, 1980: Section 3(2), (3) & (4). 
Preventve Detention-Detention order-Approval of-"No such 
order shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the making 
of order unless in the meantime approved by the State Govemment"-
Computation of period of twelve days-The day on which order is 
passed-Whether should be included. 
Detention-Delegation of powers on the Commissioner of 
Po/ice-Whether ultra vires-Non-supply of copy of delegation order to 
the detenu-Whether prejudicial. 
Interpretation of Statute-When the language is plain and 
simple-The question of ascertaining legislative intent does not arise. 
c 
D 
Sub-section (4) of section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980 
provides that no order passed by an officer mentioned in sub-section (3) 
E 
shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof 
unless, in the meantime, ii has been approved by the State Government. 
The Commissioner of Police, Delhi, in exercise of the powers con-
ferred by sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Act, as delegated to him by 
the Delhi Administration, passed an order on 19.1.1989 detaining the 
F 
petitioner. The order of detention was approved by the Administrator 
on 31.I.1989. 
The petitioner filed a writ petition in this Court challenging the 
validity of the detention order contending that (i) the day on which the 
order of detention was passed should be included in the period of com-
G 
putation of twelve days and since the order of detention was approved 
' on 3 I.1.1989' that is, on the thirteenth day after the expiry-of twelve 
days, it had ceased to be in force; (ii) the non supply of the copy of order 
deiegating the power of detention on the Commissioner of Police has ยท 
seriously prejudiced the detenu; and (iii) there was serious non-
application of mind by the detaining authority. 
H 
341 
A 
342 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1989] Supp. 1 S.C.R. ยท 
Dismissing the petition, this Court, 
HELD: I. In computing the period of twelve days referred to in 
sub-section (4) of section 3 of the Act, the day on which the order of 
detention was passed should be excluded. Therefore the approval of the 
order of detention was made within twelve days after the making of the 
B order of detention. [3500] 
1.1 Sub-section (4) of section 3 has given a clear indication as to 
the computation of twelve days. It excludes the day on which the order 
is made. The word 'after' in sub-section (4) of section 3 of the Act is 
very significant and clearly excludes any contention that in computing 
C: 
the period of twelve days the day on which the order of detention is 
passed should be included. The period of twelve days has to he 
calculated 'after' the making of the order of detention, i.e. the day on 
which the cause of action arises has to be excluded in computing the 
period of time. [346E-F; 3490; 348H] 
D 
1.2 It is true that in sub-section (4) the officer making the order of 
detention shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government, but 
the word 'forthwith' will not be taken into consideration for the purpose 
of computing the period of twelve days inasmuch as there is clear indi-
cation that the said period shall be computed after the order is made. 
Computation of twelve days including the day on which the detention 
IE order is made will be ignoring the direction of the legislature, as given 
in sub-section (4) itself, that the said period of twelve days will com-
mence after the making of the detention order. [346F -G] 
F 
2. When the language of a statute is plain and simple, the ques-
tion of ascertaining the intention of the legislature does not arise. [3490] 
2.1 Sub-section (4) of section 3 admits of only one interpretation 
regarding the computation of twelve days and, accordingly, the ques-
tion as to the adoption of the interpretation which enures to the benefit 
of the detenu does not arise. [346H; 347 Al 
G 
T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, [1955) SCR 250; Haru Das Gupta 
v. State of West Bengal, [1972] 3 SCR 329 and Ratcliffv. Bartholomew, 
[1892] 1 QB 161, followed. 
Nillapareddi Chandrasekhara Reddy v. The Government of 
Andhra Pradesh and Anr., [1974] Crl. LJ 158; C. Krishna Reddy and 
fl{ Anr. v. Commissioner of Police Hyderab_ad&, Ors., [1982) Cr. LJ 592 
JITENDER v. DELHI ADMN. 
343 
and Gulam Sarwar v. State of Bihar & Ors .โ€ข [1973] BLJR 38, 
distinguished

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