JINIA KEOTIN AND ORS. versus KUMAR SITARAM MANJHI AND ORS.

Citation: [2002] SUPP. 5 S.C.R. 689 · Decided: 20-12-2002 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: DORAISWAMY RAJU · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

JINIA KEOTIN AND ORS. 
A 
v. 
KUMAR SITARAM MANJHI AND ORS. 
DECEMBER 20, 2002 
[DORAISWAMY RAJU AND SHIVARAJ V. PATIL, JJ.) 
B 
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955-Section 16(3)-Right of illegitimate child to 
inherit properly-Plea that right should not be limited only to property of 
their parents, but also to coparcenary properly-Held, since the provisions C 
limit right of such child only to the property of his parents, granting any 
fiirther rights to such child would amount to doing violence to the provision-
/I would also amount to Court relegislating on the subject under the guise of 
interpretation. 
In a partition suit, children born out of unlawful wedlock were held D 
entitled to claim their due share in the property of their parents, by the 
T~ial Court which was upheld by the First appellate Court and High 
Court. 
In appeal to this Court appellants contended that once the children 
born out of void and illegal marriage have been specifically safeguarded E 
under Section 16, as amended by the Central Act 68 of 1976, there is no 
justification to deny them equal treatment on par with the children born 
of wife in lawful wedlock by countenancing claims for inheritance even in 
the ancestral coparcenary property; and that the provisions of Section 
16(3) of the Act also should be construed keeping in view the totality of 
circumstances and the object and purpose of the legislation in respect of F 
right to inherit ~operty also like the children born out of lawful wedlock. 
Dismissing the appeal, the Coµrt 
HELD: Though Section 16 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 was enacted G 
to legitimize children, who would otherwise suffer by becoming illegitimate, 
at the same time it expressly provides in sub-section (3) by engrafting a 
provision with a non obstante clause stipulating specifically that nothing 
contained in sub-section (I) or sub-section (2) shall be construed as 
conferring upon any child of a marriage, which is null and void or which 
689 
H 
690 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) SUPP. 5 S.C.R. 
A is annulled by a decree 9f nullity under Section 12, "any rights in or to 
the property of any person, other than the parents, in any case where, 
but for the passing of this Act, such child would have been incapable of 
possessing or acquiring any such rights by reason of his not being the 
legitimate child of his parents". In the light of such an express mandate 
B of the legislature itself, there is no room for according upon such children 
who but foi: Section 16 would have been branded as illegitimate any 
further rights than envisaged therein by resorting to any presumptive or 
inferential process of reasoning, having recourse to the mere object or 
purpose of enacting Section 16 of the Act but also would amount to court 
relegislating on the subject under the guise of interpretation, against even 
C the will expressed in the enactment itself. 1692-G-H; 693-A, B, q 
D 
E 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 7247 of 1995. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 20.12.1991 of the Patna High 
Court in S.A. No. 315 of 1991. 
Lakshmi Raman Singh for the Appellant. 
H.L. Agrawal and K.K. Gupta (N.P.) for the Respondents. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
D. RAJU, J. The plairitiff(lst respondent herein) filed the suit claiming 
for I/6th share in Schedules A to D properties and 1/3 share in Schedules E 
properties. From the indisputable facts on record, the ancestral properties 
have to be divided firstly between Sahadeo Manjhi, his brother Mahadeo 
Manjhi (defendants Nos. I & 2) and their mother Dukhani Keotin (defendant 
F No. 7) each one getting I/3rd share. Out of the I/3rd share of Sahadeo 
Manjhi, the properties again will be equally divided in four parts each one 
of the sharers getting I /4th share. Defendants 8 to 11 are sa'id to be not 
entitled to any share on account of the fact that the marriage of the I st 
defendant with the 8th defendant was void for the reason that his first wife, 
Smt. Kamli Devi, was alive and the first marriage still subsisting. The second 
G marriag~-remarriage, of 1st defendant with the 8th defendant after the coming 
into force of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 cannot be valid. The learned 2nd 
Additional Su~ordinate Judge, Dumka passed a preliminary decree on 
27.9.1983 in Title Suit No. 40of1975 (3of1983) for the I/4th Share of the 
plaintiff in the suit properties out of the I/3rd, which has got to be allotted 
H to the share of the I st defendant. On appeal in Titl

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