LexJIA LAL versus THE DELHI ADMINISTRATION
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
1962
J agonnal~ l'rasu
••
St.ate•! UU.r
Pr•deJlr
KaJ>vr J,
1961
Miff J.
864
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
ma.ke a complaint and the proceedings without such
a. compl•iint a.re not without jurisdiotion.
In our opinion the appellants were rightly
convicted and we therefore dismiss this a.ppea.).
The appellant J a.ganna.th Prasad must surrender to
his bail bonds.
Appeal di&misstJJ.
JIA LAL
v.
THE DELHI ADMINISTRATION
(B. P.
SINHA, c. J.,
P. B.
GAJENDRAGADKA.R,
K. N. WAXCHOO, N. RAJAGOPA.L.A
AYYANGAR
and T. L. VENKATARAMA AIYAR, JJ.)
Criminal Trial-Po . .,,.8'ion of ·unliunwl arm8 SanGlion-
Provision requiring Randionfor prosecution. in certain area& and
nnt in other af'ell-If discriminatory-Whether offending portion
of provision can. be removed anrl rrmaining portion allotted to
sta.nd-lf im·alidity of p?ovision regarding •anction affectll
substantive proLisio"" a/so-Indian Arm. Act, 1878 (XI of
1878), 88. 19(1)(/), 29-Canstitution of India, Art. U.
Section 29 of the Indian Arms Act, 1878, provided that
for prosecution for an offence under s. 19(f) of the Act com•
mittcd in the territories north of the Jumna and Ganga no
sanction was required but sanction \\'as required for the pro-
secution if the offence v.ras committrd in other areas. J was
found in po5scssion of an unlicensed firtarm in Delhi, and
though sanction under s. 29 was necessary, he was tried and
convicted \vithout ohtaining s·u·h sanction.
B was found in
possc!=o;ion of an unJicensed fire::irm in Saharanpur and as no
sanction under s. 29 was necessary for his prosecution he was
tried and convicted without obtaining any sanction.
The
respondents contended that s. 29 nffcnded Art. 14 of the
Constitution and was unconstitutional. J contended that even
ifs. ?9 wa~ invalid in it5 operation a~- r('gards tt'rritories to the
North of the .Jurnna and Ganga it was not invalid in its
. .j
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2 s.c.R.
SUPREME COUR.'.l' REPORTS
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T
865
application to the other territories as the .part• of s. 29 .were
separate and severable. B contended that if th'e 'portion' of
s. 29 which offended Art. 14 was struck down the remaining
portion was complete in itself and required . sanction ·for pro-
secution in all cases, and that if s~29 was void in toto s.19 could
· not stand and also become void and unenforceable.
Heltl, thats. 29 Arms Act offended Art. 14 and was
unconstitutional and as such no sanction was necessary for the
prosecutiol) of either J or B. The differentiation bet .. een the
territories north of the Jumna and Ganga and the other
territories had no relevance now to the object of the legisla-
tion. The differentiation had come into heing an. account of
the fact that the largest opposition to the British Government
in 18,57 had come from the people to the north.of the Jumna
and Ganga and they had been disarmed. But now after more
than a century conditions have changed and the distinction
could not be sustained on any ground pertinent to the object
of the law in quession.
Mehar Ohand v. Bte,te, A,I.R. (1959) All. 660, approved.
Hel<I, further, that i; was not permissible to strike out
only the offending words from s. 29 and to read the section as
requiring sanction for prosecution. for offences in areas north
of the Jamna and Ganga. The section could not be construed
as for bidding what it expressly authorised. Nor could the
section insofar as it requir~d sanction for prosecution for
offences committed in other territories be severed from the rest
and held valid as that would· n<cCBsarily again result in
discrimination. The entires. 29 must be struck down.
Bhai Singh v. State, A.I.R. (1960) All. 369, approved;
Ohamarhaugwalla v. Union of India, (1957) S.C.R. 930,
referred to.
.
Helli, further, that s. 29 was sever11ble from the other
pr~vi~ions of the Act and that its invalidity did not affect the
. valld1ty qf s. 19.
Section 19 was a substantive provision
providing punishment for violation ofss. 14 and· 15 ands. 29
was merely P.'?cedural and in general the invalidity of a pro-
cedural provmon could not be held to affect the validity of a
substantive provision. There was nothing in the Arm· Act to
take it out of the general .rule. Section 29 was intended for
giving protection to lite 9ubjects against frivolous and vexatious
prosecutions but sanction was not one of the elements of the
µ,oder olfence s, 19(f). It could n~t be .said tha~ the legisl11tµrr;
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