JAYVANT RAO AND OTHERS versus CHANDRA KANT RAO OTHERS

Citation: [1970] 3 S.C.R. 837 · Decided: 26-02-1970 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: S.M. SIKRI · Disposal: Dismissed

cites 1 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
JAYVANT RAO AND OTHERS 
v. 
CHANDRA KANT RAO~ 
OTHERS 
February 26, 1970 
[S. M. S!KRI AND V. BHARGAYA, JJ.] 
837 
Constitution of India, Art. 372(1)-Ru/er by order applying law of 
prinzogeniture to one Jagir and 1naking it impartible-lf Order legislative 
and therefore valid. 
L had two sons, G and M. L. and h.is elder son G were granted a Jagir 
by the then Ruler of Kotah, jointly in their names, in lieu ell a debt which 
the Ruler owed to them. This property was treated as property of the 
joint family of L. The name of M, the second son born after the grant, 
was also mutated against the Jagir villages. 
The names of the descen-
dants of G and M were from time to time similarly mutated against the 
Jagir and this Jagir as well as other property of the joint family was 
managed for some time by the eldest member belonging to either branch 
of the family. 
The respondent C was a descendant of G and claimed in 
1937 before the Revenue Commissioner that as the eldest son in the eldest 
branch he alone had the right over the Jagir according to the custom and 
usage in Rajputana and, consequently, mutation in the records should be 
in his name alone. 
On a report by the Revenue Commissioner, the Ruler 
passed an order on 22nd January, 1938, directing that the Jagir, like all 
other Jagirs in the State should be given the status of an irnpartible estate 
and should be liable to render 'Cbakri' and 'Subchintki' to the Ruler. It 
was further ordered that the Jagir would be governed by the rule of primo-
geniture, so that C alone would be held to be Jagirdar. 
The appellants, who were the descendants of M, sought partition oi 
all the family properties including the villages in the Jagir. Although the 
Trial Court dismissed the suit, on appeal, the High Court granted a decree 
in respect of other properties but upheld the dismissal of the suit in so far 
as the appellants had claimed a share in the Jagir. 
The appellants claimed that the Jagir having been joint Hindu property, 
their rights as successors-in-interest of M could not be defeated by the 
order of Ruler dated 22nd January, 1938, and consequently, the appel-
lants were entitled to thei"r proper share in the Jagir. It was contended 
that all orders passed by an . .independent and sovereign Ruler do not have 
the force of law. It is only those orders which purport to lay down a 
law for the State which cannot be challenged and which would remain in 
force even after the merger of the Kotah State in India and, after the 
enforcement of the Constitution, under Art. 372 of the Constitution. It 
was submitted that, when passing the Order dated 22nd January, 1938, 
the Ruler was only exercising executive powers df directing mutation of 
names and was not exercising any legislative po\vers. 
HELD : Dismissing the appeal. 
(i) The High Court was right in holding that the villages in .the Ja_gir, 
at the time when the suit for partition 
was instituted, 
were 1mparttble 
838 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(1970) 3 S.C.R. 
prope·rty governed by the law of primogeniture and C alone could be 
treated as the owner of these villages. 
(ii) The very nature of the Order, which changed the law applicable 
.to the Jagir, indicated that it was a legislative act and not a mere execu-
tive order. The Ruler did not purport to 
lay down that the Jagir was 
already governed by the rule of primogeniture; what he did was to apply 
the rule of primogeniture to this J agir for future. 
Such an order could 
only be made in exercise of his prerogative Of laying down the law for 
the State. 
The mere fact that it was laid down for one single Jagir and 
was not a general law applicable 
to others in the State was imrr.aterial, 
because it does n'ot appear that there were any other similar Jagirs which 
also required alteration of the law applicable to them. [843 B-D] 
(iii) Although no special procedure of law-making was adopted by the 
·Ruler When making this Order, that circumstance could not change the 
nature of the Order specially when there was nothing to indicate that there 
was any recognised procedure of law-making in the Kotah State at that 
time. [844 F-G] 
Raikumar Narsingh Pratap Singh Deo v. State of Orissa and Another 
[1964] 7 S.C.R. 112; ref«Ted to. 
State of Guiara! v. Vora Fiddali Badruddin Mithibarwa/a [1964] 6 
'S.C.R. 461 and Maior Raniit Singh Rao Pha/ke "· Smr. Raia Bal Sahiba 
(dead) by her legal representatives and Vice Versa Civil Appeal Nos. 982 
an

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.