JAYESH H. PANDYA & ANR. versus SUBHTEX INDIA LTD. & ORS.
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A B C D E F G H 765 JAYESH H. PANDYA & ANR. v. SUBHTEX INDIA LTD. & ORS. (Civil Appeal No. 6300 of 2009) AUGUST 27, 2019 [N. V. RAMANA, MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR AND AJAY RASTOGI, JJ.] Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996: ss. 14 and 15 – Failure or impossibility to act – Arbitration agreement – In terms of the conditions, arbitrator to make award within four months from the date of service of copy of the agreement, however this period could be extended with the consent of the parties – Arbitrator unable to complete the arbitral proceedings within four months from the date of the first preliminary meeting in terms of the arbitration agreement and appellants refused to provide consent to extension of time – Issuance of direction by the tribunal to respondent No 1 to obtain extension of time or to approach court for a clarification – However, no application filed by respondent no. 1 – Thereafter, arbitrator fixed a meeting, however, appellants filed an application that the tribunal had become functus officio with no power to proceed as the four-month period had expired – Rejection of the application by the arbitrator – Appellant then filed arbitration petition invoking s. 14 – Declaration sought that the arbitrator had become de jure unable to perform his functions and mandate to act as arbitrator had terminated – Dismissed by the High Court – On appeal, held: It is clear from the reading of sub-section 1(a) of s. 14 that mandate of an arbitrator shall terminate if it fails to act without undue delay – Arbitration proceedings are supposed to be governed and run by the terms as agreed by the parties, failing which it would frustrate the mandate of the object of the Act – Thus, the arbitrator, cannot go beyond the clause of the arbitration agreement – Parties have to stand by the terms of contract including the Arbitrator – On facts, it cannot be held that there has been a waiver of valuable rights where the circumstances show that what was done was involuntary – Furthermore, there is no provision under the arbitration agreement to condone the delay when agreement between the parties binds [2019] 11 S.C.R. 765 765 A B C D E F G H 766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 11 S.C.R. them to see that the arbitration proceedings should be concluded within the time prescribed – s. 14 read with s. 15 also recognise this mechanism – After the expiry of four months period from the date of first preliminary meeting, the Arbitrator indeed became de jure unable to perform his functions and the mandate to act as an Arbitrator in the arbitral proceedings between the parties stood terminated – Thus, the order passed by High Court is set aside. Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1 It is clear from the bare reading of sub-section 1(a) of Section 14 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 that mandate of an arbitrator shall terminate if it fails to act without undue delay. In the instant case, the first preliminary meeting was held on 4th May, 2007 and the Arbitrator in terms of the agreement was supposed to conclude and pass the award within a period of four months which indisputedly stood expired on 4th September, 2007 and in the meantime the appellants recorded their objection of not consenting for extension of time beyond 4th September, 2007 and thus, it can be construed that parties were not in agreement for extension to the mandate of the Arbitrator failing which the arbitral proceedings automatically stood terminated. [Para 16][777-A-B] 1.2 Sub-section (2) of Section 14 clearly stipulates that if a controversy remains concerning any of the grounds referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (1), the party may, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, apply to the Court to decide on the termination of the mandate and the appellants rightly applied to the Court for termination of the mandate of the Arbitrator pursuant to the provisions of this Section and the Court was within its jurisdiction to decide accordingly. [Para 17][777-C-D] 1.3 It is true that the object of the scheme of the Act, 1996 is to secure expeditious resolution of disputes and it is based on the fulcrum of promptitude but at the same time the Arbitrator is required to adjudicate the disputes in view of the agreed terms of contract and the procedure. Therefore, the arbitration proceedings are supposed to be governed and run by the terms as agreed by the parties. The Arbitrator, therefore, cannot go A B C D E F G H 767 beyond the clause of the arbitration agreement.
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