JAVER CHAND AND OTHERS versus PUKHRAJ SURANA

Citation: [1962] 2 S.C.R. 333 · Decided: 25-04-1961 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 2 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
333 
the laws guaranteed by Art. 14 and this contention 
z961 
whas repe
11
lled. The argumf ent ofblearn.ed Cdoubnsel for Nav llattanmal 
t e appe ants has there ore to 
e reiecte 
oth on 
v. 
the ground of principle as well as on the ratio under- State of Rajasthan 
lying the decisions of this Court. 
The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. 
Ayyangar J. 
Appeal dismissed. 
JAVER CHAND AND OTHERS 
v. 
PUKHRAJ SURAN A 
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., K. SUBBA RAO, 
RAGHUBAR DAYAL and J. R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.)_ 
Document-Hundi-Inadequatcly stamped- Exhibited -Ad-
missibility-Objection when to be raised-Courts 1 if can revise or 
review order admitting document-M arwar Stamp Act, 1914, ss. 9 
and II-Marwar Stamp Act, 1947, ss. 35 proviso (a), 36. 
The respondent admitted the execution of two Hundis in 
suit which were tendered and marked as exhibits but denied 
consideration and raised the plea that the "hundis exhibited 
were inadmissible in evidence as at the time the suit was filed in 
1949 they had not been stamped according to the Stamp Law. 
When the hundis were executed in December, 1946, the Marwar 
Stamp Act of 1914 was in force "and ss. 9 and II of that Act 
authorised the court to realise the full stamp duty and penalty 
in case of unstamped instruments produced in evidence, where-
upon the documents were admissible in evidence. 
The High Court pointed 9ut that after coming into force of 
the Marwar Stamp Act, 1947, (Similar to Indian Stamp Act) 
which had amended the 1914 Act, the hundis in question could 
not be admitted in evidence in view of the provision of s. 35 
proviso (a) of the Marwar Stamp Act, 1947, even on payment of 
duty and penalty and the appellant could not take advantage 
of s. 36 of the 1947 Stamp Act, because the admission of the 
two hundis was a pure mistake as the Trial Court had lost 
sight of the 1947 Stamp Act and the appeal Court could go 
behind the orders of the Trial Court and correct the mistake 
made by that Court. 
Held, that once the Court, rightly or wrongly decided to 
43 
Ig6z 
April 25, 
334 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1962) 
1961 
admit the document in evidence, so far as the parties were con-
cerned, the matter was closed. The court had to judicially 
]av" Chand 
determine the matter as soon as the document was tendered in 
v. 
evidence and before it was marked as an exhibit in the case, 
Pukhraj Su.ana and ·once the document had been marked as an exhibit and the 
trial had proceeded on that footings. 36 of the Marwar Stamp 
Act, 1947, came into operation, and, thereafter, it was not open 
either to the trial court itself or to a court of appeal or revision 
to go behind that order. Such an order was not one of those 
judicial orders which ar.e liable to be revised or reviewed by the 
same court or a court of superior jurisdiction. 
Ratan Lal v. Dau Das, I.L.R. [1953] Raj. 833, disapproved. 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: 
Civil Appeal No. 
3of1958. 
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated Octo-
ber 8, 1956, of the Rajasthan High Court in Civil 
Regular Appeal No. 1 of 1953. 
S. T. Desai and B. P. Maheshwari, for the appel-
lants. 
N. 0. Chatterjee and H.P. Wanchoo, for the respon-
dent. 
1961. April 25. 
The Judgment of the Court was 
delivered by 
Sinha c. J. 
SINHA; C. J.-The substantial question for determi-
nation in this appeal is whether or not the two hundis 
sued upon were admissible in evidence. The learned 
Trial Judge held that they were, and in that view of 
the matter decreed the suit in full with costs and 
future interest, by his judgment and decree dated 
September 26, 1952. On appeal, the High Court of 
Rajasthan at Jodhpur, by its judgment and decree 
dated October 8, 1956 allowed the appeal and dismis-
sed the plaintiffs' suit. Each party was directed to 
bear its own costs throughout. The High Court grant-
ed the necessary certificate under Art. 133(1)(a) of the 
Constitution. That is how the appeal is before us. 
It is only necessary to state the following facts in 
order to appreciate the question of law that has to be 
determined in this appeal. The defendant-respondent 
is said to have owed money to the plaintiffs, the 
appellants in this case, during the course of their 
business as commission agents for the defendant, at 
2 S.C.R. .SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
335 
Bombay. Towards the payment of those dues, the 
defendant drew two mudatti hundis in favour of the 
plaintiffs, for the sum of 35 thousand rupees, one for 
]aver Ch

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