JANGBIR versus MAHAVIR PRASAD GUPTA

Citation: [1977] 1 S.C.R. 670 · Decided: 22-09-1976 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

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670 
JANGBIR 
v. 
MAHA YIR PRASAD GUPTA 
September 22, 1976 
[M. H. BEG AND P. N. SHINGHAL, JJ.] 
Sewnd Appeal-Disturbance of a concurrent finding of fact without con-
siderinJ? the objects of the notifications or discussinf? any principle of construc-
tion of documents which could indicate that a point of law had really arisen for 
a decision is patemly exceeding the jurisdiction of the Jligh Court-Cil'il Pro-
cedure Code (Act V) 1908, S. 100. 
Interpretation of documents-Principles applicable to interpretation of docu_ 
111mts-Notif1cations Nos. F. 915/59-R&S published in gazette dated 
17-1-60 
11/s. 507 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (66 of 1957) and Notifi-
cation-GSR 486 u/s 1(2) of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (59 of 1958) 
liazetted on 21-4-62-Whether the whole of Mauza Clwwkri M11bart1kabad and 
whole of Onkar Nagar and Leklwpura were meant to be notified. 
Mauza Chowkri Mubarakabad was included within the 
limits 
of Delhi 
Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 by a notification dated 7th January, 1960. By 
a notification dated 12th April 1962, the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control 
Act, 1958 was extended to the localities mentioned in the schedule to th·: notifi-
cation dated 7th Ja,nuary 1960. The respondent landlord who purchas«l a house-
situated in Khasra No. 203, Khewat No. 1 situated at vi!!qge Chowkri J\lubaraka-
bad, Delhi Province within the Abadi of Onkar Nagar II, filed a suit for cject-
ment of the appellant/tenant of a room in the said house and for recovery of 
rent. The trial court and the first appellate court held that the 
juri5diction 
of the civil court was barred by the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. 
However 
on second appeal, a single judge of the High Court disturbed the findings of 
fact and reversed the judgments of the courts below. Dismissing the appeal by 
special leave the Court, 
HELD : (i) There cannot be any' doubt, that, in the instant case. by deciding 
to set aside the concurrent findings of fact, ignoring the law laid down by this 
Court, and, before that by the judicial committee of the Privy Council, the High 
Court, patently exceeded its jurisdiction under s. 100 C.P.C. without considering 
the objects of the notifications or discussing any principle of construction of 
documents which could indicate that a point of Jaw had really arisen for deci-
sioN. [673 D-F] 
Deity Pattabhiramaswamy v. S. Hanyamayya & Ors., AIR 1959 
SC 57; 
Sri Sinha Ramanuja Jeer & Ors. v. Shri Ranga Ramanuja Jeer & Anr. 1962(2) 
SCR 509; Nedunuri Kameswaramma v. Sampati Subba Rao, 1963(2) SCR 208; 
Bhusawal Borough Municipality v. Amalgamated Electricity Co. 
Ltd. & 
Anr. 
1964(5) SCR 905; Secy. of State v. Rameswaram Devasthanam & Or.<., AIR 
1934 PC 112; Anup Malito v. Mita Dusadh & Ors. AIR 1934 PC 5 and Naraya11-
rao· Deshmukh v. Jaiwantrao Yadaorao Deshmukh & Anr., AIR 1933 PC 171; 
applied 
(ii) The well known principles of iµterpretation of documents nre : (a) 
firstly, a document must be construed as a whole; (b) secondly, it has to be so 
'construed as not to reduce what was meant or being done by it to a p:itent 
absurdity; and (c) thirdly, if any entry of a column appears to 
have been 
carelessly made, so as not to give a correct indication of what was otherwise 
clearly capable of being inferred from the objects and rest of the contents of 
such a notification, the slight error, due obviously to inadvertance, would not 
matter on an application of the principle : "Falsa Demonstratio 11011 1zncPt." 
[675 B-Cl 
\ 
;: 
t 
JANGBIR v. MAHAVIR PD. GUPTA (Beg, 1.) 
671 
(iii) Unless interpretation of a document involvas the question of application 
of a principle of law, mere inferences from or the evidentiary value of a docu-
ment generally raises only a question of fact. [6H CJ 
Nedunuri Kameswaramnw v. Sampati Suhha Rao, 1963 (2) SCR 208; ex-
plained. 
Meenakshi Mills, Madurai v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras, 
1956 SCR 691; referred to 
(iv) In the instant case, it is evident that the proviso does not require the · 
mention of anything more than the urban areas which is to be included or 
excluded from the limits of the . Municipal Corporation. That area was suffi-
ciently clearly indicated by entries in columns 2 and 3 meant, for the Revenue 
Estate· or Mauza and for tlie colony or the village. 
The whole of 
Mauza 
Chowkri Mubarakabad and the whole of Onkar Nagar and Lekhupura were 
meant to be notified. The mere fact that the last column

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