JAI CHARAN LAL versus STATE OF U.P. & ORS.
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B D E F G H JAi CHARAN LAL v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. May 5, 1967 [M. HIDAYATULLAH AND C. A. VAIDIALINGAl\I Jn U.P. Municipalities Act (2 of 1916), s. 81-A-(3) and (5)-"'Nor earlier than 30 days", meaning of-"'Send by registered post not· less than 7 clear aays" Scope. of-"Adjourn'", meaning of. Under '· 87A(3) of the Uttar Pradesh Municipalities Act. J9i6. when a notice of intention to make a motion of non-confidence in the President of a Municipality is <lelivereil by tho requisite number of members of the Municipal Board, to the District Magistrate, the District Magistrate shall convene a meeting on a date not earlier tlzan thirty, and not later than thirty-five ·days from the date on which the notice was delivered to him. He shall send by registered post, not Jess than seven clear days nefore the date of the meeting, notice• of the date and time of the meeting to all members. Under s. 87A(4) he shall arrange with the District Judge for a judicial officer to preside at the meeting. If the presiding judicial officer doc!i not attend the meeting, it stands automaticall} adjourned to a date and time to be appointed by h:m later. and, i.nder s. 87A(5), if the judicial officer is unable to preside at the meeting, he may, after ·recording his reasons, adjourn the meeting to such other date and time as he may appoint. In the present case, the notice by the members \\'US delivered to the District Magistrate on October. 26, 1966. He issued registered notices on November 17, 1966, fixing November 25, 1966 as the date of the me-zting. The District Judge had nominated the Additional Civil Judge to preside at the meeting, but the latter made an order on November 22, 1966 intimating that he would be unable to preside on the 25th and adjourning the meeting to December 5, 1966. The appellant, who wa' the President of the Municipal Board and against whom the notice of non-confidence was directed, filed a writ petition in the High Court for stay of the meeting but before it was heard the resolution of non-con- fidence was passed unanimously by the members on December 5, 1966. The appellant prayed that the High Court may quash the resolution, but the High Court declined to exercise its discretionary powers as the resolution had already been pa·;sed by the necessary majority. Jn appeal to this Court it was contended that, (!) there was a breach of s. 87-A(3), because, (a) : excluding November 18, 1966, the presumable date of receipt of the registered notice issued by the District Magistrate, and November 25, 1966, the date of the meeting, seven clear days did not intervene as required by the section, and (b) : the expression "not earlier than thirty days" means "not less than thirty days and on that basis, excluding both the terminal days, namely October 26, 1966 and November 25, 1966 thirty clear days, as required by the section, did not intervene; and (2) there was also a breach of s. 87-A(S), becall<e, the presiding judicial officer was not empowered to adjourn the meeting in advance but could only do so on the date of the meeting if he was unable to preside. SUPRBM!i COURT REPORTS [1%7] 3 S.C.R. HELD: ( 11 There was no hreach or s. 87-A(3) (a) Since the expression in the section is "~hall send lhc notice" the critical <late is the date of dc:-.pittch of the notice nnd not the date of its receipt. As the notice \Va'i sent on the 17th and the n1ceting wa' called on the :!5th. excluding the l\.i./o dates, seven clear days did intervene. !9X5A-BJ (b) Tht: cxprcs'iions ,;not earlier than 30 Jays"' ~ind ··not Jc"ls than 30 days" c.111not he euuatc<l. Just as '"not later than thirty-five days'' would not exclude the 35th day. "not earlier than 30 days" would not exclude the Jllth day. "Not earlier than 30 days" means that it should not he 29th day. hut there is nothing to show that the language excludes the 30th <lay fron1 computation. If the provision were "not earlier than thiriy days and not later than thirty days" it is obvious that only the .10th day could he meant. Therefore, in the present case, although October ~~ h"d lo he excluded. Novcniher 25. the date on which the 111l'cting Y•<ts to he called. ncc<l not he excluded and the date of the meeting cannot r., described "' earlier than 30 day•. 1985F-H; 986A-C] If. H. Raia !1ari11d,,,. St'11g/i v . .\'. Kamat'/ St'11glt & Or.1'., A.J:R, 1957 S.C. 271. followed. S111t. Hanu
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