JAGMOHAN SINGH versus THE STATE OF U. P.

Citation: [1973] 2 S.C.R. 541 · Decided: 03-10-1972 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: S.M. SIKRI · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 14 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

541 
A 
JAGMOHAN SINGH 
v. 
THE STATE OF U. P. 
October 3, 1972 
[S. M. SIKRI, CJ., A. N. RAY, I. D. DUA, D. G. l'ALEKAR AND 
B 
M. H. BEG, JJ.J. 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
Jndiu.11 Penal ('ode S. 302-Vlllidity-Provi'sion for sentence of death 
whether violative of frcedo111s under Art. 19 · Constitution of /ndia-
U'hether suf]ers jro//l excessive delegation-Whether violative of Art. 14 
-Whether deprive~· ac:cused of his life without any "protedure estab-
lished hr low" wi1!1in 111caning of Art 21. 
The sentence of death for an offence under S. 302 of the lndian 
Penal Code 
imposed on the appellant by the Sessions Judge and con-
firmed by he High Court was challenged in appeal by special leave 
in this Court on the following grounds : (i) that the death sentence 
puts an end to all fundamental rights guaranteed under clauses (a) to 
(g) of sub-clause (ii) of Art. 19 of the Constitution and therefore the 
law with regard to capital sentenc\, is unreasonable and nol 
in 
the 
interest of the general public; (ii) that the o'scretion invested 
in 
the 
J udgcs to impose capital punishment is not booed on any stunt.lards 
or policy required by the Legislature for imposing capital punish1ncnt 
in 
preference 
to 
imprisonment 
for 
1ife; 
(iii) 
that 
th~ 
un~ 
controlled and unguided discretion in the Judges to 
impose 
t.:apita1 
punishment or i.mprison1nent for 1ife is hit by Art. 14 of the Constitution 
(iv) that the pfovisions of the Jaw do not provide a procedure for trial 
of factors and circumstances crucial for making the choice betv,.'cen the 
capital penalty and imprisonment for life, and therefore Art. 21 is violated. 
Dismissing the appeal, 
HELD : (i) Articles 72(1 )(c), and 134 of the Constitution and 
entries l and 2 in List Ill of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution 
show that the Constitution nlakers had recognised the death 
sentence 
as a permisSible punishment and had made constitutional provi~ion:-. 1vr 
appeal, reprieve, and the like. 
But, more important than 
these 
pro-
visions in the Constitution is Art. 21, which provides that no person 
shall be deprived of his life except according to procedure established 
by law. 
The implication is very clear. 
Deprivation of life is constitu~ 
tionally permissible if that is done according to procedure established 
by law. 
In the face of the'.e indications of constitutional postulate• it 
will be very difficult to hold that capital sentence was regarded pa se' as 
unreasonable or not in the public interest. 
In the context of our Criminal law, which punishes murder one can-
·not ignore the fru::t that life imprisonment works out in mosi cases to 
a dozen years of imprisonment and it may be seriously questioned 
-v.-hether that sole alternative will be an adequate substitute for the death 
penalty. 
Proposals for its abolition have not been accepted by Parlia-
ment. In this state of affairs, it cannot be said that capital punishment 
"' such, is either unreasonable or not in public interest. [5t9CF; 552B] ' 
(ii) In India, the onerous duty of passing the death sentence is cast 
on Ju~ges, and, for more _than a century, judge~ have. been ca~ryi~g 
out this duty under the Indian Penal Code. 
!Ji.e 1mposS1bility of laying 
down standards is at the very core of the Criminal Ja\V as. administered 
;n Jn<lia ~hich inve1;ts the Judges with a verv wide discretion 
1~ thie 
542 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1973] 2 s.c.R. 
matter of fixing the degree of punishment. 
That 
discretion 
in 
the 
matter of sentence is liable to be corrected by superior Courts. 
The 
exercise of judicial discretion on well recognised principles is in the 
final analysis, the safest possible safeguard for the accused. [5S9B] 
·(iii) Crime as crime may appear to be superficially the same, but 
the facts and cirdun1stances of a crin1e are widely different, and, since 
a decision of the court as regards punishment is dependent upon a con-
sideration of aH the fads and circumstances. there is hardly any ground 
for a challenge uhder Art. 14. [559G] 
(iv) The acciused in a trial for n1urdcr has opportunities at various 
· !:tages of the trial to bring on record 
1f~.cts and circun1stances that v.;ould 
iustifv. on conviction, the Jesser penalty of 
!if~ i1nprison1nent. 
T'hcre 
is also nothir:g in the Criminal Procec';ore Code which prevents addition-
al e\·~dence bein"g taken. 
It is, however, not the expericncle of crin1in~tl 
courts. in India that the accused lh'ith a vic·\v to obtaining a reduc

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