JAGDISH PRASAD versus STATE OF U.P.

Citation: [1965] 3 S.C.R. 806 · Decided: 15-04-1965 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: A.K. SARKAR · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
JAGDISH PRASAD 
v. 
STATE OF U.P. 
April 15, 1965 
[A. -K. SARKAR, RAGHUBAR DAYAL AND R. S. BACHAWAT, JJ.J 
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954-Higher punwhment 
for "second o:[J'ence"·-Meaning of "second offence"-Whether offence of 
the same type or offence subsequent in tim~, 
C 
The appellant having been once convicted under the Prevention 
of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 for keeping foodstuff for sale in d 
container without coverini< it, was for a second time convicted for 
.selling foodstuff which had been coloured with a prohibited dye. 
Treating the latter conviction as a "second offence" under s. 16(1) 
of the Act the Trial Court sentenced the appellant to two years D 
imprisonment. Having failed to get r.edress in the High Court he 
appealed to this Court by special leave. 
It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the "second 
o'i'ence" contemplated by s. 16(1) was an offence of the same kind 
as the first and not any offence under the Act. 
HELD: (i) The word second in the expression "second offence" 
in s. 16(1) means second in time, and not second of the same type. 
The· section does not say "second offence" of ·the same type; the 
latter words are not there. On the other hand from the phrase 'sub-
sequen't offences' used in the section in respect of offences subsequent 
E 
to the third one, it is clear that the words 'first', 'second' and 'third' 
were intended to indicate things 
happening one after another in F 
point of time. 
[808 BJ 
The object of the sub-section is cjearly to prevent repetition of 
offences. That is why for the offence subsequently committed a 
heavier sentence is provid~d. No object could have been served by 
seeking to stop the repetition of the same type of conduct only. 
(808 E-FJ 
(ii) There is no foundation in the Act for distinguishing between 
trivial and serious offences and then arguing that the Act could not 
have intended to impose a heavier punishment for a second offence 
which might be of a less serious nature than the first. The Act pro-
vides the same punishment for ·each offence under it. If the punish-
ment is the same, it would follow that the statute considered them 
to be of the same seriousness. [808 HJ 
(iii) The "second: offence~ mus~ be an offence under ~he A~ 
althoug~ it is not specifically so stated. Section 16(1) says that .1f 
any person does any of the acts mentioned in els. (a) to (g) in it, 
he shall be punishable for the first offence with a certain pe~alty, 
for the second offence with a higher penalty, and for the third a 
still. higher penalty. It is clear that the acts or omissions mentioned 
806 
G 
B 
A 
B 
JAGDISH PRASAD v. STATE (Sa;rkar, J.) 
807 
in the different clauses constitute the offences for which the penal-
ties are provided. From this structure of the sub-section the impli-
cation necessarily arises that the penalties were imposed for offences 
under the Act only. [809 E-F] 
City Board, Saharanpur v. Abdul Wahid, A.LR. (1959) All. 695, 
Chuttan v. State, A.LR. (1950) All. 629 and In re Authers, (1889), L.R. 
22 Q.B.D. 345, referred to. 
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JurusmcTION: Criminal Appeal No. 43 
of 1965. 
c 
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated 
November 10, 1964 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Revi-
sion No. 2097 of 1963. 
D 
E 
F 
B. C. Misra, for the appellant. 
0. P. Rana, for the respondent. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by. 
Sarkar, J. This appeal raises a question of construc-
tion of sub-s. (I) of s. 16 of the Prevention of Food Adul-
teration Act, 1954. The sub-section in providing for punishment for 
breaches of the Act slates, "for a second offence, with imprison-
ment for a term which may extend to two years and with fine". 
In respect of the first offence it provides for a smaller sentence. 
The question is whether the appellant was liable to punishment £or 
a second offence. The order of this Court granting leave to appeal 
confind it only to that question. 
It appears that on an earlier occasion the appellant kept food-
stuff for sale in a container without covering it as required by 
sub-r. (3) of r. 49 of the rules made under the Act and was there-
upon convicted under s. 16 and sentenced to a fine of Rs. 40/- as 
tor a first offence. This time he has been convicted for selling food-
stuff which had been coloured with a dye the use of which was 
prohibited by r. 28 of the same rules. 
G 
Learned counsel for the appellant stated that the present was 
not a seco

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