JAGAT SINGH KISHOR SINGH DARBAR ETC. versus THE STATE OF GUJARAT

Citation: [1979] 3 S.C.R. 33 · Decided: 06-02-1979 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: P.S. KAILASAM · Disposal: Dismissed
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Judgment (excerpt)

JAGAT SINGH KISHOR SINGH DARBAR ETC. 
v. 
THE STATE OF GUJARAT 
February 6, 1979 
[P. s. KAILASAM, D. A. DESAI AND A. D. KosiiAL, JJ.] 
33 
Bon1bay PJ'ei•ention. of Gan1bli11g Act, 1887-S. 3(ii)-Scope of-Direct 
,.relation lVitlz use of the premises or with instrument of gaming-If necessary 
to bring the place withln the scope of the definition-Mere probability or 
expectation of profit-If snfficient-Presun1ption under s. 1-When raised. 
The term "common gaming house" has been defined in s. 3 of the Bombay 
i:'Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887. Under cl. (i) of the section a house or 
-pklce in which any of six different types of gaming enun1erated therein takes 
place or in which instruments of gaming are kept or used for such gaming 
would fall within the definition. 
Clause (ii) of that section states that in the 
·-case of any other form of gaming (a) any house, room or place whatsoever 
in which any instn1ments of gaming \J.'fe kept or used (b) for the profit or 
gain.of the person owning, occupying, using or keeping such house, etc., (c) 
by way of charge for the use of such house, roon1 or instrument or otherwise 
holvsoever, would be a common gaming house. 
Certain instruments of gaming were seized by the po1ice from the premises 
-of appellant no. 1 in both the appeals. 
He was convicted 
for 
keeping a 
common gaming house while the other appe11ants we:re convicted of an offence 
under s. 5 of the Act. 
On appeal, rejecting the appellants' contention that a mere expectation or 
probability of profit arising from gaming, without establishing a direct rela-
tion with the use of the premises or v-:ith instruments of gaming, would not 
·be sufficient to bring the p1ace within the scope of the definition, the High 
:Court held that the purpose of occupying or using the premises must be such 
profit or gain as meant a probability or expectation of profit or gain and not 
necessarily a certainty of it. 
The argument urged before the High Court was reiterated in appeal before 
this Court. 
Dismissing the appeals, 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
HEID : 1. The expression "or otherwise hO'-''Soever" is of 
the 
widest 
·Omplitude and cannot be restricted to the words immediately 
preceding it, 
G 
namely, "for profit or gain. . . . by way of charge for the use of the 
pre-
· mises." 
[37F] 
2. For proving that a particular house, room or place was 
a 
common 
·gaming house, it would be sufficient if it was shown that the house was one 
in which instruments of gaming were kept or were used for the 
profit ·or 
gain of the person keeping or using such place, that is, where . the 
person 
"keeping or using the house knew that profit or gain would in all probability 
result from the use of the instruments of gaming. 
Profit or gain may not 
·actually result from such use. Even the hope of making a profit out of the 
H 
A 
8 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
' ' 
34 
SUPRJ/ME COURT REPORTS 
[1979] 3 s.c.R. 
gambling would be sufficient to satisfy the definition. In a given 
case 
the· 
occupier of a house may allow it to be used by the public for gambling and 
he himself may take part in it in the hope of making profit although he may 
not necessarily make it every time. 
Such a hope would be sufficient to make 
the house a common gaming house and the occupier liable for keeping such 
a house. At the same time the prosecution must establish that the purpose 
of keeping or using the instrun1ents was profit or gain, which may be done 
either by showing that the owner was charging for use of the instruments of 
gaming or for the use of the house, room or place or in any other manner 
that may be possible having regard ·to the nature of the gan1e carried on. 
[38E, 39E-Fl 
3. The profit or gain and the other requirements mentioned in cl. (ii) of 
the definition are a matter of peremptory presumption which has to be raised 
by the court as soon as seizure of instruments of gaming from the place is 
prorcd. Section 7 which allows a presumption to be raised against the accus-
ed, provides that seizure Of instruments of gaming from the premises shall 
be evidence, until the contrary was proved, that they were used as a common 
- gaming house and the persons found therein were present for the purpose of 
gaming, although no gaming was actually s'een. 
In the instant case there is 
no evidence in rebuttal of the presumption. [40F-GJ 
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos. 126-
127 of 1972. 
(From the Judgment and Order dt. 21-4-72 of the Gnjarat Hi
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