JAGAN NATH versus RAM KISHAN DASS AND ANR.

Citation: [1985] 2 S.C.R. 388 · Decided: 12-12-1984 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: Y.V. CHANDRACHUD · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

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388 
JAGAN NATH 
v. 
RAM KISHAN DASS AND ANR. 
December 12, 1984 
[Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, CJ. AND R:S PATHAK J.) 
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958-S. 14(1) proviso scope of. 
The respondentsJ Landlord, filed three ejectment applications on 
March 9, 1967, May 13, 1968 and March 9, 1971 respectively against the 
appellants, a tenant for possession of one room situate at Kamla Nagar, 
New Delhi. The first application was on the ground of non.payment arrears 
of rent and bona fide requirement, the second on the ground of bona fide 
requirement of the landlord and the third one again on the ground of non .. 
payment of arrears of rent. Tb" first application, where the appellant 
complied with an order passed by tbe Rent Controller u/s 14(2) r/w s. IS(!) 
of the Delhi Rent Control Act; 1958 calling upon the appeHant to deposit 
arrears of rent, was 
with~raw~ by the respondents subsequently on the 
ground that they had not given to the appellant a notice to quit. The 
second application was dismissed on merits. In the third application out of 
which the present appeal arises, the Additional Rent Controller passed atl 
order of eviction against the appellant holding that no order u/s. 15(1), of 
the Act could be passed on the ground that such a benefit was given to the 
appellant in the first eviction petition and that by reason of the proviso to 
sub-s. 2 of s. 14 of the Act, the appellant could not claim that benefit 
once again. The appeal of the appellant against the c rder of eviction was 
allowed by the Rent Control Tribunal. which took the view th at the 
appellant was entitled to the benefit of the provision contained in section 
14 (2) of the Act and that, the proviso to that sub-section bad no appJi-
oation because, the benefit of the provision contained in section 14 (2) was 
being availed of by the appellant for the first time in the present proceed-
ings. 
But the High Court in second apf'cal set aside the judgment of the 
Rent Control Tribunal and restored that of the Rent Controller. 
The appellant contended that the proviso to sub·s. (2) of s. 14 can 
have no application to the instant case because, in the first ejectment pro~ 
ceedings the appel1ant had not obtained any benefit under that sub-section. 
The respondent contended that if a tenant avails of the benefit of an order 
passed u/s. IS (I); he must be regarded as having obtained the benefit of 
the provision contained ins. 14 (2) and that the final result of tho eviction 
petition in which an order was passed under section 15 (1) for the first time, 
or the form of the final order passed in that proceeding, has no relevance on 
the question whether the tenant bad obtained benefit of the provision con· 
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tained in section 14 (2). 
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1AGAN NATH v. RAM KISHAN 
389 
Allowing the appeal, 
HELD : (!)Section 14 (2) of the Act provides that oo order for the 
recovery of possession of any premises can be made on the ground that the 
tenaat bas committed default in the payment of rent, if he pays or deposits 
the rent in accordance with the prov is ions of section 15. 
The benefit which 
the tenant obtains under section 14 (2) is the avoidance of the decree for Pas .. 
session. ThoD;gh he bad committed default in the payment of rent, no decree 
for possession can be passed again<;t him. This benefit accrues to the terant by 
reason cf the fact that he bas complied with the order passed by the Control-
ler under section JS of the Act. The passing of an order under section lS is 
not a benefit which accrues to the tenant under section 14(2). It is obligatory 
upon' the Controller to pass an order under section 15(1) in every proceeding 
for the recovery of possession on the ground specified in section 14 (1) (a), 
that isJ on the ground.that the tenant has committed default in the payment 
of rent. 
That is a facility which the law obliges the Controller to give to 
the tenant uodcr section 15. It is through the medium of that facility that 
the tenant obtains the benefit under section 14(2), And that benefit consists 
in the acquisition of an immunity against the passing of an order of posses~ 
sion on the ground of default in the payment of rent. It must follow that, it 
is only if an order for possession is not passed against the tenant by reason 
of the provision contained in sec.tioo 14(2), that it can be said tbat 111 has 
obtained a benefit under that section. [394C-G] 
(2) If the earlier proceeding was withdrawn by the 

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