JAFFER HUSSEIN DASTGIR versus STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

Citation: [1970] 2 S.C.R. 332 · Decided: 11-09-1969 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: S.M. SIKRI · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 2 judgment(s) · cites 1 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

332 
JAFFER HUSSEIN DASTGm 
v. 
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 
September 11, 1969 
(S. M. S!KRI, G. K. MITTER AND P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY, JJ.] 
Jndian Evidence Act, 1872, s. 27--Scope of. 
The appellant was charged under s. 379/34 l.P.C. for committing 
the.ft of a parcel containing diamonds along~ with the, two other persons. 
In the course of investigation the police went to a newspaper office where 
they learnt that one of the co-accused had come to put in 
advertise-
in.r.nt respecting the recovery of the diamonds, stating that it was in 
his rossession, and left ·an address with the newspaper. The police could 
not trace that co-accused, but later, as a result of infurmation f\ftnished 
by the appellant to the police and the panchas the police were taken to 
a pJace where the diamonds were discovered from that other co-accused. 
On the question whether the statement of the appellant was edmissible 
in evidence against him under s. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 
HELD : The statement was not admissible. 
Under s. 25 of the Evidence Act no confession made by an accused 
to n police officer can be admitted in evidl nee against him. An exce.ption 
to this is ho\\'ever provided by s. 26 which makes a confessional statement 
made before a Magistrate admissible in evidence against an accused not· 
withs.tanding the fact that he was in custody of the police when he made 
the incriminating statement. 
Section 27 is a proviso to s. 26 and makes 
admissible so much of the statement of the accused Which leads to the 
discovery of a fact deposed to by him and connected w_ith the crime, 
hTe~pective of the question "'.:hether it is confessional or otherwise. The 
essential ingredient of the section is that the information given by the 
accused must lead to the discovery of the fact -which is the direct outcome 
of such information. 
Secondly, only such portion 
o'f 
the 
information 
given as is distinctly connected 
wit~ the said recovery is 
admissible 
against the accused. 
Thirdly, the discovery of the fact 
must relate 
to 
the commissioh of some offence. 
The embargo on statements 
of the 
accused before the police will not apply if all the above conditions are 
.fulfilled. If an accused charged with a theft of articles or receiving stolen 
articles, within the meaning of s. 411 l.P.C.. states to the police. 'I will 
shew you the articles at the place where I have kept them' and the 
articles are actually found there, there can be no doubt that the informa· 
tion given by him led tO the discovery of a fact i.e. keeping of the articles 
by the accused at the place mentioned. 
The 
discovery of the 
fact 
deposed to in such a case is not the discovery of the articles but the 
discovery of the fact that the articles were kept by the accused at a 
par1icular place. 
In principle. there is no difference between the above 
statement and that made by the appellant in this case which in effect 
fs that 'I will show you the person to whom I have given the diamonds 
exceeding 200 in number'. 
The only difference between the two state-
ments is that a 'named person' is substituted for 'the place' where the 
article is kept. 
In neither caoe are. the articles or the diamonds the 
fact discovered. [338 C-HJ 
In the present case, the police had learnt earlier that the other accused 
hnd the custody of the diamonds .. Therefore, the statement of the appel-
' 
A 
B 
c 
E 
F 
G 
H 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
JAFFER HUSSEIN v. MAHARASHTRA (Mitter, J.) 
333.· 
lant that the other accused had the custody of the diamonds 
would not 
~ something unknown to the police so as to constitute. 'a fact deposed 
to as discovered in consequence of information received' from the appel-
lant. 
The discovery, if any, merely related to the whereabouts of the 
other accused. 
There was no discovery of any fact deposed to by the 
appellant within the meaning of s. 27. If the police had not gone to the 
otlice of the ne\rspaper and had not learnt of the complicity of the other 
accu~ed with the crime., the statement of the appellant would amount. 
to infurmation received from him relating to the discovery of the dia-
monds in the custody of that other accu<ed. [343 Bl 
Pulukuri Katayya v. King Emperor, 76 I.A. 65 and K. Chinnaswamy 
Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, [1963] 3 S.C.R. 412. referred tu. 
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 
84 of 1968. 
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated 
February 9, 12, 1968 of the Bombay High Court i

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