J.S. SEKHON versus UNION OF INDIA

Citation: [2010] 9 S.C.R. 1025 · Decided: 10-08-2010 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA · Disposal: Dismissed
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Judgment (excerpt)

[2010] 9 S.C.R. 1025 
J.S. SEKHON 
v. 
UNION OF INDIA 
(Civil Appeal No. 6274 of 2003) 
AUGUST 10, 2010 
[DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA AND ANIL R. · DAVE, 
JJ.] 
A 
B 
Army Act, 1950 - s.122 - Conviction by General Court 
Martial (GCM) of Garrison Engineer for defrauding the Army C 
- Conviction challenged on ground that the convening of the 
GCM was barred by time in view of s. 122 - Held: The 
limitation period for holding a trial by court martial is three 
years - In the instant case, what is relevant is the knowledge 
of the competent authority to convene a general court martial D 
against the delinquent - Since the authority competent to 
initiate action derived its knowledge about the commission of 
the offence on submission of the report of the Court of Enquiry 
on 11-10-1996 or at the most on submission of the report by 
the technical board of officers on 9-4-1995 and the date of E 
convening of the trial by general court martial was 9-3-1998, 
the trial was not barred by limitation. 
F 
Army Regulations - Paragraph 449(b) - Scope and 
applicability of -
C~nviction by General Court Martial (GCM) 
of Garrison Engineer for defrauding the Army - Conviction 
challenged on ground that the Convening Officer of the GCM 
being the Commanding Officer of the delinquent, there was 
violation of the provision of paragraph 449(b) - Held: The 
submission made by the appellant that the convening officer 
of the General Court Martial,was his commanding officer and, 
G 
. therefore, there was violation of Paragraph 449(b) is factually 
incorrect- There was no violation at all of Paragraph 449(b). 
Words and Phrases - "person aggrieved by the offence" 
1025 
H 
1026 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2010] 9 S.C.R. 
A and "knowledge of the authority competent to initiate action 
[in s.122(1)(b) of the Army Act, 1950] - Meaning of 
General Court Martial (GCM) proceedings were held 
against appellant-Garrison Engineer on the ground that 
8 he defrauded the Army by entering into agreements with 
private parties for purchasing services to replace and 
repair items at rates much higher than permissible under 
the standard scheduled rates .. The GCM convicted the 
appellant and sentenced him to one year rigorous 
C imprisonment. The conviction of appellant was upheld by 
the High Court. 
In the instant appeal, the appellant challenged his 
conviction on two grounds; 1) that the convening of the 
GCM was barred by time in view of s.122 of the Army Act, 
D 1950 and 2) that the Convening Officer of the GCM being 
the Commanding Officer of the. appellant, there was 
violation of the provision of paragraph 449(b) of the Army 
Regulations. 
E 
Dismissing the appeal, the Court 
HELD:1.1. Section 122 of the Army Act, 1950 provides 
the period of limitation for trial, and prescribes that no trial 
by court martial of any person shall be commenced after 
the expiration of a period of three years (a) from the date 
F of the offence or, (b) where the commission of the offence 
was not known to the person aggrieved by the offence 
or to the authority competent to initiate action, the first 
day on which such offence comes to the knowledge of 
such person or authority, whichever is earlier or (c) where 
G it is not known by whom the offence was committed, the 
first day on which the identity of the offender is known -
to the person aggrieved by the offence or by the authority 
competent to initiate action, whichever is earlier. In the 
present case, clause (b) of sub-Section (1) of Section 122 
H 
J.S. SEKHON v. UNION OF INDIA 
1027 
is applicable and hence the limitation of three years 
A 
period would commence from the date of the knowledge 
of the commission of such offence by the person 
aggrieved by the offence or by the authority competent 
to initiate action. [Paras 11, 12, 13] [1033-H; 1034-~·D] 
B 
1.2. The factual position of the instant case indicates 
that although a vigilance check report was submitted on 
19.12.1994, the Commanding Works Engineer sought for 
comments from the appellant and on receipt of the 
comments of the appellant some variations were found 
C 
while comparing the vigilance report and the comments 
of the appellant and, therefore, a Technical Board of 
Officers was required to be constituted which was 
accordingly constituted on 29.3.1995. When the technical 
board of officers so constituted submitted its report on 
9.4.1995, it could be said that the fact of commission of D 
offence by the appellant came to be finally recorded,
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