J. KUMARADASAN NAIR & ANR. versus IRIC SOHAN & ORS.

Citation: [2009] 3 S.C.R. 238 · Decided: 12-02-2009 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: S.B. SINHA · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 2 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

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[2009) 3 S.C.R. 238 
J. KUMARADASAN NAIR & ANR. 
II. 
IRIC SOHAN & ORS. 
(Civil Appeal Nos. 943-944 of 2009) 
FEBRUARY 12, 2009 
[S.8. SINHA AND DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, JJ.] 
LIM/TA TION ACT, 1963: 
Section 14 - Interpretation/application of - In the facts of 
the case especially since the party was prosecuting the first 
appeal and second appeal before the wrong forum, and 
mentioning a wrong provision, S.14(2) per se may not be 
applicable but the principles thereof would be applicable for 
the purpose of condonation of delay in terms of S.5 - Matter 
remitted to High Court with a request to dispose of the matter 
as expeditiously as possible preferably within three months. 
Interpretation and/or application of Section 14 of the 
Limitation Act, 1963 is in question in this appeal as the 
appellant was prosecuting the first and second appeals 
before a wrong forum, mentioning a wrong provision. 
On behalf of the appellant, it was contended that the 
High Court committed a serious error insofar as it failed 
F to take into consideration that the appellant was bona fide 
prosecuting the first appeal and second appeal before a 
wrong forum and, thus, Sub-section (2) of Section 14 of 
the Limitation Act would be attracted. 
On behalf of the respondents, it was contended that 
G the provision of Sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the 
Limitation Act is not applicable as the same applied in a 
suit; and that the appellants in fact filed an application 
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act but withdrew the 
same. 
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238 
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J. KUMARADASAN NAIR & ANR. v. IRIC SOHAN & ORS. 239 
Allowing the appeal, this Court 
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HELD: 1. The provisions of Sections 5 and 14 of the 
Limitation Act alike should, thus, be applied in a broad-
based manner. When Sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the 
Limitation Act per se is not applicable, the same would not 
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mean that the principles akin thereto would not be 
applied. Otherwise, the provisions of Section 5 of the 
Limitation Act would apply. There cannot be any doubt 
whatsoever that the same would be applicable to a case 
of this nature. [Para 12] [245-G; 246-A] 
2. There cannot furthermore be any doubt 
whatsoever that having regard to the definition of 'suit' 
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as contained in Section 2(1) of the Limitation Act, a 
revision application will not answer the said description. 
But, although the provisions of Section 14 of the 
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Limitatio·n Act per se are not applicable, the principles 
thereof would be applicable for the purpose of 
condonation of delay in filing an appeal or a revision 
application in terms of Section 5 thereof. [Para 13] [246-
B] 
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3.1. It is also now a well-settled principle of law that 
mentioning of a wrong provision or non-mentioning of 
any provision of law would, by itself, be not sufficient to 
take away the jurisdiction of a court if it is otherwise 
vested in it in law. While exercising its power, the court 
will merely consider whether it has the source to exercise 
such power or not. The court will not apply the beneficient 
provisions like Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act in 
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a pedantic manner. When the provisions are meant to 
apply and in fact found to be applicable to the facts and 
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circumstances of a case, there is no reason as to why the 
court will refuse to apply the same only because a wrong 
provision has been mentioned. In a case of this nature, 
Sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Limitation Act per se 
may not be applicable, but, as indicated hereinbefore, the 
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240 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2009] 3 S.C.R. 
principles thereof would be applicable for the purpose of 
,< 
A 
condonation of delay in terms of Section 5 thereof. [Para 
14) [246-D] 
3.2. The impugned judgment cannot be sustained 
B which is set aside accordingly, the matter is remitted to 
the High Court for consideration thereof on merits. High 
Court is requested to dispose of the revision application 
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filed by the appellants herein as expeditiously as possible 
.,. 
and preferably within a period of three mont:1s from the 
date of communication of this order. This unusual 
c request is made keeping in view the fact that the 
respondents have obtained a decree as far back as in 
1969. [Para 15] [250-E] 
Ram/al and others v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 
D 361; Ghasi Ram and Others v. Chait Ram Saini and Others 
(1998) 6 SCC 200; Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. 
Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department and Others (2008) 
7 SC

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