LexJ.J. IRANI & ANR. versus STATE OF JHARKHAND
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[2014] 8 S.C.R. 385 J.J. IRANI & ANR. v. STATE OF JHARKHAND (Criminal Appeal Nos. 1668-70 of 2014) AUGUST 8, 2014 [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA AND S.A. BOBDE, JJ.] A B Factories Act, 1948 - s. 106 - Limitation for prosecµtion - Fire accident dated 3.3.1989 - Complaint by Inspector of C factories on 7.5.1990 - Whether barred by /imitation - Held: A complaint is required to be filed within three months of the date on which the alleged commission of offence came to the knowledge of the Inspector - In the facts of the case, the date of knowledge to the Inspector would be 5.3.1989 i.e. when the D preliminary investigation was conducted - The date on which the Inspector formally received the detailed inquiry report, cannot be considered as date of knowledge, in the facts of the case - Bihar Factory Rules, 1950. Practice and Procedure - Interim order/stay of proceedings before lower forum - Continuation of, despite disposal of the procee.dings in higher forum - Held: Such continuation cannot be assumed. E On 3.3.1989, during celebration of Foundation Day of F Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd. (TISCO), the temporary pandals, constructed at the gate of the factory caught fire resulting in death and injuries to the people present there. Notice of intimation of the accident was given to the Inspector" of Factories. Preliminary investigation was G conducted on 5,3.1989 and 6.3.1989, and thereby recommended the State to constitute a Committee for conducting detailed investigation. The report of the enquiry was handed over by the Committee, to the 385 H 386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 8 S.C.R. A Inspector of Factories on 23.4.1990. Pursuant thereto, on 7 .5.1990, the Inspector of Factories filed criminal complaints. Objection was raised as to maintainability of the complaint on the ground that the same was barred by limitation in view of s. 106 of Factories Act, 1948. As B per s. 106, the complaint should have been filed within 3 months of the date on which the alleged commission of offence came to the knowledge of the Inspector. Trial court dismissed the complaint, holding that limitation would be reckoned from 5.3.1989 as date of knowledge c because the inspector would be considered to be having knowledge of the occurrence on 5.3.1989 when the preliminary inquiry was conducted . In Revision petition against the order of trial court, High Court held that there is difference between 'knowledge of accident' and 0 'knowledge of commission of offence'; and that the Inspector could have known about the commission of .. offence only after receiving the inquiry report i.~. on 23.4.1990 and thus the complaint was filed within limitation. Hence, the present appeals. E The State inter alia contended that the High Court could not have proceeded to decide the matter in view of the fact that the proceedings before High Court were stayed by Supreme Court in a writ petition filed by the victims of the accident. (However, the writ petition was F disposed of before the High Court passed the order). Allowing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1. In the present case, the Inspector was himself part of the team, which conducted the preliminary G inquiry between 5th and 6th March, 1989. The inquiry is a detailed investigation going into all aspects of the occurrence. In these circumstances, it is not possible to hold that the Inspector of Factories, who undertook a detailed inquiry into the accident along with the Chief H J.J. IRANI v. STATE OF JHARKHAND 387 Inspector of Factories, remained ignorant that the A offences in question have been allegedly committed. It is proper to assume that an officer, conducting an investigation, comes to know what has happened, that being the only purpose of the investigation. It has not been disputed at any stage that the complainant was not B associated with and did not participate in the preliminary investigation. [Paras 15 and 16] [395-E-G] 1.2. A perusal of allegations of the offence against the appellants, makes it clear that an inquiry or investigation at the site of the accident was not necessary C in order to gain knowledge of the alleged breach. For instance, the failure to submit "Plans of Pandals and Structures" as required under Section 6(1 )(aa) of the Act read with Rule 8 of the 8ihar Factory Rules, 1950; not drawing up an "on-sight" Emergency Plan and Disaster D Control for the Pandals and Structures as req
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