J BAR COUNCIL OF MAHARASHTRA versus M. V. DABHOLKAR ETC. ETC.

Citation: [1976] 2 S.C.R. 48 · Decided: 03-10-1975 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: V.R. KRISHNA IYER · Disposal: Disposed off
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Judgment (excerpt)

A 
B 
c 
D 
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F 
G 
H 
48 
BAR COUNCIL OF MAHARASHTRA 
v. 
M. V. DABHOLKAR ETC. ETC. 
October 3, 1975 
[\l. R. KRISHNA IYER, R. S. SARKARIA, A. C. GUPTA AND S. MURTAZA 
FAZAL ALI, JJ.] 
Advocates Act, 1961-S. 35(i) and r. 36 of the Rules made under 
the 
Act-Scope of. 
Profcssio11a/ co11duct-So/iciti11g Jl'Drk-lf a111ou11ts to misconduct-Disci-
plinary Committee of State Bar Council-D'i!fects in its w()'rki11g. 
The rule of law cannot be built on the ruins of democracy. for where law 
ends tyranny begins. If such be the keynote thought for the very survival 
of our Republic, the integral bond between the lawyer and the public is un-
breakable. And the vital role of the lawyer depends upon his probity and 
professional life-style. 
Be it remembered that tbe central function of the legal 
profession is to promote the administration of justice. If the practice of law 
is thus a public utility of great implications and a monopoly is statutorily 
granted by the nation, it obligates. the lawyer to observe scrupulously those 
norms which make him worthy of the confidence of the community in him as 
a vehicle of justice-social justice. The Bar cannot behave 
wit~ doubtful 
scruples or strive to thrive on litigation. Canons or conduct cannot be cry• 
stallised into rigid rules but felt by the collective conscience of the practi-
tioners as right. [55 F-H]. 
Justice cannot be attained without the stream being pellucid throughout 
its course and that is of _great public concern, not merelv professional care. [50 F]. 
The respondents, who were lawyers practising in. criminal courts, were 
charged with professional misconduct under s. 
35(1) 
of the 
Advocates Act, 
1961. in that they positioned themselves at the entrance to the Magistrates' 
Courts, watchful of the arrival of potential litigants and at 
sight, 
rushed 
towards the clients in an ugly scrimmage to snatch the briefs. to lay claim 
to the engagements even by physical fight to undercut fees, and by this un-' 
edifying exhibition. sometimes carried even into the Bar Library, solicited 
and secured work for themselves. 
The Bar Council of Maharashtra considered 
the complaint received from the High Court against the lawyers and referred 
the matter to its Disciplinary Committee for fu~ther probe. The Disciplinary 
Committee of the State Bar Council held the respondents guilty of professional 
misconduct and suspend·~d them 
from practising as 
advocates for a period 
of three years. 
On appeal, the Disciplinar·y Committee of the Bar Council 
of India held that under r. 36 of the rules framed under s. 49(c) of the AdvCJ'o' 
cates Act. in order to be amenable to the disciplinary jurisdiction the advocates 
must have (i) solicited work (ii) from a particular person and (iii) 
with 
respect to a case. It held that unless the three elements were satisfied it could 
not be said that an advocate had acted beyond the standard of professional con-
duct and etiquette. 
It. ther-efore, absolved all the respondents of the charge 
of professional misconduct. The State Bar Council has come in appeal to 
this Court. 
HELD : Rule 36 of the rules framed ·under s. 49 (c) of the Advocates 
Act, fairly construed,· sets, out wholesome rules of professional. conducn 
and 
the dis-section of the said rule, the way it has been done by the Disciplinary 
Tribunal, disfigur~s it. (59 CJ. 
( 1) The canons of ethics and propriety for the legal profession totally taboo 
conduct by way of' solictiting, advertising. scrambling and other obnoxious 
practices, subtle or clumsy_ for betterment of legal business. 
Law is no trade, 
briefs no merchandise and so the leaven of commercial competition or procure-
ment should not vulgarise the legal profession •. [60 CJ. 
' J 
• 
llAR COUNCIL v. M. v. DABHOLKAR (Krishna Iyer, J.) 
49 
(2) (a) The ;procedure adopted by the State Bar Council in referring the 
cases to its Disciplinary Committee i~ in due compliance with s. 35 (1) of the 
Advocates Act. (51 G--D]. 
(b) The contention that the resolution of the Bar Council did not ex facie 
disclose that it had reason to believe that the advocates were guilty of profes-
sional misconduct had no merit. The reqµirement of "reason 
to 
believe" 
cannot be converted into a formalised procedural road blocik, it being 
essen-
tially a barrier against frivolous enquiries. It is implicit in· the resoh1tion 
of the Bar Council, when it says· that it has considered the complaint and 
decided to refer the matter to the Disc
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