LexIZHAR AHMAD KHAN versus UNION OF INDIA
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- - - - 3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 235 explain the case made against hiin and that state· ment can be taken into consideration in judging the innocence or guilt of the person so accused. Therefore if the courts below have accepted this explanation it must be held that the respondent has discharged the onus which was placed on him by s. 65(2) of the Act. The appeal is therefore dismissed. Appeal dismissed. IZHAR AHMAD KHAN v. UNION OF INDIA (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR, K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS GUPTA and N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.) Citizenship, Termination of-Determination by Central Government-Rule rnaking obtaining of passport from another country conclusive evidence-Validity-Citizenship Act, 1955( 57 of 1955), s. 9(2)-Citizenship Rules, 1956, Sch. Ill, r 3. The petitioners claiming to be Indian Citizens sought to enforce their fundamental rights under Art. 19 (1) (e) of the Constitution. The crucial question was \Vhethcr they \Vere citizens of India. While the petitions were pending the Government of India under s. 9(2) of the citizenship Act, 1955 determined that they had voluntarily acquired the citizenship of Pakistan by the application of r. 3 of Sch. III of the Citizenship Rules, 1956, framed by the Central Government under s. 18 of the Act. Section 9 of the Citizenship Act, 1955, provides as follows:- "( I) Any citizen of India who by naturalisation, regist· ration or otherwise voluntarily acquires, or has at any time between the 26th January, 1950, and the commencement of this Act voluntarily acquired, the citizenship of another country, shall, upon such acquisition or, as the case may be, such commencement, cease to be a citizen of India . (2} If any question arises as to whether, when or how any person has acquired the citizenship of another country, jl Jlla!! be detertnil)ed by such ~uthority! in s.uGh i;nanqer1 alj~ 198% Stat1 of Mahorasher a •• Luman J airam KapurJ. 19•1 1962 lzhar Ahmod Khan v. llnion nf Trltli• 236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1062]"SUPP. having regard to such rules of evidence, as mav be prescribed in 1his behalf." , Rule 30 of the Rules which made the Central Govern- ment the authoricy for the purpose of s.9 (2) provided that for a determination under that section the Central Govern· ment should have due regard to the rules of evidence specified in Sch. II I of the Rules. Ruic 3 of the said schedule was as follows. «The fart that a citizen of India has obtained on any date a passport from the Government of any olhcr country shall be conclusive proof of his having volunlarily acquired the citizenship of the country before that date.'.' After such determination by the Central Government the petitioners challenged the constitulional validity of s. <J (2) of the Citizenship Act, 1955, as also of r. 3 of Sch. II I of the Citizenship Rules, 1956. Their case was that (I) r. 3 of Sch. Ill of the Rules was not a rule of evidence but a rule of substantive Ja\v and ao; such outside the · purvic\\' of the delegated authority conferred by s. 9 (2) as also the general rule making power under s. 18 of the Act, and that (2) s. 9 (2) itself \\'as u1trrr. i·irr-~ as it affected the :::tatl1s of citizenship and deprived the petitioners of their fundamental rights under Art. 19 (I) (e) of the Constitution. Held, (per Gajendragadkar, Wanchoo and Ayyangar, .JJ.) that the contentions raised by the peti1ioners must fail. It was not correct to say that r. 3 of Sr.h III of the Citizenship Rules, 1956, which made it obligatory on the authority to infer the acquisition of foreign cilizenship from the fact of obtaining a passport from a foreign country \\•as not a rule of evidence but a rule of substantive la\\'. Like the n!le of rebuttablc presumption, \vh;ch was undoubtedly a rule of evidence, The function of an irrcbuttable presumption was also to help the judicial mind in apprecia- ting the existence of facts with this differenr.e that while the former was open to rebuttal, the latter v.·as placed beyond rebuttal. So considered a rule of irrcbuttable presumption could not be said to fall outside the law of evidcnc.c. D. fl. Heiner v . .lo/,n. II. ])on11r111, (1932) 76 Law Ed. 772, referred to. That such a rule ruight in son1e cases lead to hardship and injustice was not a relevant consideration in judging its constitutional validity. The real test whether a rule of irrebuttablc preswnption was one of
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