ISRAR versus STATE OF U.P.
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.. ISRAR A V. STATE OF U.P. DECEMBER 6, 2004 [ARIJIT PASAYAT AND S.H. KAPADIA, JJ.] B Penal Code, 1860 : Section 304 read with section 34-Conviction under, on basis of testimony of witnesses-Order upheld by High Court-Justification , C of-Held: Evidence of witnesses being a close relative and consequently being a partisan witnesses cannot be discarded-Falsity of particular material witness does not throw the prosecution case-Further, the evidence describes that the accused had common intention to cause death of deceased-Also light facilitate identification of accused and the dying D declaration does not suffer from any infirmity-Hence, conviction justified- Evidence Act, 1872-Sections 3 and 34. Section 34-Application of-General principals-Discussed. Maxim : "Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus"-App/icability of-Discussed. According to the prosecution, there was previous enmity between the parties. On the date of occurrence at night when Z was returning home along with PW-2, in front of the mosque, appellant-accused caught hold of Z from back and his nephew inflicted blows on him. PWs - 3, 4, 5 rushed to the spot and saw the occurrence and also tried to intervene. Z was taken to the hospital. Case was registered, and his dying declaration was recorded. He died two days thereafter. Autopsy E F was conducted and cause of death was recorded as peritonitis and G broncho pneumonia. Trial Court recorded evidence. Except PW-2 other witnesses narrated the incident as witnessed by them. Trial Court convicted and sentenced the appellant and his nephew under section 302 read with section 34 IPC. High Court upheld the order. Hence the present appeal. H 695 A B 696 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) SUPP. 6 S.C.R. Appellant-accused contended that the eye witnesses being partisan witnesses, their evidence should be discarded; that the principle of ''falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" is applicable; that it could not be established that the accused had any common intention to cause death of the deceased, thus section 34 has no application; that there was no light for facilitating the identification of the accused; and that the cause of death was due to peritonitis and broncho pneumonia and as such with proper medical treatment and care, life of the deceased could have been saved. Respondent-State contended that merely because the witnesses C were friends or relatives of the accused, their credible and cogent evidence cannot be discarded; and tltat the part played by the appellant has been vividly described, therefore, Section 34 IPC has been rightly applied. D Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD : 1.1. Relationship is not a factor to affect the credibility of a witness. It is more often than not that a relation would not conceal actual culprit and make alleg~tions against an innocent person. Foundation has to be laid if plea of false implication is made. In such E cases, the court had to adopt a careful approach and analyse evidence to find out whether it is cogent and credible. Thus, it cannot be said that the witness being close relative and consequently a partisan witness, the evidence should not be relied upon. [701-F-G; 702-E] F Dalip Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab, AIR (1953) SC 364; Guli Chand and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan, [1974) 3 SCC 698; Masalti and Ors. v. State of U.P., AIR (1965) SC 202; State of Punjah v. Jagir Singh, AIR (1973) SC 2407 and Lehna v. State of Haryana, [2002) 3 SCC 76, referred to. G 2.1. It is the duty of Court to separate grain from chaff. Where chaff can be separated from grain, it would be open to the Court to convict an accused notwithstanding the fact that evidence has been found to be deficient to prove guilt of other accused persons. Falsity of particular material witness or material particular would not ruin it H from the beginning to end. [703-E-F] .. ISRAR v. STATE 697 2.2. The maxim 'fa ls us in uno falsus in omnibus" (false in one thing, A false in everything) has no application in India. The maxim has not received general acceptance nor it has come~ to occupy the status of rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to, is that in such cas~~ testimony may be disregarded, and not that it must be disregarded. The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of B evidence which a Court may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called 'a mandatory rule of evidenc
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