IQBAL SINGH versus AVTAR SINGH AND ORS.
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IQBAL SINGH
v.
AVTAR SINGH AND ORS.
JULY 26, 1994
[M.N. VENKATACHALIAH CJI AND R.M. SAHA!, J.J
Representation of the People Act, 1950: Sections 83, IOO(l){b){d) (ii)
and 123.
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Election Petition-A/legation of com1pt practice-Standard of proof-
Each allegation '!'ust be pleaded and proved with necessary details-Dismiss-
al of petition shom of necessary details and materials to support allegations
held valid.
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Corrupt practic,,-Mere allegation of withdrawal of candidate from
election and his immediate appointment to political office held not sufficient
to prove corrupt practice.
The appellant, a defeated candidate in the assembly elections of 1992
from an assembly constituency filed a petition, under section 80 of the
E Representation of the People Act, 1951, challenging the election of the
returned candidate, respondent No. 1 on the ground that the returned
candidate and respondent No. 3, President of Pradesh of a political party
committee had committed corrupt practice inasmuch as they conspired
and influenced respondent No. 2 to withdraw from the electoral contest
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and as a quid pro quo of the same, appointed him as General Secretary of
the Pradesh [Congress) Committee.
The High Court dismissed the petition holding that (i) it did not
contain a concise statement of material facts setting forth full particulars
of the corrupt practice as required by section 83; (ii) the allegations were
G not sufficient to make out any case of the corrupt practice or any ground
under section 100; and (iii) there was no other material to prove the
allegation of corrupt practice.
I.n app,,a( to this court, it was contended on behalf of the appellant
H that since the returned candidate had not disputed the allegations, it was
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IQBALSINGH v.AVfARSINGH
259
not necessary for the appellant to lead any evidence and it should be A
inferred as a matter of law that the corrupt practice was made out; (ii) the
corrupt practice, covered by section lOO(l)(d)(ii), would extend even to
respondent No. 3 as it was 'committed in the interest of the returned
candidate by an agent other than election agent'.
Dismissing the appeal, this Court
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HELD : 1. Withdrawal of a candidate from the election and his
appointment lo a political office during election period may not be very
proper and conducive to the democratic growth of the election process and
setting up of healthy precedent. Yet even assuming the two facts it may C
utmost give rise to a suspicion but in election law it is not suspicion but
proof which could result In setting aside of election of returned candidate.
Suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof. [263-A-B]
Bisltundeo Narain v. Seogeni Rai, A.I.R. (1951) SC 280; referred to.
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2.1 The allegation made in the election petition was hardly sufficient,
in law, to establish the corrupt practice as vasualised by Section 100 unless
the allegation was proved which required necessary details and material
to support it. Mere allegation that the two conspired, in the absence of any
detail, did not, constitute a plea of corrupt practice, which the returned E
candidate could have been called upon to meet. [263-F-G]
2.2 The bargaining and quid pro quo alleged in the petition were pleas
which were required to be supported by particulars. But mere averment
was not sufficient in law and the appellant cannot claim that since this was
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a fact known to respondents the requirement of law was satisfied by merely
averring it and it was the duty of the respondents to disprove the same.
That is notthe law of burden of proofand certainly not In election matters.
In the absence of statement of fact in the petition which, If proved, may
have given rise to an inference in law, the High Court did not commit any
error in recording the finding that the petition was lacking in material
particulars. [263-H, 264-A-B]
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3. Clause (b) of Section 100 comes into operation if the corrupt
practice as defined in Section 123 of the Act is alleged to have been
committed by the returned candidate. The petition did not disclose that H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
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the returned candidate was in any manner responsible for the withdrawal
of the candidate. No allegation was made nor any details were furnished
which could even, remotely, suggest that the returned candidate was guilty
of corrupt' practice. Therefore, the High Court was right that the allega-
tions in Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.
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