INDU BHUSHAN GUPTA versus STATE OF U.P. & ORS.

Citation: [1980] 1 S.C.R. 179 · Decided: 01-08-1979 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: N.L. UNTWALIA · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

INDU BHUSHAN GUPTA 
v. 
STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 
August 1, 1979 
[N. L. UNTWALIA AND A. P. SEN, JJ.] 
UP. Zamindari & Land Reforms Act, 1950 Ss. 6, 289(1), 291(3)-Scope 
of-Taccavi loan taken by agriculturist-If could be deducted from compensa~ 
lion payable to him for abolition of Zamindaris. 
The appellant and the sixth respondent, who were brothers, constituted a 
A 
B 
joint Hindu family. 
Though younger in age than the sixth respondent, 
the 
C 
appellant by virtue of a settlen1ent, became Karfit of the joint family. 
The 
family o\vnc<l vast Zamindari properties, one of which was a• 
Farn1 known as 
Mukundpur Farm. For the improve1nent of the Farm the 
appellant 
took 
taccaiii loan by offering his half share in the joint family property as security. 
On his failure to repay the loan the Collector of the District ordered attach· 
rnent of the hypothecated property under s. 150 of the U.P. Land Revenue 
Act, 190i'. The appellant ·alleged that as a result of the partition of properties 
D 
between him and his brother the hypothecated property fell to the share of his 
brother, that under the compromise decree his brother 
undertook 
to 
dis· 
charge the loan and that therefore it was he who was responsible for repay-
ment of the loan. 
(The Government, however was not impleaded as a party 
to the suit in \\'hich compromise was arrived at between the brothers.) 
Sometime later the sixth respondent resiled from the compromise decree 
E 
and stated that he was not liable to repay the loan because it was not taken by 
the .appellant in his capacity as Karta of the joint family but that it was taken 
only in his (appellant's) personal capacity and that, therefore, he alone was 
liable to repay it. The Collector made enquiries and held that the loan was 
taken by the appellant in his individual capacity and not as Karta of the joint 
family and held that he was personally liable to repay the loan. EventuaHy 
it was decided that the realisation of the dues should be made from the hypo-
F 
thecated property as well as from his person and accordingly proceedings for 
realisation of the principal and interest on the loan were started. 
The High Court rejected the appellant's writ petition. In appeal the follow-
ing three questions Vt'ere raised. 
(I) whether the taccavi loan was taken by 
the appellant as Karta of the joint family, and, therefore, had to be recovered 
from the sixth respondent to whose share the hypothecated property had fallen 
in the partition ·of. the property; (2) Whether the Collector was precluded from 
taking resort to any one or other i:nodes prescribed by s. 7 (1) of the land Im· 
provement Loans Act, 1883 for recovery of the sum 
remaining 
unrealised 
towards the taccavi loan; (3) Whether the Government had no right to recover 
the outstanding amount due except from the compensation amount in terms 
of s.6(e) thereof? 
HELD : I. The loan in question was taken by the appellant in his individual 
ctlpacity and not as Karta of the joirit family .. By the terms of the taccavi bond 
the appellant had bound him.elf to discharge the liability from his property. Even 
G 
H 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
180 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1980] l S.C.K. 
assuming that he took the loan as Karta, he was personally and severally liable 
to pay. In the compromise suit the Government was not made a party and, 
therefore, was not bound by the terms of the compromise decree; nor ~'as the 
Government bound by the ·alleged partition effected between the appellant and the 
sixth respondent. 
[185-D-E; 186C] 
2. (a) Section 7(1) of the Land Improvement Loans Act empowers the Col-
lector to recover taccavi dues from the defaulter as UTrears of land revenue and 
the Collector could have taken resort to s. 289(1) of the U.P. Zamindari Aboli-
tion and Land Reforms Act, 1950, for the recovery of the unrealised amount of 
raccavi loan by attacb1nent and sales of properties belonging to the appellant. 
Section 289 applies only to those cases in which the provision of s. 243(1) 
have been made applicable and it is nobody's case that a notification couten1-
plated by s. 243 (2) was ever issued. The question of s. 289 (2) operating as a 
bar to the recovery proceedings upon expiry of period of three years, therefore, 
does not arise. 
Ifs. 289(2) is read in the context of sub-s. (1) 
it \Vill be 
clear that upon the expiry of the period of three years the village bas to be 
restored free of claim on the part of the Government for any arrear o

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