INDU BHUSAN BOSE versus RAMA SUNDARI DEVI & ANR.
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443 A INDU BHUSAN BOSE v. RAMA SUNDARI DEVI & ANR. April 29, 1969 B [M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J., J. M. SHELAT, V. BHARGAVA, c D E F G K. S. HEGDE AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.] Constitution of India, 7th Schedule, Entry 3, List I-If grants exclu· sive power to Parliament to legislate covering all cspects of house accom· modation in cantonment areas, including on relationships of landlord and tenant. The first respondent, who was the owner of certain premises situated within the cantonment area of Barrackpore filed a suit for the appellant's eviction from the premises. In the plaint it was claimed that the appellant was not entitled to the protection of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 12 of 1956, the regulation of house accommodation including control of rents being a subject in Entry 3 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, the State Legislature could not competently enact a law on the same subject for Cantoriment areas and the extension of the Act to the cantonment area was ultra vires and void. Upon the Trial Court making a reference under s. 113 C.P.C. to the High Court for a decision of the constitutional question, that court upheld the first respondent's contention. In appeal to this Court it was contended that the High Court was in error in holding that the field of legislation covered by the Act, which is primarily concerned with control of rents and eviction of tenants, is included in the expression ';regulation of house accommodation in can- tonment areas" used in Entry 3 List I, regulation of house accommodation will not include within it laws or rules on the subject of relationship of landlord and tenant of buildings situated in the cantonment areas. On the other hand according to the appellant, legislation on this subject can be made either under entry 18 of List II, or entries 6, 7 and 13 of List III, so that a State Legislature is competent to legislate and regulate relation- ship between landlord and tenant in the cantonment areas; that under Entry 3 List I Parliament is empowered to legislate in respect of house accom- modation situated in cantonment areas only to the extent that house accom- modation is needed for military purposes and. laws are required for requisi- tioning or otherwise obtaining possession of that accommodation for such purposes. The alternative submission made was that regulation of house accommodation by parliamentary law should be confined to houses acquir· ed requisitioned or allotted for military pulrposes. Entry 3, List I, a~ording to the appellant, should not be read as giving Parliament the power to legislate on the relationship of landlord and tenant in respect of houses situated in cantonment areas if such houses are let out privately by a private owner to his tenant and have nothing at all to do with the requirements of the military. HELD : Dismissing the appeal, H When power is granted to Parliament under Entry 3 List I to make laws for the regulation of house accommodation in cantonment areas, there are no qualifying words to indicate that the house accommo- dation, which is to be subject to such legislation, must be accommodation 4'4 SUPREME OOURT REPOR.TS [1970] l S.C.R. required for mili!aly purposes, or must be. accommodation that has already A been acquired, requisitioned or allotted to the military. [447B] When legislating in respect of local self-government in cantonment areas, it is obvious that Parliament will have to legislate for the entire can- tonment area including portions of it which may be in possession of civilians and not military authorities or military ofllccrs. Similarly, the powers of the cantonment authorities, which could be granted by legisla- tion by Parliament, cannot be confined to th""<' areas or bu~dings which B are in actual possession of military authorities or officers and must be in ~t of the entire cantonment area including those buildings and lands which may be in actual ownership as well as occupation of civilians. In these circumstances, tlierc is no reason to narrow down the scope of le)lislation on regulation of house accommodation and oonfine it to houses which are required <Yr are actually in possession of military authorities or military officers. [447F-H] C 1be word "regulation" cannot be so narrowly interpreted as to be con- fined to allotment only an.J not to other incidents, such as termination of existing tenancies and eviction of
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