INDIRA SOHANLAL versus USTODIAN OF EVACUEE PROPERTY, DELHI & OTHERS.
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1117
also not only reasonable but called for in the circum-
stances, which occasioned the Evacuee Property laws.
In this case the petitioner is deprived of his bargain
and incurs consequential loss, not by virtue of any
unconstitutional law
but by reason of the
quasi-
judicial order of the Custodian declining to confirm
the transaction. The contention of the learned coun-
sel for the petitioner that any fundamental right of
his has been violated must, therefore, be reiected.
Learned counsel next urges that the action of the
Custodian in basing his decision on some circular of
the Custodian-General is illegal and that it is not re-
levant material under section 5-A. It is enough to
say that even if this contention be correct, this does
not raise
any
question of violation of fundamental
rights. If this is the sole ground, this application is
misconceived.
ยท
This petition accordingly fails and is dismissed but
in the circuqistances without costs.
INDIRA SOHANLAL
ti.
CUSTODIAN OF EVACUEE PROPERTY,
DELHI & OTHERS.
[S. R. DAs, AcTING C. J., VIVIAN BosE, JAGANNADHA-
DAS, JAFER IMAM and CttANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]
Evacuee
Pt'Dperty-Custodian-General-Revisional
powers-
Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 (XXXI of 1950), ss.
27, 58(3)-Transaction before the passing of the Act-Application for
confirmation-East Punjab Evacttees'
(Administration of Property)
Act, 1947 (East Punjab Act XIV of 1947), ss. 5-A, 5-B-Order of
confirmation .afte1ยท passing of Act XXXI of 1950-Revision-Vali-
dity-General Clauses Act (X of 1897), s. 6-Applicability.
The appellant, a displaced person from Lahore, was the owner
o( a house there and on the 10th of October, 1947, she arranged to
have it exchanged with certain lands in a village in the State of
Delhi, belonging to M, an evacuee. On the 23rd of February, 1948,
she made an application to the Additional Custodian
of Evacuee
Property (Rural), Delhi, for
confirmation of the transaction of ex-
1955
Sadhll Ram
v.
The Custodian-
Gentral of Evacuee
Property
JagannadhadaJ ].
1955
Octob<r 28.
1955
Indirtl Sohonlal
v.
Cust.Jian of
&acuu Property,
Delhi and othtrs
1118
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
change under s. 5-A of the East Punjab Evacuees' {Administration
of Property) Act, 1947, as amended in 1948 and applied to the State
of Delhi. Under s. 5-B of the Act an order if passed by the Custo-
dian or Additional Custodian would not be subject to appeal or revi-
sion, and would become final and conclusive.
But the application
\.Vas not disposed of until the 20th of March, 1952, and on that date
ยท the Additional Custodian passed an order confirming the exchange.
In the 1neanwhile~ there were changes in the la\v relating to evacuee
property by \Vhich the East Punjab Act as applied to the State of
Delhi v1as repealed and re-enacted, and ultimately Central Act XXXI
of 1950 was passed which, among other
things, conferred by s. 27
revisional powers on the Custodian-General. The Custodian-General
issued a notice under s. 7.7 to the appellant and, after hearing her,
set aside the order of confirmation and directed the matter to be re-
considered by the Custodian,
It was
contended for the
appellant
that the order of confirmation by the Additional Custodian was not
open to revision, on the ground that on the filing of the application
in 1948 the appellant got a vested right to have it determined under
s. 5-A, with the attribute of finality and conclusiveness under s. 5-B
attaching to such determination, and that the subsequent repe3l and
re-enactment of these provisions cannot affect
such a right, in view
of s. 6 of the General Clauses Act,
and s. 58(3) of Act XXXI of
1950.
Held, (i) that s. 6 of~ General Clauses Act (X. oj 1897) was
not applicable to the case, as s. 58(\) ~\ Act XXXI 'of 1950 was a
self-contained provision
indicative "f the intention to e:icclude the
operatic n of s. 6 ;
(ii) that the right to a determination with the attribute of fina-
lity, assuming that such a right exists, is not a vested right and it
does not accrue until the determination is in fact made, ~1hen alone
it becon1es an existing right.
Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving ([1905] A.C. 369)
and Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Income-tar Com-
missioner ( [ 1927] J.L.R. 9 Lah. 284 ; 54 I.A. 421 ), distinguished;
(iii) that the words "the repeal
shall not affect the previous
operation of Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.
Lex