INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. THROUGH ITS SENIOR MANAGER versus M/S SHREE GANESH PETROLEUM RAJGURUNAGAR THROUGH ITS PROPRIETOR MR. LAXMAN DAGDU THITE
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A B C D E F G H 450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 16 S.C.R. INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. THROUGH ITS SENIOR MANAGER v. M/S SHREE GANESH PETROLEUM RAJGURUNAGAR THROUGH ITS PROPRIETOR MR. LAXMAN DAGDU THITE (Civil Appeal Nos. 837-838 of 2022) FEBRUARY 01, 2022 [INDIRA BANERJEE AND ABHAY S. OKA, JJ.] Arbitration And Conciliation Act, 1996 : ss. 34, 37 β Arbitral award β Setting aside of β Parties entered into two agreements, dealership agreement and lease agreement having distinct provisions for reference of the dispute to the arbitrator β Termination of the dealership agreement by the appellant β Appointment of an arbitrator in terms of the agreement β Arbitrator passed an award holding that the termination of the dealership was valid, and increased the monthly lease rent and reduced the period of the lease β Challenge to, by the appellant and the respondent β High Court partly allowed the respondentβs appeal and dismissed the appellantβs appeal holding that there was no scope for the district court to interfere with the award β On appeal, held: An arbitral tribunal being a creature of contract, is bound to act in terms of the contract under which it is constituted β An award can be said to be unquestionably illegal where the arbitral tribunal has failed to act in terms of the specificities of the contract β An arbitral tribunal is entitled to interpret the terms and conditions of a contract, while adjudicating a dispute - An error in interpretation of a contract in a case where there is valid and lawful submission of arbitral disputes to an arbitral tribunal is an error within jurisdiction while adjudicating a dispute β Court does not sit in appeal over the award made by an arbitral tribunal β Court does not ordinarily interfere with the interpretation made by the arbitral tribunal of a contractual provision, unless such interpretation is patently unreasonable or perverse β Impugned award insofar as it pertains to lease rent and lease period is patently beyond the scope of the competence of the arbitrator appointed in terms of the dealership agreement β An arbitral tribunal, or for that matter, the Court cannot alter the terms [2022] 16 S.C.R. 450 450 A B C D E F G H 451 and conditions of a valid contract executed between the parties with their eyes open β Judgment of the High Court set aside, as also of the District Court insofar as the same pertains to lease rent and lease period. Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1 The lease agreement and the dealership agreement are distinct agreements, independent of each other. Disputes under the lease agreement were referrable to the arbitration of the Managing Director of the appellant who was to be the sole Arbitrator, and only if the Managing Director was unable or unwilling to act as sole Arbitrator the disputes were to be referred to the sole Arbitrator designated or nominated by the Managing Director in his place. If the disputes could not be referred to the Managing Director for any reason, the matter was not to be referred to arbitration at all. In the instant case, the respondent invoked the Arbitration Clause under the Dealership Agreement and approached the Director (Marketing) of the appellant who appointed Mr. B.L. Parihar as the sole Arbitrator. The Arbitrator, Mr. B.L. Parihar, nominated by the Director (Marketing) of the appellant had no authority and/or jurisdiction to adjudicate any dispute pertaining to the lease agreement. [Para 32, 33][476-C-F] 1.2 In so far as disputes with regard to lease rent and/or any other conditions of the deed of lease were concerned, the High Court proceeded on the patently erroneous basis that the appellant had not objected to the competence or the authority or jurisdiction of the Arbitrator to entertain and decide disputes with regard to lease agreement, ignoring the specific averments made by the appellant in its counter statement. In its counter statement, the appellant had specifically averred that the alternate prayer of the respondent claiming increase in lease rent to Rs.35,000/- per month with 20% increase in every three years was outside the ambit of the arbitration proceedings. The appellant also asserted categorically that, without challenging the registered lease deed executed by it, the respondent could not seek an order of the Arbitrator, modifying the terms of the lease deed. The High Court also apparently overlooked the fact that the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal to increase the monthly lease rent from I
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