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INDIAN IRON & STEEL CO. LTD. versus BISWANATH SONAR

Citation: [1966] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 15 · Decided: 22-03-1966 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: K.N. WANCHOO · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

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INDIAN IRON & STEEL CO. LTD. 
v. 
BISWANATH SONAR 
March 22, 1966 
[K. N. WANCHOO, M. HIDAYATULLAH AND J. C. SHAH, JJ.] 
Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, s. 9(l)(iii)-Benefit under 
section whether available in case of monthly tenancy-'Term' in sec-
tion whether means agreed term or period of occupation. 
The appellant company gave on lease a piece of land to the res-
pondent in 1938. On June 28, 1950 the company gave notice to the res-
pondent terminating the tenancy. The period mentioned in the notice, 
which was received by the respondent on June 29, 1950 
was six 
monthsΒ· ending with the expiry of December 1950. Later the com-
pany filed a suit for the eviction of the respondent. The latter claim-
ed benefit of s. 9(1) (iii) of the Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act. 
The trial court decreed the suit and the first appellate Court upheld 
the decree, but the High Court set it aside and dismissed the suit. 
By special leave, the company appealed to this Court contending 
that since the respondent's tenancy was from month to month s. 9 
(1) (iii) did not apply, It was urged: (i) the phrase "for a term of 
more than one year but less than twelve years" in the first part of 
the section contemplated tenancies in which the agreed duration 
under a contract was more than: one year but less than 12 years; (ii) 
the phrase "six months' notice expiring with the end of a year of the 
tenancy" in the latter part of the section meant that the notice in 
writing must expire with the end of the year of the tenancy when 
the tenancy was from year to year and with the end of the term 
when it was more than one year's duration. 
HELD: (i) The Act uses the word "term" both in the sense of a 
period of occupation and of a perfod agreed upon in a contract. The 
context must determine the sense in which it is to be understood. In 
the opening words of s. 9(1) (iii) it means that the land must be held, 
that is, occupied, for more than one year. It does not signify that there 
should be an agreed term of more than one year. [18 C-D; 19C; 20E] 
(ii) The words "end of a year of tenancy" in the latter part of s. 
9(1) (iii) are no doubt indicative of a tenancy from year to year but 
they are not such as to be inapplicable to a tenancy from month to 
month. What the section conterflplates is occupation for more than 
one year and it says that a tenant who has held the land for more than 
a year, dbeit, on a tenancy from month to month, shall only be evic-
ted on the anniversary od' the day on which his tenancy commences. 
[20 F-H]. 
Β· 
(iii) The tenancy having commenced as held by the High Court 
on December 1, 1938 the notice given by the company in the present 
case fell short of the statutory six months and was therefore in-
valid. [21 E-G]. 
C!vrL APPELLATE JuRrsmcnoN: Civil Appeal No. 1090 of 
1963. 
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated 
June 2, 1961 of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal from Appellate 
Decree No. 786 of 1956. 
M. C. Setalvad and D. N. Mukherjee, for the appellant. 
A. K. Sen and P. K. Chatterjee, for the respondent. 
16 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(1966] 
SUPP. S.C.R. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
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Hidayatullab, J. This appeal by special leave against the 
judgment and order of the High Court of Calcutta, December 5, 
1961, arises from a suit between landlord and tenant. The Indian 
Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. (appellant) is the landlord and Biswanath 
Sonar (respondent) is the tenant, and the tenancy is in respect of a 
B 
piece of land with a rent of Rs. 4 /- per month. According to the 
Company the tenancy commenced in December 1938 and according 
to the tenant in the beginning of 1935. The two courts of fact have 
found in favour of the Company on this point and the High Court 
has very properly accepted this concurrent finding but has held that 
tenancy began on the 1st of December, 1938, but more of that later. 
The suit was commenced in the Court of the Munsif at Asansol by 
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the Company after serving a notice dated June 28, 1950 terminating 
the alleged monthly tenancy of the respondent with the expiry of 
December, 1950. The notice was served on June 29, 1950. The 
Company asked for the relief of khas possession by evicting the 
tenant and reserved the relief of compensation for wrongful occu-
pation after January 1, 1951, for a separate suit. The Company 
offered to pay such reasonable compensation for structures on the 
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land as the court

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