INDIA TOBACCO CO. L1D. versus THE COMMERCIAL TAX OFFICER, BHAVANIPORE & ORS.

Citation: [1975] 2 S.C.R. 612 · Decided: 05-11-1974 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: HANS RAJ KHANNA · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

612 
INDIA TOBACCO CO. L1D. 
v. 
THE COMMERCIAL TAX OFFICER, BHAV ANIPORE & ORS. 
November 5, 1974 
[H. R. KHANNA, R. S. SA!ucARIA AND A. C. GUPTA, JJ.] 
Interpretation of statutes-Repeal, nature of-Bengal Finance ·(Sales Tax) 
Act, 1941, if repealed, with regard to cigarettes by West Bengal Sales Tax Act, 
1954-West Bengal Sales Tax (.'4.mendment) A.ct, 1958-EjJect of, 
Under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941, the definitions of 'goods' 
and 'dealer' are very comprehensive and general, and 1hey cover 'clgarettes' and 
a dealer in cigarettes. Under s. 5(2)(a)(ii), a dealer would be entitled to pur· 
chase free of tax goods required by him for use in the manufacture of cigarettes. 
Section 23 of the West Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1954, excepts everything relating 
to cigarettes from the operations of the 1941-Act, save to the extent indicated 
in the proviso to that section, which retains the benefit under s. 5(2)(a)(ii) of 
the 1941-Act. As a conscquen::e of the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods 
of Special Importance) Act, 1957 (Central Act ·58 of 1957), the West Bengal 
State legislature passed the West Bengal Sales Tax (Amendment) 
Act, 1958. 
This Act amended the 1954 Act, hy substitutini the words 'certain notified com-
modities' for the words 'cigarettes and other commodities.' .Tue 1958-Act also 
substituted new ss. 23 and 25 in the 1954-Act. Under the new s, 25, the 
1954-Act can be made applieabk: by a notification only to a. commodity 'which 
is liable to taxation under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941' and fur· 
ther, the 1941-Act 'shall cease to apply to such commodity' and the 1954· 
Act shall apply to such commodity, only from the date of such notification,. 
The appellant-company Claimed that as a result of the 1958-Act, the 1941· 
Act was applicable to cigarettes and as such it was entitled to the benefit of 
s. 5(2)(a)(ii) of the 1941-Act and ·that the Sales Tax Authorities were not 
competent to amend the registration certificate issued to it under the 1941-Act. 
The Commercial Tax Officer rejected the contention al)d asked the appellant for 
its registration certificate for amendment and deletion of exemption. The al!Pll· 
!ant file:d a writ petition in the High Court, challenging the threatened action, 
and the. writ petition was allowed by a Single Judge. 
In LP. Appeal, the Division Ben.ch of the High Court held that the 1954· 
Act had the effect of completely repealing the 1941·Act, in relation to ciga-
rettes, that the 1958-AJC! did not revive the operation of the 1941-Act and 
that since the 1941-Act stood completely obliterated from the statute book in 
relation to cigarettes, no sales tax would be payable in regard thereto either 
under 1954-Act or under the 1!~41·Act, and that therefore, the appellant was 
not entitled to any certificate of registration under the. 1941-Act. 
Allowing the appeal to this COurt, 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
HELD : 
( 1 ) The general rule of construction is that the repeal of a repeal. 
ing Act does not revive anything repealed thereby. 
But the operation of the 
G 
rnle is not absolute and is subject to the appearance of a 'different intention' in 
the repealing statute, which may lie explicit or implicit Repeal connotes abroga-
tion or obliteration of one statute by another, from the statute book, as-
com· 
pletcly as it if had never been .Passed. When an Act is repealed, it must be con-
sidered (excePt as to transactton1 past and closed) 85 if it had never existed. 
Repeal is not a matter of form but one of substance;, depending UJ><!n the inten-
tion of the Legislature. If th• inte11tion was to .abrogate or wipe Off the former 
enactment, wholly or in part, then it would be a ca'IC of total or pro tanto re· 
peal. If the intention was mercl:~ to ·modify the former enactment by engraft· 
H 
ing an exception or granting an e~emption, or by super-adding conditions, or by 
restricting, intercepting or suspcoding its operation, such modification would not 
amount to a repeal. 
[6170-B. F-H] 
A 
8 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
INDIA TOBACCO co. LTD. v. c.r.o. (Sarkaria, /.) 
613 
Kay v. Goodwin, [1830] 6 Bing 576 at p. 582; Surtees v. Ellison, (1829) 
9 
B & C 750 at p. 752; State of Orissa v. M. A. Tulloch & Co., A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 
1284 and Mount v. Taylor referred to. 
(2) The High Court was wron~ in holding that s. 23 of the 1954-Act re-
peals the 1941-Act with regard to cigarettes and thllt cl. (ii) of its proviso does 
not save the operation of s. S of the 1941-Act b

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