LexaceLexace Ask the AI ›
⚖️ Ask the AI about your situation:🚗 Car Accident💼 Work / Job🏠 Housing / Eviction👪 Family / Divorce📋 Contract Dispute💰 Money Owed

INDIA ELECTRIC WORKS LTD. versus JAMES MANTOSH & ANR.

Citation: [1971] 2 S.C.R. 397 · Decided: 15-09-1970 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: J.C. SHAH · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 1 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this case

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
B 
c 
D 
G 
H 
397 
INDIA ELECTRIC WORKS LTD. 
v. 
JAMES MANTQSH & ANR. 
September 15, 1970 
[J, C. SHAH, K. S. HEGDE AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.] 
Indian Limitation Act (9 ~ 1908), s. 14 'Othe~ cause of a like nature,' 
scope of. 
The plaintiff filed a money suit claiming rent in respect <if certain 
structures, for the -period upto the date of suit and for future 
rent as 
damages. It was decreed by the trial court in its entirety, but the High 
Court negatived the claim for future damages on the . sole ground that in 
a pure money suit, no decree could be granted for recovery of compensa-
tion after the date of suit or after the date of decree ,The plaintilfs 
then filed a suit claiming damages for the period upto the 
date 
of 
the second suit which included the period for which the claim· 
was di!allowed in the frrst suit. 
As the total period was more than 
3 years, protection from limitation 'for the period beyond 3 years 
was ·. 
claimed under ;, 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908, by deducting the time 
during which the earlier suit was prosecuted, and also on general principles, 
The cause of action for the two suits was the saine and it was found . 
that the previous suit 'had been prosecuted in good faith and with due 
deligence. 
HELD : The plaintiff was entitled to deduct the time during which 
the ea·rJier suit was pending. 
(Per Shah and Gro\er, JJ.) : The tondition for the applicability of 
s. 14(1) to the present case is that the court in which the previous suit 
was filed should have been unable to entertain ·the claim 
relating to 
future mesne profits, 'from defect of jurisdiction or 'other cause of a 
like nature'. The words 'other cause of a like nature' must be construed 
liberally and two constructions have been placed upon the words. (a) 
In Nrityamoni Dassi v. Lakhan Chandra, I.L.R. [1916) 43 Cal. 660 (P.C.) 
it, was held that if there was an effective decree by a competent court 
capable of being enforced until it was set aside, the period of litigation 
of that suit was deductible from the period of limitation for a second 
suit filed for that same relief; and (b) in Jaikishan Singh v. People• Bank, 
I.L.R. [1944) Lah. 451(F.B.j it was held that the defect must have been 
of such a character as to make it impossible for the court to ·entertain 
the suit or application in its inception, or at any rate, prevent it from 
deciding the matter on merits. [400 G-H; 401 C; 402 B, F-G] 
In the present case, either of the tests is applicable, because, {a) In 
the earlier money suit the trial court had passed a decree for recovery 
of future mesne profits, which was effective till the High Court lie! it 
aside; or 
(b) It could not he said that the previous money·suit was altogether 
111isconceived, and therefore, the defect in it was of such a nature that 
it had to be decided before the claim could be disposed of on merits. 
[403 I'!] 
Makhan Lal Matlak v. Girish Chandra 66 C.W.N. 692, referred to. 
The general principle deduced in Narayan Jiwiji Patil v. Khandappa-
gauda Patil. I.L.R. [1939'] Born. 173, fr<?m various p~onounce.ments of 
the Privy Council 
that 
where 
a 
claim 
was 
satisfied 
either 
by 
398 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(1971] 2 S.C.R. 
agreement of parties or by a decree of court, and. if t)le satisfaction or 
the decree was set aside subsequently in a judicial proceeding a fresh 
cause O'f action would accrue in favour of the claimant, was not relied 
upon because, s. 14(1) was applicable to the present case. [404 A-B, CJ 
(Per Hcgde, J.) : Section 14'(1) in terms does not apply, but in 
Mst. Ranee Sumo Moyee v. Shooshee M~khee, 12 M.I.A. 244 it was 
held by the Judicial Committee that a daim which is satisfied, an expres-
sion held to include even getting a decree on a claim, if reopened because 
of the decree of the appellate court or otherwise, a new cause of action 
accrues to the plaintiff on the date the earlier satisfaction is taken away. 
This view has held the field for a long time and it is 
not in public 
interest to disturb it. · Applying the mle to the facts of $e present case, 
a new cause df action 111ust be deemed to have accrued to the plaintiff 
in respect of the mesne profits under dispute on the date the decree 
of the trial court was set aside by the High Court. 
[ 404 D-G] 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals No. 1646 of 
1966. 
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated April 11, 1963 
of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal from Original Decree No. 
306 of 195

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.